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From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, bhavesh.davda@oracle.com,
	daniel.kiper@oracle.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] kexec: use hypercall_create_continuation to protect KEXEC ops
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 04:48:06 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <58F60B060200007800151839@prv-mh.provo.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1492456146-28808-2-git-send-email-eric.devolder@oracle.com>

>>> On 17.04.17 at 21:09, <eric.devolder@oracle.com> wrote:
> --- a/xen/common/kexec.c
> +++ b/xen/common/kexec.c
> @@ -50,9 +50,10 @@ static cpumask_t crash_saved_cpus;
>  
>  static struct kexec_image *kexec_image[KEXEC_IMAGE_NR];
>  
> -#define KEXEC_FLAG_DEFAULT_POS   (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 0)
> -#define KEXEC_FLAG_CRASH_POS     (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 1)
> -#define KEXEC_FLAG_IN_PROGRESS   (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 2)
> +#define KEXEC_FLAG_DEFAULT_POS    (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 0)
> +#define KEXEC_FLAG_CRASH_POS      (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 1)
> +#define KEXEC_FLAG_IN_PROGRESS    (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 2)
> +#define KEXEC_FLAG_HC_IN_PROGRESS (KEXEC_IMAGE_NR + 3)

Perhaps KEXEC_FLAG_IN_HYPERCALL? Other than that (and this
clearly is subject to Andrew's opinion)
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Jan


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  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-18 10:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-17 19:09 [PATCH v2 0/2] kexec: Use hypercall_create_continuation to protect KEXEC ops Eric DeVolder
2017-04-17 19:09 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] kexec: use " Eric DeVolder
2017-04-18 10:48   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2017-04-19 11:00     ` Daniel Kiper
2017-04-19 11:48       ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-19 12:16         ` Daniel Kiper
2017-04-19 15:48         ` Eric DeVolder
2017-04-17 19:09 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] kexec: remove spinlock now that all KEXEC hypercall ops are protected at the top-level Eric DeVolder
2017-04-18 10:49   ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-19 10:56     ` Daniel Kiper
2017-04-19 11:20       ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-19 11:52         ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-19 12:13         ` Daniel Kiper
2017-04-19 13:37           ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-19 15:49             ` Eric DeVolder

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