* [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304
@ 2016-09-23 8:48 Anuj Mittal
2016-09-23 8:56 ` Maxin B. John
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Anuj Mittal @ 2016-09-23 8:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
Reference:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt
Upstream fix:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a7771c15b
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anujx.mittal@intel.com>
---
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59d66f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 10:08:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
+sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
+be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
+Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
+default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
+Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
+problem but I could not find any other issues.
+
+CVE-2016-6304
+
+Issue reported by Shi Lei.
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-6304
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a7771c15b
+
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anujx.mittal@intel.com>
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fbcf2e6..e4b4e27 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2316,6 +2316,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size)
+ goto err;
++
++ /*
++ * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
++ * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
++ */
++ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
++ OCSP_RESPID_free);
++ if (dsize > 0) {
++ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
++ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
++ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ } else {
++ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
++ }
++
+ while (dsize > 0) {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ int idsize;
+@@ -2335,13 +2352,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
+- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+- return 0;
+- }
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
index c8444d3..c369d01 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://find.pl;subdir=${BP}/util/ \
file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
file://openssl-util-perlpath.pl-cwd.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919"
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304
2016-09-23 8:48 [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304 Anuj Mittal
@ 2016-09-23 8:56 ` Maxin B. John
2016-09-23 9:06 ` Paul Eggleton
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Maxin B. John @ 2016-09-23 8:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Anuj Mittal; +Cc: openembedded-core
Hi,
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 04:48:37PM +0800, Anuj Mittal wrote:
> Reference:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt
>
> Upstream fix:
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a7771c15b
>
> Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anujx.mittal@intel.com>
> ---
> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++
Mid air collision with Patrick's patch.
http://lists.openembedded.org/pipermail/openembedded-core/2016-September/126840.html
Regards,
Maxin
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304
2016-09-23 8:56 ` Maxin B. John
@ 2016-09-23 9:06 ` Paul Eggleton
2016-09-23 15:20 ` Patrick Ohly
2016-09-23 16:59 ` akuster808
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Paul Eggleton @ 2016-09-23 9:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core; +Cc: Patrick Ohly, Armin Kuster
On Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:56:41 Maxin B. John wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 04:48:37PM +0800, Anuj Mittal wrote:
> > Reference:
> > https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt
> >
> > Upstream fix:
> > https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a
> > 7771c15b
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anujx.mittal@intel.com>
> > ---
> >
> > .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch | 75
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++
> Mid air collision with Patrick's patch.
I guess for krogoth and jethro we have the choice of applying just this fix or
the upgrade. Looking over the commits for 1.0.2i it does look like quite a lot
more than the list of CVEs in the recent security advisory were fixed, and
it's somewhat concerning that the 1.0.2i release went out with an apparently
compile-breaking typo in it (subsequently fixed, patch applied in Patrick's
upgrade).
Cheers,
Paul
--
Paul Eggleton
Intel Open Source Technology Centre
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304
2016-09-23 9:06 ` Paul Eggleton
@ 2016-09-23 15:20 ` Patrick Ohly
2016-09-26 12:40 ` Alexander Kanavin
2016-09-23 16:59 ` akuster808
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Patrick Ohly @ 2016-09-23 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Eggleton; +Cc: openembedded-core, Armin Kuster
[resending from my Intel account, the one on GMX isn't subscribed]
On Fri, 2016-09-23 at 21:06 +1200, Paul Eggleton wrote:
> On Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:56:41 Maxin B. John wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 04:48:37PM +0800, Anuj Mittal wrote:
> > > Reference:
> > > https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt
> > >
> > > Upstream fix:
> > > https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a
> > > 7771c15b
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anujx.mittal@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch | 75
> > > ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > Mid air collision with Patrick's patch.
>
> I guess for krogoth and jethro we have the choice of applying just this fix or
> the upgrade. Looking over the commits for 1.0.2i it does look like quite a lot
> more than the list of CVEs in the recent security advisory were fixed, and
> it's somewhat concerning that the 1.0.2i release went out with an apparently
> compile-breaking typo in it (subsequently fixed, patch applied in Patrick's
> upgrade).
The compile error is inside an #ifdef, so it could be that just that
particular configuration hadn't been tested. But yes, one has to wonder.
So what's preferred for OE-core master and the 2.2 release? Updating to
1.0.2i or backporting the critical patch?
I don't have any strong opinion either way myself.
--
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly
The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304
2016-09-23 9:06 ` Paul Eggleton
2016-09-23 15:20 ` Patrick Ohly
@ 2016-09-23 16:59 ` akuster808
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: akuster808 @ 2016-09-23 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Eggleton, openembedded-core; +Cc: Patrick Ohly, Armin Kuster
On 09/23/2016 02:06 AM, Paul Eggleton wrote:
> On Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:56:41 Maxin B. John wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 04:48:37PM +0800, Anuj Mittal wrote:
>>> Reference:
>>> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt
>>>
>>> Upstream fix:
>>> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a
>>> 7771c15b
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anujx.mittal@intel.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-6304.patch | 75
>>> ++++++++++++++++++++++
>> Mid air collision with Patrick's patch.
> I guess for krogoth and jethro we have the choice of applying just this fix or
> the upgrade.
The last time we upgraded openssl, we broke stuff in other layers. I am
more nervous about upgrading jethro than krogoth do to the age of the
other packages openssl supports.
> Looking over the commits for 1.0.2i it does look like quite a lot
> more than the list of CVEs in the recent security advisory were fixed,
Its hard to say at this time if some of the other commits are in support
of a CVE fix.
- armin
> and
> it's somewhat concerning that the 1.0.2i release went out with an apparently
> compile-breaking typo in it (subsequently fixed, patch applied in Patrick's
> upgrade).
>
> Cheers,
> Paul
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304
2016-09-23 15:20 ` Patrick Ohly
@ 2016-09-26 12:40 ` Alexander Kanavin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Kanavin @ 2016-09-26 12:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
On 09/23/2016 06:20 PM, Patrick Ohly wrote:
> The compile error is inside an #ifdef, so it could be that just that
> particular configuration hadn't been tested. But yes, one has to wonder.
>
> So what's preferred for OE-core master and the 2.2 release? Updating to
> 1.0.2i or backporting the critical patch?
>
> I don't have any strong opinion either way myself.
Meanwhile, 1.0.2j is out :) I'd say for master we should just go ahead
and update to that.
Alex
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-09-26 12:42 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2016-09-23 8:48 [master][PATCH] openssl: security fix CVE-2016-6304 Anuj Mittal
2016-09-23 8:56 ` Maxin B. John
2016-09-23 9:06 ` Paul Eggleton
2016-09-23 15:20 ` Patrick Ohly
2016-09-26 12:40 ` Alexander Kanavin
2016-09-23 16:59 ` akuster808
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