[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Mark Rutland]

This patch is a followup to the discussion in [1].

When using KASAN and CPU idle and/or CPU hotplug, KASAN leaves the stack shadow
poisoned on exit from the kernel, and this poison is later hit when a CPU is
brought online and reuses that portion of the stack. Hitting the poison depends
on stackframe layout, so the bug only manifests in some configurations.

I think that the hotplug issue is generic, and x86 is affected. I couldn't spot
magic around idle, so x86 may be fine there. It would be great if someone
familiar with the x86 code could prove/disprove either of those assertions.

If x86 is affected, it likely makes sense to unpoison the stack in common code
prior to bringing a CPU online to avoid that.

For idle I'm not keen on having to perform a memset of THREAD_SIZE/8 every time
a CPU re-enters the kernel. I don't yet have numbers for how bad that is, but
it doesn't sound good.

Thanks,
Mark.

[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-February/408961.html

---->8----
When a CPU is shut down or placed into a low power state, the functions
on the critical path to firmware never return, and hence their epilogues
never execute. When using KASAN, this means that the shadow entries for
the corresponding stack are poisoned but never unpoisoned. When a CPU
subsequently re-enters the kernel via another path, and begins using
the stack, it may hit stale poison values, leading to false-positive
KASAN failures.

We can't ensure that all functions on the critical path are not
instrumented. For CPU hotplug this includes lots of core code starting
from secondary_start_kernel, and for CPU idle we can't ensure that
specific functions are not instrumented, as the compiler always poisons
the stack even when told to not instrument a function:

https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69863

This patch works around the issue by forcefully unpoisoning the shadow
region for all stack on the critical path, before we return to
instrumented C code. As we cannot statically determine the stack usage
of code in the critical path, we must clear the shadow for all remaining
stack, meaning that we must clear up to 2K of shadow memory each time a
CPU enters the kernel from idle or hotplug.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h  | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S        |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S       |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
index 2774fa3..b75b171 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -1,10 +1,30 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_KASAN_H
 #define __ASM_KASAN_H
 
-#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-
+#ifndef LINKER_SCRIPT
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove stale shadow posion for the stack left over from a prior
+	 * hot-unplug or idle exit, covering up to offset bytes above the
+	 * current stack pointer. Shadow poison above this is preserved.
+	 */
+	.macro kasan_unpoison_stack offset=0
+	add	x1, sp, #\offset
+	and	x0, x1, #~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)
+	add	x0, x0, #THREAD_INFO_SIZE
+	and	x1, x1, #(THREAD_SIZE - 1)
+	sub	x1, x1, #THREAD_INFO_SIZE
+	bl	kasan_unpoison_shadow
+	.endm
+
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 
@@ -30,9 +50,17 @@
 void kasan_init(void);
 asmlinkage void kasan_early_init(void);
 
-#else
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+	.macro kasan_unpoison_stack offset
+	.endm
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY */
 static inline void kasan_init(void) { }
-#endif
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+#endif /* LINKER_SCRIPT */
+#endif /* __ASM_KASAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index fffa4ac6..c615fa3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int main(void)
   DEFINE(TI_ADDR_LIMIT,		offsetof(struct thread_info, addr_limit));
   DEFINE(TI_TASK,		offsetof(struct thread_info, task));
   DEFINE(TI_CPU,		offsetof(struct thread_info, cpu));
+  DEFINE(THREAD_INFO_SIZE,	sizeof(struct thread_info));
   BLANK();
   DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));
   BLANK();
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index ffe9c2b..a0c3ec7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/cache.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/kasan.h>
 #include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
@@ -611,6 +612,7 @@ ENTRY(__secondary_switched)
 	and	x0, x0, #~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)
 	msr	sp_el0, x0			// save thread_info
 	mov	x29, #0
+	kasan_unpoison_stack
 	b	secondary_start_kernel
 ENDPROC(__secondary_switched)
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
index e33fe33..3b95841 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
+#include <asm/kasan.h>
 
 	.text
 /*
@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
 ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
 	.popsection
 cpu_resume_after_mmu:
+	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
 	mov	x0, #0			// return zero on success
 	ldp	x19, x20, [sp, #16]
 	ldp	x21, x22, [sp, #32]
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Mark Rutland]

This patch is a followup to the discussion in [1].

When using KASAN and CPU idle and/or CPU hotplug, KASAN leaves the stack shadow
poisoned on exit from the kernel, and this poison is later hit when a CPU is
brought online and reuses that portion of the stack. Hitting the poison depends
on stackframe layout, so the bug only manifests in some configurations.

I think that the hotplug issue is generic, and x86 is affected. I couldn't spot
magic around idle, so x86 may be fine there. It would be great if someone
familiar with the x86 code could prove/disprove either of those assertions.

If x86 is affected, it likely makes sense to unpoison the stack in common code
prior to bringing a CPU online to avoid that.

For idle I'm not keen on having to perform a memset of THREAD_SIZE/8 every time
a CPU re-enters the kernel. I don't yet have numbers for how bad that is, but
it doesn't sound good.

Thanks,
Mark.

[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-February/408961.html

---->8----
When a CPU is shut down or placed into a low power state, the functions
on the critical path to firmware never return, and hence their epilogues
never execute. When using KASAN, this means that the shadow entries for
the corresponding stack are poisoned but never unpoisoned. When a CPU
subsequently re-enters the kernel via another path, and begins using
the stack, it may hit stale poison values, leading to false-positive
KASAN failures.

We can't ensure that all functions on the critical path are not
instrumented. For CPU hotplug this includes lots of core code starting
from secondary_start_kernel, and for CPU idle we can't ensure that
specific functions are not instrumented, as the compiler always poisons
the stack even when told to not instrument a function:

https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69863

This patch works around the issue by forcefully unpoisoning the shadow
region for all stack on the critical path, before we return to
instrumented C code. As we cannot statically determine the stack usage
of code in the critical path, we must clear the shadow for all remaining
stack, meaning that we must clear up to 2K of shadow memory each time a
CPU enters the kernel from idle or hotplug.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h  | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S        |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S       |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
index 2774fa3..b75b171 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -1,10 +1,30 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_KASAN_H
 #define __ASM_KASAN_H
 
-#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-
+#ifndef LINKER_SCRIPT
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
 
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove stale shadow posion for the stack left over from a prior
+	 * hot-unplug or idle exit, covering up to offset bytes above the
+	 * current stack pointer. Shadow poison above this is preserved.
+	 */
+	.macro kasan_unpoison_stack offset=0
+	add	x1, sp, #\offset
+	and	x0, x1, #~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)
+	add	x0, x0, #THREAD_INFO_SIZE
+	and	x1, x1, #(THREAD_SIZE - 1)
+	sub	x1, x1, #THREAD_INFO_SIZE
+	bl	kasan_unpoison_shadow
+	.endm
+
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 
@@ -30,9 +50,17 @@
 void kasan_init(void);
 asmlinkage void kasan_early_init(void);
 
-#else
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+	.macro kasan_unpoison_stack offset
+	.endm
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY */
 static inline void kasan_init(void) { }
-#endif
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+#endif /* LINKER_SCRIPT */
+#endif /* __ASM_KASAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index fffa4ac6..c615fa3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int main(void)
   DEFINE(TI_ADDR_LIMIT,		offsetof(struct thread_info, addr_limit));
   DEFINE(TI_TASK,		offsetof(struct thread_info, task));
   DEFINE(TI_CPU,		offsetof(struct thread_info, cpu));
+  DEFINE(THREAD_INFO_SIZE,	sizeof(struct thread_info));
   BLANK();
   DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));
   BLANK();
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index ffe9c2b..a0c3ec7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/cache.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/kasan.h>
 #include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
@@ -611,6 +612,7 @@ ENTRY(__secondary_switched)
 	and	x0, x0, #~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)
 	msr	sp_el0, x0			// save thread_info
 	mov	x29, #0
+	kasan_unpoison_stack
 	b	secondary_start_kernel
 ENDPROC(__secondary_switched)
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
index e33fe33..3b95841 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
+#include <asm/kasan.h>
 
 	.text
 /*
@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
 ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
 	.popsection
 cpu_resume_after_mmu:
+	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
 	mov	x0, #0			// return zero on success
 	ldp	x19, x20, [sp, #16]
 	ldp	x21, x22, [sp, #32]
-- 
1.9.1

Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Catalin Marinas]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
>  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
>  	.popsection
>  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96

I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
(cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.

Otherwise the patch looks fine.

-- 
Catalin

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Catalin Marinas]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
>  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
>  	.popsection
>  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96

I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
(cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.

Otherwise the patch looks fine.

-- 
Catalin

Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Will Deacon]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> >  	.popsection
> >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> 
> I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> 
> Otherwise the patch looks fine.

I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
honour the fno-sanitize flag?

Will

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Will Deacon]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> >  	.popsection
> >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> 
> I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> 
> Otherwise the patch looks fine.

I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
honour the fno-sanitize flag?

Will

Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Catalin Marinas]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:03:54PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > >  	.popsection
> > >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> > 
> > I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> > assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> > (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> > 
> > Otherwise the patch looks fine.
> 
> I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
> that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
> honour the fno-sanitize flag?

A simple, non-sanitised C wrapper around __cpu_suspend_enter() would
probably work. We need to make sure it is static inline when !KASAN to
avoid an unnecessary function call. Or we just move cpu_suspend() to a
different compilation unit, though that's a slightly larger function
which we may want to track under KASAN.

-- 
Catalin

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Catalin Marinas]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:03:54PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > >  	.popsection
> > >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> > 
> > I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> > assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> > (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> > 
> > Otherwise the patch looks fine.
> 
> I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
> that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
> honour the fno-sanitize flag?

A simple, non-sanitised C wrapper around __cpu_suspend_enter() would
probably work. We need to make sure it is static inline when !KASAN to
avoid an unnecessary function call. Or we just move cpu_suspend() to a
different compilation unit, though that's a slightly larger function
which we may want to track under KASAN.

-- 
Catalin

Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Lorenzo Pieralisi]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:13:57PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:03:54PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  	.popsection
> > > >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > > > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> > > 
> > > I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> > > assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> > > (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> > > 
> > > Otherwise the patch looks fine.
> > 
> > I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
> > that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
> > honour the fno-sanitize flag?
> 
> A simple, non-sanitised C wrapper around __cpu_suspend_enter() would
> probably work. We need to make sure it is static inline when !KASAN to
> avoid an unnecessary function call. Or we just move cpu_suspend() to a
> different compilation unit, though that's a slightly larger function
> which we may want to track under KASAN.

Both options are ok with me. There is one more. We pass the "saved" sp
to __cpu_suspend_save (ie in cpu_suspend_ctx), you can stash it and
use it in the resume path (through logical cpu indexing) to carry
out the kasan clean-up, in C, with no wrapper needed.

With James' hibernate patches:

http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-February/408597.html

this is going to be even easier, since the struct above is on the
cpu_suspend stack upon cpu_resume, so you can use the sp in there
straight away.

We can put together a fix following Catalin's suggestion and when James'
patches land in mainline we will update the code.

Thanks,
Lorenzo

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Lorenzo Pieralisi]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:13:57PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:03:54PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  	.popsection
> > > >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > > > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> > > 
> > > I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> > > assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> > > (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> > > 
> > > Otherwise the patch looks fine.
> > 
> > I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
> > that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
> > honour the fno-sanitize flag?
> 
> A simple, non-sanitised C wrapper around __cpu_suspend_enter() would
> probably work. We need to make sure it is static inline when !KASAN to
> avoid an unnecessary function call. Or we just move cpu_suspend() to a
> different compilation unit, though that's a slightly larger function
> which we may want to track under KASAN.

Both options are ok with me. There is one more. We pass the "saved" sp
to __cpu_suspend_save (ie in cpu_suspend_ctx), you can stash it and
use it in the resume path (through logical cpu indexing) to carry
out the kasan clean-up, in C, with no wrapper needed.

With James' hibernate patches:

http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-February/408597.html

this is going to be even easier, since the struct above is on the
cpu_suspend stack upon cpu_resume, so you can use the sp in there
straight away.

We can put together a fix following Catalin's suggestion and when James'
patches land in mainline we will update the code.

Thanks,
Lorenzo

Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Mark Rutland]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:13:57PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:03:54PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  	.popsection
> > > >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > > > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> > > 
> > > I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> > > assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> > > (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> > > 
> > > Otherwise the patch looks fine.
> > 
> > I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
> > that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
> > honour the fno-sanitize flag?
> 
> A simple, non-sanitised C wrapper around __cpu_suspend_enter() would
> probably work. We need to make sure it is static inline when !KASAN to
> avoid an unnecessary function call.

I think this could work, but I don't see a way that we can get a safe
value of the SP. Using current_stack_pointer() only gives us a snapshot,
and the real SP value may move before/after. So that snaphot, even if
taken in cpu_suspend, is not guaranteed to be above all the shadow
poison.

> Or we just move cpu_suspend() to a different compilation unit, though
> that's a slightly larger function which we may want to track under
> KASAN.

If we're going to force something into another compilation unit, that
may as well be the functions on the critical path:
psci_suspend_finisher, psci_cpu_suspend, and invoke_psci_fn_*.

Then we don't need to bother with the clearing on the return path at
all, as there should never be any stale shadow to begin with.

Thanks,
Mark.

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Mark Rutland]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:13:57PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 06:03:54PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:54:47PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 05:27:38PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > > @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ ENTRY(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  ENDPROC(cpu_resume_mmu)
> > > >  	.popsection
> > > >  cpu_resume_after_mmu:
> > > > +	kasan_unpoison_stack 96
> > > 
> > > I don't think the 96 here is needed since we populate the stack in
> > > assembly (__cpu_suspend_enter) and unwind it again still in assembly
> > > (cpu_resume_after_mmu), so no KASAN shadow writes/reads.
> > > 
> > > Otherwise the patch looks fine.
> > 
> > I'd much rather it was written in C -- is there a reason we can't do
> > that if we use a separate compilation unit where the compiler will
> > honour the fno-sanitize flag?
> 
> A simple, non-sanitised C wrapper around __cpu_suspend_enter() would
> probably work. We need to make sure it is static inline when !KASAN to
> avoid an unnecessary function call.

I think this could work, but I don't see a way that we can get a safe
value of the SP. Using current_stack_pointer() only gives us a snapshot,
and the real SP value may move before/after. So that snaphot, even if
taken in cpu_suspend, is not guaranteed to be above all the shadow
poison.

> Or we just move cpu_suspend() to a different compilation unit, though
> that's a slightly larger function which we may want to track under
> KASAN.

If we're going to force something into another compilation unit, that
may as well be the functions on the critical path:
psci_suspend_finisher, psci_cpu_suspend, and invoke_psci_fn_*.

Then we don't need to bother with the clearing on the return path at
all, as there should never be any stale shadow to begin with.

Thanks,
Mark.

Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Andrey Ryabinin]

On 02/18/2016 08:27 PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This patch is a followup to the discussion in [1].
> 
> When using KASAN and CPU idle and/or CPU hotplug, KASAN leaves the stack shadow
> poisoned on exit from the kernel, and this poison is later hit when a CPU is
> brought online and reuses that portion of the stack. Hitting the poison depends
> on stackframe layout, so the bug only manifests in some configurations.
> 
> I think that the hotplug issue is generic, and x86 is affected. I couldn't spot
> magic around idle, so x86 may be fine there. It would be great if someone
> familiar with the x86 code could prove/disprove either of those assertions.
> 
> If x86 is affected, it likely makes sense to unpoison the stack in common code
> prior to bringing a CPU online to avoid that.
> 

I think x86 need that unpoisoning. do_boot_cpu() resets stack for secondary cpu,
so it could be possible to hit stale shadow.

static int do_boot_cpu(int apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
{
....
	idle->thread.sp = (unsigned long) (((struct pt_regs *)
			  (THREAD_SIZE +  task_stack_page(idle))) - 1);

	early_gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
	initial_code = (unsigned long)start_secondary;
	stack_start  = idle->thread.sp;




> For idle I'm not keen on having to perform a memset of THREAD_SIZE/8 every time
> a CPU re-enters the kernel. I don't yet have numbers for how bad that is, but
> it doesn't sound good.
> 
> Thanks,
> Mark.
> 
> [1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-February/408961.html
> 

[PATCH] arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison

[Andrey Ryabinin]

On 02/18/2016 08:27 PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This patch is a followup to the discussion in [1].
> 
> When using KASAN and CPU idle and/or CPU hotplug, KASAN leaves the stack shadow
> poisoned on exit from the kernel, and this poison is later hit when a CPU is
> brought online and reuses that portion of the stack. Hitting the poison depends
> on stackframe layout, so the bug only manifests in some configurations.
> 
> I think that the hotplug issue is generic, and x86 is affected. I couldn't spot
> magic around idle, so x86 may be fine there. It would be great if someone
> familiar with the x86 code could prove/disprove either of those assertions.
> 
> If x86 is affected, it likely makes sense to unpoison the stack in common code
> prior to bringing a CPU online to avoid that.
> 

I think x86 need that unpoisoning. do_boot_cpu() resets stack for secondary cpu,
so it could be possible to hit stale shadow.

static int do_boot_cpu(int apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
{
....
	idle->thread.sp = (unsigned long) (((struct pt_regs *)
			  (THREAD_SIZE +  task_stack_page(idle))) - 1);

	early_gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
	initial_code = (unsigned long)start_secondary;
	stack_start  = idle->thread.sp;




> For idle I'm not keen on having to perform a memset of THREAD_SIZE/8 every time
> a CPU re-enters the kernel. I don't yet have numbers for how bad that is, but
> it doesn't sound good.
> 
> Thanks,
> Mark.
> 
> [1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2016-February/408961.html
>