From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 11:16:57 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A28029.2060608@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160122171954.GA3945@davidb.org>
On 1/22/16 9:19 AM, David Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:08:34AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and uses
>> it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. Also
>> adds a new kernel parameter to help debug future use and adds an lkdtm
>> test to check the results.
>
> I've tested these patches on 32-bit ARM using the provoke-crashes
> test. However, they do require CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS to be enabled
> as well, which does incur additional memory usage.
>
> Do we want to consider making CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS default y for
> security reasons, and just document that memory-constrained systems
> may want to turn it off?
>
> I'll test the arm64 next.
>
> David
Kees had previously pushed a patch to do so but it exposed a couple of
underlying issues, mostly with low power paths
(c.f. http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.ports.arm.kernel/471199,
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.mm/143489)
Those will need to be all fixed up before this could be made default.
Thanks,
Laura
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-22 19:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-19 18:08 [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] asm-generic: consolidate mark_rodata_ro() Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-20 2:09 ` Joe Perches
2016-01-20 2:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2016-01-22 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 23:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-22 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] param: convert some "on"/"off" users " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-27 21:11 ` David Brown
2016-01-27 21:11 ` David Brown
2016-01-27 21:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-27 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 0:09 ` [PATCH] arm64: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional David Brown
2016-01-28 0:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-01-28 0:09 ` David Brown
2016-01-28 0:09 ` David Brown
2016-01-28 0:09 ` David Brown
2016-01-28 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 0:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 8:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28 8:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28 8:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28 8:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28 8:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28 11:06 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:06 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:59 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59 ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 15:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] init: create cmdline param to disable readonly Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] x86: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] lkdtm: verify that __ro_after_init works correctly Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-19 19:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-19 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-20 2:51 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-01-20 2:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2016-01-20 2:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-20 2:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-20 2:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-22 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory David Brown
2016-01-22 17:19 ` David Brown
2016-01-22 19:16 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2016-01-22 19:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-22 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-23 9:49 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2016-01-23 9:49 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2016-02-16 21:36 ` [PATCH] ARM: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only David Brown
2016-02-16 21:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-02-16 21:36 ` David Brown
2016-02-16 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-16 21:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-02-16 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-16 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 5:20 ` David Brown
2016-02-17 5:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-02-17 5:20 ` David Brown
2016-02-17 5:20 ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:43 ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-02-17 23:43 ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:43 ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-02-18 10:46 ` PaX Team
2016-02-18 10:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-02-18 10:46 ` PaX Team
2016-02-18 10:46 ` PaX Team
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