All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
To: Eric Auger <eric.auger@linaro.org>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: eric.auger@st.com, will.deacon@arm.com, joro@8bytes.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, jason@lakedaemon.net, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	christoffer.dall@linaro.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, patches@linaro.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Bharat.Bhushan@freescale.com,
	pranav.sawargaonkar@gmail.com, p.fedin@samsung.com,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Jean-Philippe.Brucker@arm.com,
	julien.grall@arm.com, yehuday@marvell.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 5/7] vfio/type1: also check IRQ remapping capability at msi domain
Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 10:31:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5732FBF0.4040105@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5732EF96.4070001@linaro.org>

On 11/05/16 09:38, Eric Auger wrote:
> Hi Robin, Alex,
> On 05/10/2016 07:24 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> On 10/05/16 17:10, Eric Auger wrote:
>>> Hi Alex,
>>> On 05/10/2016 12:49 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
>>>> On Wed,  4 May 2016 11:54:16 +0000
>>>> Eric Auger <eric.auger@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On x86 IRQ remapping is abstracted by the IOMMU. On ARM this is
>>>>> abstracted
>>>>> by the msi controller. vfio_safe_irq_domain allows to check whether
>>>>> interrupts are "safe" for a given device. They are if the device does
>>>>> not use MSI
>>>>
>>>> Are we sure we're not opening a security hole here?  An MSI is simply a
>>>> DMA write, so really whether or not a device uses MSI is irrelevant.
>>>> If it can generate a DMA to the MSI doorbell then we need to be
>>>> protected and I think we pretty much need to assume that devices are
>>>> DMA capable.  Do the MSI domain checks cover this?
>>> Let me try to rephrase: we check the device is not attached to an MSI
>>> controller (I think this is the semantic of dev_get_msi_domain(dev)).
>>>
>>> If it is not, we don't have to care about MSI isolation: there will be
>>> no IOMMU binding between the device and any MSI doorbell. If it is we
>>> check the msi domain is backed by an MSI controller able to perform MSI
>>> isolation.
>>>
>>> So effectively "usage of MSIs" is improper - since it is decided after
>>> the group attachment anyway  - and the commit message should rather
>>> state "if the device is linked to an MSI controller" (dt msi-parent
>>> notion I think).
>>
>> Hmm, I think Alex has a point here - on a GICv2m I can happily fire
>> arbitrary MSIs from _a shell_ (using /dev/mem), and the CPUs definitely
>> aren't in an MSI domain, so I don't think it's valid to assume that a
>> device using only wired interrupts, therefore with no connection to any
>> MSI controller, isn't still capable of maliciously spewing DMA all over
>> any and every doorbell region in the system.
>
> Sorry but I still don't get the point. For the device to reach the
> doorbell there must be an IOMMU mapping.

Only when the doorbell is _downstream_ of IOMMU translation.

> - if the device is not attached to an MSI domain, there won't be any
> doorbell iommu mapping built by this series, so no risk, right?
>
> The device will be allowed to reach only memory iommu mapped by
> userspace with VFIO DMA MAP standard API. Of course if the userspace can
> mmap all the host PA that's a more general issue, right?
>
> - If the device is attached to an MSI domain (msi-parent link), 2 cases:
> 1) the MSI controller advertises MSI isolation (ITS cases), no risk
> 2) the MSI controller does not advertise MSI isolation (GICv2m), there
> is a security hole.
>     a) by default we reject the device attachment
>     b) if the userspace overrides the safe interrupt option he accepts
> the security hole
>
> What am I missing?

The x86-with-interrupt-remapping-disabled case. Currently, without 
unsafe_interrupts, everything is rejected - with this patch, we'll still 
reject anything with an MSI domain, but e.g. legacy PCI devices using 
INTx would be free to scribble all over the un-translated interrupt 
region willy-nilly. That's the subtle, but significant, change in behaviour.

Robin.

> Best Regards
>
> Eric
>>
>> Robin.
>>
>>> Does it sound better?
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>> Eric
>>>>
>>>>> or if the device uses MSI and the msi-parent controller
>>>>> supports IRQ remapping.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then we check at group level if all devices have safe interrupts: if
>>>>> not,
>>>>> we only allow the group to be attached if allow_unsafe_interrupts is
>>>>> set.
>>>>>
>>>>> At this point ARM sMMU still advertises IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP. This is
>>>>> changed in next patch.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@linaro.org>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> v3 -> v4:
>>>>> - rename vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable into
>>>>> vfio_safe_irq_domain
>>>>>     and irq_remapping into safe_irq_domains
>>>>>
>>>>> v2 -> v3:
>>>>> - protect vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable with
>>>>>     CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 44
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>    1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> index 4d3a6f1..2fc8197 100644
>>>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
>>>>>    #include <linux/vfio.h>
>>>>>    #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>>>>>    #include <linux/msi-iommu.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/msi.h>
>>>>>
>>>>>    #define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.2"
>>>>>    #define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "Alex Williamson
>>>>> <alex.williamson@redhat.com>"
>>>>> @@ -777,6 +779,33 @@ static int vfio_bus_type(struct device *dev,
>>>>> void *data)
>>>>>        return 0;
>>>>>    }
>>>>>
>>>>> +/**
>>>>> + * vfio_safe_irq_domain: returns whether the irq domain
>>>>> + * the device is attached to is safe with respect to MSI isolation.
>>>>> + * If the irq domain is not an MSI domain, we return it is safe.
>>>>> + *
>>>>> + * @dev: device handle
>>>>> + * @data: unused
>>>>> + * returns 0 if the irq domain is safe, -1 if not.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> +static int vfio_safe_irq_domain(struct device *dev, void *data)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>> +    struct irq_domain *domain;
>>>>> +    struct msi_domain_info *info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    domain = dev_get_msi_domain(dev);
>>>>> +    if (!domain)
>>>>> +        return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    info = msi_get_domain_info(domain);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!(info->flags & MSI_FLAG_IRQ_REMAPPING))
>>>>> +        return -1;
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +    return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>>    static int vfio_iommu_replay(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,
>>>>>                     struct vfio_domain *domain)
>>>>>    {
>>>>> @@ -870,7 +899,7 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>        struct vfio_group *group, *g;
>>>>>        struct vfio_domain *domain, *d;
>>>>>        struct bus_type *bus = NULL;
>>>>> -    int ret;
>>>>> +    int ret, safe_irq_domains;
>>>>>
>>>>>        mutex_lock(&iommu->lock);
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -893,6 +922,13 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>
>>>>>        group->iommu_group = iommu_group;
>>>>>
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * Determine if all the devices of the group have a safe irq
>>>>> domain
>>>>> +     * with respect to MSI isolation
>>>>> +     */
>>>>> +    safe_irq_domains = !iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus,
>>>>> +                       vfio_safe_irq_domain);
>>>>> +
>>>>>        /* Determine bus_type in order to allocate a domain */
>>>>>        ret = iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus, vfio_bus_type);
>>>>>        if (ret)
>>>>> @@ -920,8 +956,12 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->group_list);
>>>>>        list_add(&group->next, &domain->group_list);
>>>>>
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * to advertise safe interrupts either the IOMMU or the MSI
>>>>> controllers
>>>>> +     * must support IRQ remapping/interrupt translation
>>>>> +     */
>>>>>        if (!allow_unsafe_interrupts &&
>>>>> -        !iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP)) {
>>>>> +        (!iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>>>>> !safe_irq_domains)) {
>>>>>            pr_warn("%s: No interrupt remapping support.  Use the
>>>>> module param \"allow_unsafe_interrupts\" to enable VFIO IOMMU
>>>>> support on this platform\n",
>>>>>                   __func__);
>>>>>            ret = -EPERM;
>>>>
>>>
>>
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
To: Eric Auger <eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Alex Williamson
	<alex.williamson-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: julien.grall-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org,
	eric.auger-qxv4g6HH51o@public.gmane.org,
	jason-NLaQJdtUoK4Be96aLqz0jA@public.gmane.org,
	patches-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	marc.zyngier-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org,
	p.fedin-Sze3O3UU22JBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org,
	will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
	pranav.sawargaonkar-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
	tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org,
	christoffer.dall-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	yehuday-eYqpPyKDWXRBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 5/7] vfio/type1: also check IRQ remapping capability at msi domain
Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 10:31:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5732FBF0.4040105@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5732EF96.4070001-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>

On 11/05/16 09:38, Eric Auger wrote:
> Hi Robin, Alex,
> On 05/10/2016 07:24 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> On 10/05/16 17:10, Eric Auger wrote:
>>> Hi Alex,
>>> On 05/10/2016 12:49 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
>>>> On Wed,  4 May 2016 11:54:16 +0000
>>>> Eric Auger <eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On x86 IRQ remapping is abstracted by the IOMMU. On ARM this is
>>>>> abstracted
>>>>> by the msi controller. vfio_safe_irq_domain allows to check whether
>>>>> interrupts are "safe" for a given device. They are if the device does
>>>>> not use MSI
>>>>
>>>> Are we sure we're not opening a security hole here?  An MSI is simply a
>>>> DMA write, so really whether or not a device uses MSI is irrelevant.
>>>> If it can generate a DMA to the MSI doorbell then we need to be
>>>> protected and I think we pretty much need to assume that devices are
>>>> DMA capable.  Do the MSI domain checks cover this?
>>> Let me try to rephrase: we check the device is not attached to an MSI
>>> controller (I think this is the semantic of dev_get_msi_domain(dev)).
>>>
>>> If it is not, we don't have to care about MSI isolation: there will be
>>> no IOMMU binding between the device and any MSI doorbell. If it is we
>>> check the msi domain is backed by an MSI controller able to perform MSI
>>> isolation.
>>>
>>> So effectively "usage of MSIs" is improper - since it is decided after
>>> the group attachment anyway  - and the commit message should rather
>>> state "if the device is linked to an MSI controller" (dt msi-parent
>>> notion I think).
>>
>> Hmm, I think Alex has a point here - on a GICv2m I can happily fire
>> arbitrary MSIs from _a shell_ (using /dev/mem), and the CPUs definitely
>> aren't in an MSI domain, so I don't think it's valid to assume that a
>> device using only wired interrupts, therefore with no connection to any
>> MSI controller, isn't still capable of maliciously spewing DMA all over
>> any and every doorbell region in the system.
>
> Sorry but I still don't get the point. For the device to reach the
> doorbell there must be an IOMMU mapping.

Only when the doorbell is _downstream_ of IOMMU translation.

> - if the device is not attached to an MSI domain, there won't be any
> doorbell iommu mapping built by this series, so no risk, right?
>
> The device will be allowed to reach only memory iommu mapped by
> userspace with VFIO DMA MAP standard API. Of course if the userspace can
> mmap all the host PA that's a more general issue, right?
>
> - If the device is attached to an MSI domain (msi-parent link), 2 cases:
> 1) the MSI controller advertises MSI isolation (ITS cases), no risk
> 2) the MSI controller does not advertise MSI isolation (GICv2m), there
> is a security hole.
>     a) by default we reject the device attachment
>     b) if the userspace overrides the safe interrupt option he accepts
> the security hole
>
> What am I missing?

The x86-with-interrupt-remapping-disabled case. Currently, without 
unsafe_interrupts, everything is rejected - with this patch, we'll still 
reject anything with an MSI domain, but e.g. legacy PCI devices using 
INTx would be free to scribble all over the un-translated interrupt 
region willy-nilly. That's the subtle, but significant, change in behaviour.

Robin.

> Best Regards
>
> Eric
>>
>> Robin.
>>
>>> Does it sound better?
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>> Eric
>>>>
>>>>> or if the device uses MSI and the msi-parent controller
>>>>> supports IRQ remapping.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then we check at group level if all devices have safe interrupts: if
>>>>> not,
>>>>> we only allow the group to be attached if allow_unsafe_interrupts is
>>>>> set.
>>>>>
>>>>> At this point ARM sMMU still advertises IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP. This is
>>>>> changed in next patch.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> v3 -> v4:
>>>>> - rename vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable into
>>>>> vfio_safe_irq_domain
>>>>>     and irq_remapping into safe_irq_domains
>>>>>
>>>>> v2 -> v3:
>>>>> - protect vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable with
>>>>>     CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 44
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>    1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> index 4d3a6f1..2fc8197 100644
>>>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
>>>>>    #include <linux/vfio.h>
>>>>>    #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>>>>>    #include <linux/msi-iommu.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/msi.h>
>>>>>
>>>>>    #define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.2"
>>>>>    #define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "Alex Williamson
>>>>> <alex.williamson-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>"
>>>>> @@ -777,6 +779,33 @@ static int vfio_bus_type(struct device *dev,
>>>>> void *data)
>>>>>        return 0;
>>>>>    }
>>>>>
>>>>> +/**
>>>>> + * vfio_safe_irq_domain: returns whether the irq domain
>>>>> + * the device is attached to is safe with respect to MSI isolation.
>>>>> + * If the irq domain is not an MSI domain, we return it is safe.
>>>>> + *
>>>>> + * @dev: device handle
>>>>> + * @data: unused
>>>>> + * returns 0 if the irq domain is safe, -1 if not.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> +static int vfio_safe_irq_domain(struct device *dev, void *data)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>> +    struct irq_domain *domain;
>>>>> +    struct msi_domain_info *info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    domain = dev_get_msi_domain(dev);
>>>>> +    if (!domain)
>>>>> +        return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    info = msi_get_domain_info(domain);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!(info->flags & MSI_FLAG_IRQ_REMAPPING))
>>>>> +        return -1;
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +    return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>>    static int vfio_iommu_replay(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,
>>>>>                     struct vfio_domain *domain)
>>>>>    {
>>>>> @@ -870,7 +899,7 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>        struct vfio_group *group, *g;
>>>>>        struct vfio_domain *domain, *d;
>>>>>        struct bus_type *bus = NULL;
>>>>> -    int ret;
>>>>> +    int ret, safe_irq_domains;
>>>>>
>>>>>        mutex_lock(&iommu->lock);
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -893,6 +922,13 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>
>>>>>        group->iommu_group = iommu_group;
>>>>>
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * Determine if all the devices of the group have a safe irq
>>>>> domain
>>>>> +     * with respect to MSI isolation
>>>>> +     */
>>>>> +    safe_irq_domains = !iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus,
>>>>> +                       vfio_safe_irq_domain);
>>>>> +
>>>>>        /* Determine bus_type in order to allocate a domain */
>>>>>        ret = iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus, vfio_bus_type);
>>>>>        if (ret)
>>>>> @@ -920,8 +956,12 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->group_list);
>>>>>        list_add(&group->next, &domain->group_list);
>>>>>
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * to advertise safe interrupts either the IOMMU or the MSI
>>>>> controllers
>>>>> +     * must support IRQ remapping/interrupt translation
>>>>> +     */
>>>>>        if (!allow_unsafe_interrupts &&
>>>>> -        !iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP)) {
>>>>> +        (!iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>>>>> !safe_irq_domains)) {
>>>>>            pr_warn("%s: No interrupt remapping support.  Use the
>>>>> module param \"allow_unsafe_interrupts\" to enable VFIO IOMMU
>>>>> support on this platform\n",
>>>>>                   __func__);
>>>>>            ret = -EPERM;
>>>>
>>>
>>
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: robin.murphy@arm.com (Robin Murphy)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 5/7] vfio/type1: also check IRQ remapping capability at msi domain
Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 10:31:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5732FBF0.4040105@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5732EF96.4070001@linaro.org>

On 11/05/16 09:38, Eric Auger wrote:
> Hi Robin, Alex,
> On 05/10/2016 07:24 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> On 10/05/16 17:10, Eric Auger wrote:
>>> Hi Alex,
>>> On 05/10/2016 12:49 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
>>>> On Wed,  4 May 2016 11:54:16 +0000
>>>> Eric Auger <eric.auger@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On x86 IRQ remapping is abstracted by the IOMMU. On ARM this is
>>>>> abstracted
>>>>> by the msi controller. vfio_safe_irq_domain allows to check whether
>>>>> interrupts are "safe" for a given device. They are if the device does
>>>>> not use MSI
>>>>
>>>> Are we sure we're not opening a security hole here?  An MSI is simply a
>>>> DMA write, so really whether or not a device uses MSI is irrelevant.
>>>> If it can generate a DMA to the MSI doorbell then we need to be
>>>> protected and I think we pretty much need to assume that devices are
>>>> DMA capable.  Do the MSI domain checks cover this?
>>> Let me try to rephrase: we check the device is not attached to an MSI
>>> controller (I think this is the semantic of dev_get_msi_domain(dev)).
>>>
>>> If it is not, we don't have to care about MSI isolation: there will be
>>> no IOMMU binding between the device and any MSI doorbell. If it is we
>>> check the msi domain is backed by an MSI controller able to perform MSI
>>> isolation.
>>>
>>> So effectively "usage of MSIs" is improper - since it is decided after
>>> the group attachment anyway  - and the commit message should rather
>>> state "if the device is linked to an MSI controller" (dt msi-parent
>>> notion I think).
>>
>> Hmm, I think Alex has a point here - on a GICv2m I can happily fire
>> arbitrary MSIs from _a shell_ (using /dev/mem), and the CPUs definitely
>> aren't in an MSI domain, so I don't think it's valid to assume that a
>> device using only wired interrupts, therefore with no connection to any
>> MSI controller, isn't still capable of maliciously spewing DMA all over
>> any and every doorbell region in the system.
>
> Sorry but I still don't get the point. For the device to reach the
> doorbell there must be an IOMMU mapping.

Only when the doorbell is _downstream_ of IOMMU translation.

> - if the device is not attached to an MSI domain, there won't be any
> doorbell iommu mapping built by this series, so no risk, right?
>
> The device will be allowed to reach only memory iommu mapped by
> userspace with VFIO DMA MAP standard API. Of course if the userspace can
> mmap all the host PA that's a more general issue, right?
>
> - If the device is attached to an MSI domain (msi-parent link), 2 cases:
> 1) the MSI controller advertises MSI isolation (ITS cases), no risk
> 2) the MSI controller does not advertise MSI isolation (GICv2m), there
> is a security hole.
>     a) by default we reject the device attachment
>     b) if the userspace overrides the safe interrupt option he accepts
> the security hole
>
> What am I missing?

The x86-with-interrupt-remapping-disabled case. Currently, without 
unsafe_interrupts, everything is rejected - with this patch, we'll still 
reject anything with an MSI domain, but e.g. legacy PCI devices using 
INTx would be free to scribble all over the un-translated interrupt 
region willy-nilly. That's the subtle, but significant, change in behaviour.

Robin.

> Best Regards
>
> Eric
>>
>> Robin.
>>
>>> Does it sound better?
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>> Eric
>>>>
>>>>> or if the device uses MSI and the msi-parent controller
>>>>> supports IRQ remapping.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then we check at group level if all devices have safe interrupts: if
>>>>> not,
>>>>> we only allow the group to be attached if allow_unsafe_interrupts is
>>>>> set.
>>>>>
>>>>> At this point ARM sMMU still advertises IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP. This is
>>>>> changed in next patch.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@linaro.org>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> v3 -> v4:
>>>>> - rename vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable into
>>>>> vfio_safe_irq_domain
>>>>>     and irq_remapping into safe_irq_domains
>>>>>
>>>>> v2 -> v3:
>>>>> - protect vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable with
>>>>>     CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 44
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>    1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> index 4d3a6f1..2fc8197 100644
>>>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
>>>>>    #include <linux/vfio.h>
>>>>>    #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>>>>>    #include <linux/msi-iommu.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/msi.h>
>>>>>
>>>>>    #define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.2"
>>>>>    #define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "Alex Williamson
>>>>> <alex.williamson@redhat.com>"
>>>>> @@ -777,6 +779,33 @@ static int vfio_bus_type(struct device *dev,
>>>>> void *data)
>>>>>        return 0;
>>>>>    }
>>>>>
>>>>> +/**
>>>>> + * vfio_safe_irq_domain: returns whether the irq domain
>>>>> + * the device is attached to is safe with respect to MSI isolation.
>>>>> + * If the irq domain is not an MSI domain, we return it is safe.
>>>>> + *
>>>>> + * @dev: device handle
>>>>> + * @data: unused
>>>>> + * returns 0 if the irq domain is safe, -1 if not.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> +static int vfio_safe_irq_domain(struct device *dev, void *data)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>> +    struct irq_domain *domain;
>>>>> +    struct msi_domain_info *info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    domain = dev_get_msi_domain(dev);
>>>>> +    if (!domain)
>>>>> +        return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    info = msi_get_domain_info(domain);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!(info->flags & MSI_FLAG_IRQ_REMAPPING))
>>>>> +        return -1;
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +    return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>>    static int vfio_iommu_replay(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,
>>>>>                     struct vfio_domain *domain)
>>>>>    {
>>>>> @@ -870,7 +899,7 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>        struct vfio_group *group, *g;
>>>>>        struct vfio_domain *domain, *d;
>>>>>        struct bus_type *bus = NULL;
>>>>> -    int ret;
>>>>> +    int ret, safe_irq_domains;
>>>>>
>>>>>        mutex_lock(&iommu->lock);
>>>>>
>>>>> @@ -893,6 +922,13 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>
>>>>>        group->iommu_group = iommu_group;
>>>>>
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * Determine if all the devices of the group have a safe irq
>>>>> domain
>>>>> +     * with respect to MSI isolation
>>>>> +     */
>>>>> +    safe_irq_domains = !iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus,
>>>>> +                       vfio_safe_irq_domain);
>>>>> +
>>>>>        /* Determine bus_type in order to allocate a domain */
>>>>>        ret = iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus, vfio_bus_type);
>>>>>        if (ret)
>>>>> @@ -920,8 +956,12 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->group_list);
>>>>>        list_add(&group->next, &domain->group_list);
>>>>>
>>>>> +    /*
>>>>> +     * to advertise safe interrupts either the IOMMU or the MSI
>>>>> controllers
>>>>> +     * must support IRQ remapping/interrupt translation
>>>>> +     */
>>>>>        if (!allow_unsafe_interrupts &&
>>>>> -        !iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP)) {
>>>>> +        (!iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>>>>> !safe_irq_domains)) {
>>>>>            pr_warn("%s: No interrupt remapping support.  Use the
>>>>> module param \"allow_unsafe_interrupts\" to enable VFIO IOMMU
>>>>> support on this platform\n",
>>>>>                   __func__);
>>>>>            ret = -EPERM;
>>>>
>>>
>>
>

  reply	other threads:[~2016-05-11  9:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-05-04 11:54 [PATCH v9 0/7] KVM PCIe/MSI passthrough on ARM/ARM64: kernel part 3/3: vfio changes Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] vfio: introduce a vfio_dma type field Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] vfio/type1: vfio_find_dma accepting a type argument Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09 22:49   ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 14:54     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 14:54       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 14:54       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] vfio/type1: bypass unmap/unpin and replay for VFIO_IOVA_RESERVED slots Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09 22:49   ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-11 12:58     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11 12:58       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11 12:58       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] vfio: allow reserved msi iova registration Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-05 19:22   ` Chalamarla, Tirumalesh
2016-05-05 19:22     ` Chalamarla, Tirumalesh
2016-05-05 19:22     ` Chalamarla, Tirumalesh
2016-05-09  7:55     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09  7:55       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09  7:55       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 15:29   ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 15:29     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 15:29     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 15:34     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 15:34       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 15:34       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] vfio/type1: also check IRQ remapping capability at msi domain Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-05 19:23   ` Chalamarla, Tirumalesh
2016-05-05 19:23     ` Chalamarla, Tirumalesh
2016-05-05 19:23     ` Chalamarla, Tirumalesh
2016-05-09  8:05     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09  8:05       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09  8:05       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09 22:49   ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 16:10     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 16:10       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 16:10       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 17:24       ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-10 17:24         ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-10 17:24         ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-11  8:38         ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11  8:38           ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11  8:38           ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11  9:31           ` Robin Murphy [this message]
2016-05-11  9:31             ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-11  9:31             ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-11  9:44             ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11  9:44               ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11  9:44               ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11 13:48               ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-11 13:48                 ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-11 13:48                 ` Robin Murphy
2016-05-11 14:37                 ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11 14:37                   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-11 14:37                   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] iommu/arm-smmu: do not advertise IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] vfio/type1: return MSI geometry through VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO capability chains Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 11:54   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 12:06   ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 12:06     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-04 12:06     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09 23:03     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 23:03       ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 23:03       ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 16:50       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 16:50         ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 16:50         ` Eric Auger
2016-05-09 22:49   ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-09 22:49     ` Alex Williamson
2016-05-10 16:36     ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 16:36       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-10 16:36       ` Eric Auger
2016-05-20 16:01 ` [PATCH v9 0/7] KVM PCIe/MSI passthrough on ARM/ARM64: kernel part 3/3: vfio changes Eric Auger
2016-05-20 16:01   ` Eric Auger
2016-06-08  8:29   ` Auger Eric
2016-06-08  8:29     ` Auger Eric
2016-06-08  8:29     ` Auger Eric
2016-06-08 21:06     ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-08 21:06       ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-08 21:06       ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-09  7:55       ` Auger Eric
2016-06-09  7:55         ` Auger Eric
2016-06-09  7:55         ` Auger Eric
2016-06-09 19:44         ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-09 19:44           ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-09 19:44           ` Alex Williamson
2016-06-20 15:42         ` Pranav Sawargaonkar
2016-06-20 15:42           ` Pranav Sawargaonkar
2016-06-20 15:46           ` Pranav Sawargaonkar
2016-06-20 15:46             ` Pranav Sawargaonkar
2016-06-20 15:46             ` Pranav Sawargaonkar

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5732FBF0.4040105@arm.com \
    --to=robin.murphy@arm.com \
    --cc=Bharat.Bhushan@freescale.com \
    --cc=Jean-Philippe.Brucker@arm.com \
    --cc=alex.williamson@redhat.com \
    --cc=christoffer.dall@linaro.org \
    --cc=eric.auger@linaro.org \
    --cc=eric.auger@st.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=jason@lakedaemon.net \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=julien.grall@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=marc.zyngier@arm.com \
    --cc=p.fedin@samsung.com \
    --cc=patches@linaro.org \
    --cc=pranav.sawargaonkar@gmail.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=yehuday@marvell.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.