All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
	Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
	Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/13] x86: Introduce struct cpu_policy to refer to a group of individual policies
Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 07:23:22 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5B4C9C4A02000078001D46C9@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <eb2cd4e3-cc75-c0cd-f83f-4bd17ec5b00e@citrix.com>

>>> On 16.07.18 at 15:15, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
> On 16/07/18 13:29, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 16.07.18 at 14:16, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>> On 16/07/18 13:04, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>> On 13.07.18 at 22:03, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c
>>>>> @@ -31,6 +31,33 @@
>>>>>  #include <asm/psr.h>
>>>>>  #include <asm/cpuid.h>
>>>>>  
>>>>> +const struct cpu_policy system_policies[] = {
>>>> By the end of the series the array remains unused outside this
>>>> source file. I'd appreciate if it was made extern only when actually
>>>> needed, not the least because ...
>>>>
>>>>> +    [ XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_raw ] = {
>>>>> +        &raw_cpuid_policy,
>>>>> +        &raw_msr_policy,
>>>>> +    },
>>>>> +    [ XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_host ] = {
>>>>> +        &host_cpuid_policy,
>>>>> +        &host_msr_policy,
>>>>> +    },
>>>>> +    [ XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_pv_max ] = {
>>>>> +        &pv_max_cpuid_policy,
>>>>> +        &pv_max_msr_policy,
>>>>> +    },
>>>>> +    [ XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_hvm_max ] = {
>>>>> +        &hvm_max_cpuid_policy,
>>>>> +        &hvm_max_msr_policy,
>>>>> +    },
>>>>> +    [ XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_pv_default ] = {
>>>>> +        &pv_max_cpuid_policy,
>>>>> +        &pv_max_msr_policy,
>>>>> +    },
>>>>> +    [ XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_hvm_default ] = {
>>>>> +        &hvm_max_cpuid_policy,
>>>>> +        &hvm_max_msr_policy,
>>>>> +    },
>>>>> +};
>>>> ... this does not make obvious (without consulting sysctl.h) that
>>>> there are now holes (and hence hidden NULL pointers); this is
>>>> perhaps already undesirable with the user of this array that the
>>>> next patch adds.
>>> What holes?  There shouldn't be any, and gdb confirms my expectations:
>>>
>>> (gdb) p/x system_policies
>>> $1 = {{cpuid = 0xffff82d080474a80, msr = 0xffff82d080475960}, {cpuid =
>>> 0xffff82d080474340, msr = 0xffff82d08047595c}, {cpuid =
>>> 0xffff82d080473c00, msr = 0xffff82d080475954}, {cpuid =
>>> 0xffff82d0804734c0, msr = 0xffff82d080475958}, {cpuid =
>>> 0xffff82d080473c00, msr = 0xffff82d080475954}, {cpuid =
>>> 0xffff82d0804734c0, msr = 0xffff82d080475958}}
>> I didn't say there are holes, I've said "does not make obvious".
> 
> You did, but I guess what you meant to write was "... are no holes"
> rather "... are now holes".

Oops.

>> For example, it is not unreasonable to imagine for the
>> XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_* values to start at 1 rather than zero, in
>> which case there would be two hidden NULLs at the start of the
>> array.
> 
> Why does this matter?  We have similar patterns elsewhere, and the array
> cannot reasonably be used without the symbolic names (as it is really an
> unordered set happening to be layed out in array form).

It was you even more than me who was worried about NULL pointers
sitting in random places, waiting to be de-referenced. Besides the
obvious reference by symbolic, there are clearly other ways to index
into this array, not to mention someone setting up a loop over it.
Anyway - I can live with it being the way it is, and I've given the ack.

Jan



_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-16 13:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-13 20:03 [PATCH v2 00/13] x86: CPUID and MSR policy marshalling support Andrew Cooper
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] x86/msr: Drop stale comment for vcpu_msrs.spec_ctrl Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  7:21   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16  9:37   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 11:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] libx86: Introduce libx86/cpuid.h Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:23   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:22     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:51       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] libx86: generate cpuid-autogen.h in the libx86 include dir Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:31   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] libx86: Share struct cpuid_policy with userspace Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:38   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16  9:51     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:04       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:16         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:24           ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] libx86: introduce a libx86 shared library Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:02   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 10:17   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:35     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:52       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] libx86: Introduce libx86/msr.h and share msr_policy with userspace Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:41   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 10:19   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] libx86: Introduce a helper to serialise cpuid_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:18   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16  9:45     ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:39       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:55         ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:45   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 10:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-17 11:58       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] libx86: Introduce a helper to serialise msr_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:24   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 10:47   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] libx86: Introduce a helper to deserialise cpuid_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:57   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-17 10:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] libx86: introduce a helper to deserialise msr_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:07   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 11:36   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 10:17     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-17 12:01       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-17 16:23           ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] x86: Introduce struct cpu_policy to refer to a group of individual policies Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:55   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 10:32   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 12:04   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 12:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 12:29       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 13:15         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 13:23           ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] x86/sysctl: Implement XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_policy Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:16   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 10:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 11:04       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 11:54   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 16:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-18  6:45       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] x86/domctl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_get_cpu_policy Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:26   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-17 17:08     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 12:00   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-30  2:14   ` Chao Gao
2018-08-17 21:22   ` Daniel De Graaf
2018-07-30  2:46 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] x86: CPUID and MSR policy marshalling support Chao Gao

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5B4C9C4A02000078001D46C9@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com \
    --to=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
    --cc=sergey.dyasli@citrix.com \
    --cc=wei.liu2@citrix.com \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xen.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.