Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data

[Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>]

On 02/08/2013 04:50 PM, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> On 02/08/2013 08:04 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>> On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
>> should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
>> with e.g. auth keys when released.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
>
> I'll ack this, but the whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time.  Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.  It might be nice to clean that up too.

Put on my todo list for follow-up patches, thanks.

> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
>
> -vlad
>
>> ---
>>   net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++
>>   1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
>> index 17a001b..1a9c5fb 100644
>> --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
>> +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
>> @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
>>   /* Final destructor for endpoint.  */
>>   static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
>>   {
>> +    int i;
>> +
>>       SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
>>
>>       /* Free up the HMAC transform. */
>> @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
>>       sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
>>       sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
>>
>> +    for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
>> +        memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
>> +
>>       /* Remove and free the port */
>>       if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
>>           sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);
>>
>
>
> c
> If