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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
	Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/13] libx86: introduce a helper to deserialise msr_policy objects
Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 11:17:54 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f8ad62da-d243-64c4-6a97-f074996a6371@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5B4C835902000078001D4569@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>

On 16/07/18 12:36, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 13.07.18 at 22:03, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> --- a/xen/common/libx86/msr.c
>> +++ b/xen/common/libx86/msr.c
>> @@ -45,6 +45,57 @@ int x86_msr_copy_to_buffer(const struct msr_policy *p,
>>      return 0;
>>  }
>>  
>> +int x86_msr_copy_from_buffer(struct msr_policy *p,
>> +                             const msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t nr_msrs,
>> +                             uint32_t *err_msr)
>> +{
>> +    unsigned int i;
>> +    xen_msr_entry_t data;
>> +
>> +    /*
>> +     * A well formed caller is expected pass an array with entries in order,
>> +     * and without any repetitions.  However, due to per-vendor differences,
>> +     * and in the case of upgrade or levelled scenarios, we typically expect
>> +     * fewer than MAX entries to be passed.
>> +     *
>> +     * Detecting repeated entries is prohibitively complicated, so we don't
>> +     * bother.  That said, one way or another if more than MAX entries are
>> +     * passed, something is wrong.
>> +     */
>> +    if ( nr_msrs > MSR_MAX_SERIALISED_ENTRIES )
>> +        return -E2BIG;
>> +
>> +    for ( i = 0; i < nr_msrs; i++ )
>> +    {
>> +        if ( copy_from_buffer_offset(&data, msrs, i, 1) )
>> +            return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +        if ( data.flags ) /* .flags MBZ */
>> +            goto err;
>> +
>> +        switch ( data.idx )
>> +        {
>> +        case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
>> +            if ( data.val > ~0u )
> I suppose this is to guard against truncation. I think it would be
> more obvious (and future proof) if you used
> (typeof(p->plaform_info.raw))~0,

ITYM ~((typeof(p->plaform_info.raw)0) ...

>  or an intermediate variable
> of that type, or data.val >> (sizeof(p->plaform_info.raw) * 8),
> some of which would likely even trigger a compiler warning once
> the policy field was grown to uint64_t.

... but this is probably better.

>
>> +                goto err;
>> +
>> +            p->plaform_info.raw = data.val;
> No other sanity checking?

Correct.  This is a data marshalling function, not an auditing function.

The auditing functions are also needed for in-place modification to an
existing policy.

~Andrew

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-17 10:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-13 20:03 [PATCH v2 00/13] x86: CPUID and MSR policy marshalling support Andrew Cooper
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] x86/msr: Drop stale comment for vcpu_msrs.spec_ctrl Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  7:21   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16  9:37   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 11:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] libx86: Introduce libx86/cpuid.h Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:23   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:22     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:51       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] libx86: generate cpuid-autogen.h in the libx86 include dir Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:31   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] libx86: Share struct cpuid_policy with userspace Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:38   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16  9:51     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:04       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:16         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:24           ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] libx86: introduce a libx86 shared library Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:02   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 10:17   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:35     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:52       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] libx86: Introduce libx86/msr.h and share msr_policy with userspace Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:41   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 10:19   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] libx86: Introduce a helper to serialise cpuid_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:18   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16  9:45     ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:39       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:55         ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 10:45   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 10:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-17 11:58       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] libx86: Introduce a helper to serialise msr_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:24   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 10:47   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] libx86: Introduce a helper to deserialise cpuid_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:57   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-17 10:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] libx86: introduce a helper to deserialise msr_policy objects Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:07   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 11:36   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 10:17     ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-07-17 12:01       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-17 16:23           ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] x86: Introduce struct cpu_policy to refer to a group of individual policies Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16  9:55   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 10:32   ` Wei Liu
2018-07-16 12:04   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 12:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 12:29       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 13:15         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 13:23           ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] x86/sysctl: Implement XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_policy Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:16   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-16 10:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 11:04       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-16 11:54   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-17 16:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-18  6:45       ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-13 20:03 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] x86/domctl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_get_cpu_policy Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 10:26   ` Roger Pau Monné
2018-07-17 17:08     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-07-16 12:00   ` Jan Beulich
2018-07-30  2:14   ` Chao Gao
2018-08-17 21:22   ` Daniel De Graaf
2018-07-30  2:46 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] x86: CPUID and MSR policy marshalling support Chao Gao

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