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* [PATCH v4] hvm/svm: Implement Debug events
@ 2018-03-22 10:46 Alexandru Isaila
  2018-03-22 11:18 ` Jan Beulich
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Alexandru Isaila @ 2018-03-22 10:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: xen-devel
  Cc: tamas, suravee.suthikulpanit, rcojocaru, andrew.cooper3,
	jbeulich, Alexandru Isaila, boris.ostrovsky

At this moment the Debug events for the AMD architecture are not
forwarded to the monitor layer.

This patch adds the Debug event to the common capabilities, adds
the VMEXIT_ICEBP then forwards the event to the monitor layer.

Chapter 2: SVM Processor and Platform Extensions: "Note: A vector 1
exception generated by the single byte INT1
instruction (also known as ICEBP) does not trigger the #DB
intercept. Software should use the dedicated ICEBP
intercept to intercept ICEBP"

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>

---
Changes since V3:
	- Merge disable/enable hooks into set_icebp_interception
	- Address style comments.
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/emulate.c        |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c            | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 xen/arch/x86/monitor.c                |  3 ++
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h         | 25 +++++++++++++++
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/emulate.h |  1 +
 xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h         |  4 +--
 6 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/emulate.c
index e1a1581..535674e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/emulate.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static const struct {
 } opc_tab[INSTR_MAX_COUNT] = {
     [INSTR_PAUSE]   = { X86EMUL_OPC_F3(0, 0x90) },
     [INSTR_INT3]    = { X86EMUL_OPC(   0, 0xcc) },
+    [INSTR_ICEBP]   = { X86EMUL_OPC(   0, 0xf1) },
     [INSTR_HLT]     = { X86EMUL_OPC(   0, 0xf4) },
     [INSTR_XSETBV]  = { X86EMUL_OPC(0x0f, 0x01), MODRM(3, 2, 1) },
     [INSTR_VMRUN]   = { X86EMUL_OPC(0x0f, 0x01), MODRM(3, 3, 0) },
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index c34f5b5..affd8da 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -172,6 +172,24 @@ static void svm_enable_msr_interception(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr)
         svm_intercept_msr(v, msr, MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE);
 }
 
+static void svm_set_icebp_interception(struct domain *d, bool enable)
+{
+    struct vcpu *v;
+
+    for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
+    {
+        struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
+        uint32_t intercepts = vmcb_get_general2_intercepts(vmcb);
+
+        if ( enable )
+            intercepts |= GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_ICEBP;
+        else
+            intercepts &= ~GENERAL2_INTERCEPT_ICEBP;
+
+        vmcb_set_general2_intercepts(vmcb, intercepts);
+    }
+}
+
 static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
@@ -1109,7 +1127,8 @@ static void noreturn svm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
     bool debug_state = (v->domain->debugger_attached ||
-                        v->domain->arch.monitor.software_breakpoint_enabled);
+                        v->domain->arch.monitor.software_breakpoint_enabled ||
+                        v->domain->arch.monitor.debug_exception_enabled);
     bool_t vcpu_guestmode = 0;
     struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
 
@@ -2438,19 +2457,6 @@ static bool svm_get_pending_event(struct vcpu *v, struct x86_event *info)
     return true;
 }
 
-static void svm_propagate_intr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long insn_len)
-{
-    struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
-    struct x86_event event = {
-        .vector = vmcb->eventinj.fields.type,
-        .type = vmcb->eventinj.fields.type,
-        .error_code = vmcb->exitinfo1,
-    };
-
-    event.insn_len = insn_len;
-    hvm_inject_event(&event);
-}
-
 static struct hvm_function_table __initdata svm_function_table = {
     .name                 = "SVM",
     .cpu_up_prepare       = svm_cpu_up_prepare,
@@ -2490,6 +2496,7 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata svm_function_table = {
     .msr_read_intercept   = svm_msr_read_intercept,
     .msr_write_intercept  = svm_msr_write_intercept,
     .enable_msr_interception = svm_enable_msr_interception,
+    .set_icebp_interception = svm_set_icebp_interception,
     .set_rdtsc_exiting    = svm_set_rdtsc_exiting,
     .set_descriptor_access_exiting = svm_set_descriptor_access_exiting,
     .get_insn_bytes       = svm_get_insn_bytes,
@@ -2656,9 +2663,28 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
         HVMTRACE_0D(SMI);
         break;
 
+    case VMEXIT_ICEBP:
     case VMEXIT_EXCEPTION_DB:
         if ( !v->domain->debugger_attached )
-            hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_debug, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
+        {
+            int rc;
+            unsigned int trap_type = exit_reason == VMEXIT_ICEBP ?
+                X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION : X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION;
+
+            inst_len = 0;
+
+            if ( trap_type >= X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT )
+                inst_len = __get_instruction_length(v, INSTR_ICEBP);
+
+            rc = hvm_monitor_debug(regs->rip,
+                                   HVM_MONITOR_DEBUG_EXCEPTION,
+                                   trap_type, inst_len);
+            if ( rc < 0 )
+                goto unexpected_exit_type;
+            if ( !rc )
+                hvm_inject_exception(TRAP_debug,
+                                     trap_type, inst_len, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
+        }
         else
             domain_pause_for_debugger();
         break;
@@ -2687,7 +2713,9 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
            if ( rc < 0 )
                goto unexpected_exit_type;
            if ( !rc )
-               svm_propagate_intr(v, inst_len);
+               hvm_inject_exception(TRAP_int3,
+                                    X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_EXCEPTION,
+                                    inst_len, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
         }
         break;
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
index 4317658..3fb6531 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d,
         ad->monitor.debug_exception_sync = requested_status ?
                                             mop->u.debug_exception.sync :
                                             0;
+
+        hvm_set_icebp_interception(d, requested_status);
+
         domain_unpause(d);
         break;
     }
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 2376ed6..372104f 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
                                 bool_t access_w, bool_t access_x);
 
     void (*enable_msr_interception)(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr);
+    void (*set_icebp_interception)(struct domain *d, bool enable);
     bool_t (*is_singlestep_supported)(void);
 
     /* Alternate p2m */
@@ -407,6 +408,20 @@ void hvm_migrate_pirqs(struct vcpu *v);
 
 void hvm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event);
 
+static inline void hvm_inject_exception(
+    unsigned int vector, unsigned int type,
+    unsigned int insn_len, int error_code)
+{
+    struct x86_event event = {
+        .vector = vector,
+        .type = type,
+        .insn_len = insn_len,
+        .error_code = error_code,
+    };
+
+    hvm_inject_event(&event);
+}
+
 static inline void hvm_inject_hw_exception(unsigned int vector, int errcode)
 {
     struct x86_event event = {
@@ -581,6 +596,16 @@ static inline bool_t hvm_enable_msr_interception(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr)
     return 0;
 }
 
+static inline bool hvm_set_icebp_interception(struct domain *d, bool enable)
+{
+    if( hvm_funcs.set_icebp_interception )
+    {
+        hvm_funcs.set_icebp_interception(d, enable);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static inline bool_t hvm_is_singlestep_supported(void)
 {
     return (hvm_funcs.is_singlestep_supported &&
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/emulate.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/emulate.h
index 7c1dcd1..3de8236 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/emulate.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/emulate.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ enum instruction_index {
     INSTR_STGI,
     INSTR_CLGI,
     INSTR_INVLPGA,
+    INSTR_ICEBP,
     INSTR_MAX_COUNT /* Must be last - Number of instructions supported */
 };
 
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
index 99ed4b87..c5a86d1 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
@@ -82,12 +82,12 @@ static inline uint32_t arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d)
                     (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
                     (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT) |
                     (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID) |
+                    (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) |
                     (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG));
 
     if ( cpu_has_vmx )
     {
-        capabilities |= ((1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) |
-                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED));
+        capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED);
 
         /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */
         if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() )
-- 
2.7.4


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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4] hvm/svm: Implement Debug events
  2018-03-22 10:46 [PATCH v4] hvm/svm: Implement Debug events Alexandru Isaila
@ 2018-03-22 11:18 ` Jan Beulich
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2018-03-22 11:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alexandru Isaila
  Cc: tamas, rcojocaru, andrew.cooper3, xen-devel,
	suravee.suthikulpanit, boris.ostrovsky

>>> On 22.03.18 at 11:46, <aisaila@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -172,6 +172,24 @@ static void svm_enable_msr_interception(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr)
>          svm_intercept_msr(v, msr, MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE);
>  }
>  
> +static void svm_set_icebp_interception(struct domain *d, bool enable)
> +{
> +    struct vcpu *v;

While I agree that the hook's parameter would better not be a
pointer to const, the local variable here surely should be.

> @@ -2656,9 +2663,28 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>          HVMTRACE_0D(SMI);
>          break;
>  
> +    case VMEXIT_ICEBP:
>      case VMEXIT_EXCEPTION_DB:
>          if ( !v->domain->debugger_attached )
> -            hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_debug, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
> +        {
> +            int rc;
> +            unsigned int trap_type = exit_reason == VMEXIT_ICEBP ?
> +                X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION : X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION;
> +
> +            inst_len = 0;
> +
> +            if ( trap_type >= X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT )
> +                inst_len = __get_instruction_length(v, INSTR_ICEBP);

>= (other == ) implies more than a single type is covered. How
does that fit with passing the unique INSTR_ICEBP to the function?
I don't see the point anyway to set the type to one of two
possible values and then compare against a third. Things would
likely quite a bit more obvious if you had an if/else pair and did
both type and insn len assignments separately for each case.

> @@ -581,6 +596,16 @@ static inline bool_t hvm_enable_msr_interception(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr)
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool hvm_set_icebp_interception(struct domain *d, bool enable)
> +{
> +    if( hvm_funcs.set_icebp_interception )

Contrary to what your revision log says, there's still a style issue
here plus ...

> +    {
> +        hvm_funcs.set_icebp_interception(d, enable);
> +        return 1;

... true here and ...

> +    }
> +    return 0;

... false here.

Jan


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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2018-03-22 10:46 [PATCH v4] hvm/svm: Implement Debug events Alexandru Isaila
2018-03-22 11:18 ` Jan Beulich

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