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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 15:09:43 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e391176-9bf1-617c-0b3d-00aada2b3856@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170308070934.GC11045@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>

On 3/8/2017 1:09 AM, Dave Young wrote:
> On 02/16/17 at 09:47am, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Use memremap() to map the setup data.  This will make the appropriate
>> decision as to whether a RAM remapping can be done or if a fallback to
>> ioremap_cache() is needed (similar to the setup data debugfs support).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
>>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> index 4afc67f..d653b3e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
>>  #include <linux/stat.h>
>>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/io.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/io.h>
>>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>> @@ -79,12 +80,12 @@ static int get_setup_data_paddr(int nr, u64 *paddr)
>>  			*paddr = pa_data;
>>  			return 0;
>>  		}
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data)
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  		i++;
>>  	}
>>  	return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -97,17 +98,17 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_size(int nr, size_t *size)
>>  	u64 pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>
>>  	while (pa_data) {
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data)
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>  		if (nr == i) {
>>  			*size = data->len;
>> -			iounmap(data);
>> +			memunmap(data);
>>  			return 0;
>>  		}
>>
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  		i++;
>>  	}
>>  	return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -127,12 +128,12 @@ static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj,
>>  	ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return ret;
>> -	data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +	data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!data)
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>
>>  	ret = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", data->type);
>> -	iounmap(data);
>> +	memunmap(data);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
>>  	ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return ret;
>> -	data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +	data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!data)
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> @@ -170,15 +171,15 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
>>  		goto out;
>>
>>  	ret = count;
>> -	p = ioremap_cache(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len);
>> +	p = memremap(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len, MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!p) {
>>  		ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  		goto out;
>>  	}
>>  	memcpy(buf, p + off, count);
>> -	iounmap(p);
>> +	memunmap(p);
>>  out:
>> -	iounmap(data);
>> +	memunmap(data);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -250,13 +251,13 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_total_num(u64 pa_data, int *nr)
>>  	*nr = 0;
>>  	while (pa_data) {
>>  		*nr += 1;
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data) {
>>  			ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  			goto out;
>>  		}
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  	}
>>
>>  out:
>>
>
> It would be better that these cleanup patches are sent separately.

Bjorn suggested something along the same line so I've combined all the
changes from ioremap to memremap as a single pre-patch in the series.
I could send them separately if needed.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
>
> Thanks
> Dave
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozz>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 15:09:43 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e391176-9bf1-617c-0b3d-00aada2b3856@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170308070934.GC11045@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>

On 3/8/2017 1:09 AM, Dave Young wrote:
> On 02/16/17 at 09:47am, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Use memremap() to map the setup data.  This will make the appropriate
>> decision as to whether a RAM remapping can be done or if a fallback to
>> ioremap_cache() is needed (similar to the setup data debugfs support).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
>>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> index 4afc67f..d653b3e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
>>  #include <linux/stat.h>
>>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/io.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/io.h>
>>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>> @@ -79,12 +80,12 @@ static int get_setup_data_paddr(int nr, u64 *paddr)
>>  			*paddr = pa_data;
>>  			return 0;
>>  		}
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data)
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  		i++;
>>  	}
>>  	return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -97,17 +98,17 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_size(int nr, size_t *size)
>>  	u64 pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>
>>  	while (pa_data) {
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data)
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>  		if (nr == i) {
>>  			*size = data->len;
>> -			iounmap(data);
>> +			memunmap(data);
>>  			return 0;
>>  		}
>>
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  		i++;
>>  	}
>>  	return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -127,12 +128,12 @@ static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj,
>>  	ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return ret;
>> -	data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +	data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!data)
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>
>>  	ret = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", data->type);
>> -	iounmap(data);
>> +	memunmap(data);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
>>  	ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return ret;
>> -	data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +	data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!data)
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> @@ -170,15 +171,15 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
>>  		goto out;
>>
>>  	ret = count;
>> -	p = ioremap_cache(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len);
>> +	p = memremap(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len, MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!p) {
>>  		ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  		goto out;
>>  	}
>>  	memcpy(buf, p + off, count);
>> -	iounmap(p);
>> +	memunmap(p);
>>  out:
>> -	iounmap(data);
>> +	memunmap(data);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -250,13 +251,13 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_total_num(u64 pa_data, int *nr)
>>  	*nr = 0;
>>  	while (pa_data) {
>>  		*nr += 1;
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data) {
>>  			ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  			goto out;
>>  		}
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  	}
>>
>>  out:
>>
>
> It would be better that these cleanup patches are sent separately.

Bjorn suggested something along the same line so I've combined all the
changes from ioremap to memremap as a single pre-patch in the series.
I could send them separately if needed.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
>
> Thanks
> Dave
>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 15:09:43 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e391176-9bf1-617c-0b3d-00aada2b3856@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170308070934.GC11045@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com>

On 3/8/2017 1:09 AM, Dave Young wrote:
> On 02/16/17 at 09:47am, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Use memremap() to map the setup data.  This will make the appropriate
>> decision as to whether a RAM remapping can be done or if a fallback to
>> ioremap_cache() is needed (similar to the setup data debugfs support).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
>>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> index 4afc67f..d653b3e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
>> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
>>  #include <linux/stat.h>
>>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/io.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/io.h>
>>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>> @@ -79,12 +80,12 @@ static int get_setup_data_paddr(int nr, u64 *paddr)
>>  			*paddr = pa_data;
>>  			return 0;
>>  		}
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data)
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  		i++;
>>  	}
>>  	return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -97,17 +98,17 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_size(int nr, size_t *size)
>>  	u64 pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>
>>  	while (pa_data) {
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data)
>>  			return -ENOMEM;
>>  		if (nr == i) {
>>  			*size = data->len;
>> -			iounmap(data);
>> +			memunmap(data);
>>  			return 0;
>>  		}
>>
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  		i++;
>>  	}
>>  	return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -127,12 +128,12 @@ static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj,
>>  	ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return ret;
>> -	data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +	data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!data)
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>
>>  	ret = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", data->type);
>> -	iounmap(data);
>> +	memunmap(data);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
>>  	ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		return ret;
>> -	data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +	data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!data)
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> @@ -170,15 +171,15 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
>>  		goto out;
>>
>>  	ret = count;
>> -	p = ioremap_cache(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len);
>> +	p = memremap(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len, MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  	if (!p) {
>>  		ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  		goto out;
>>  	}
>>  	memcpy(buf, p + off, count);
>> -	iounmap(p);
>> +	memunmap(p);
>>  out:
>> -	iounmap(data);
>> +	memunmap(data);
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>
>> @@ -250,13 +251,13 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_total_num(u64 pa_data, int *nr)
>>  	*nr = 0;
>>  	while (pa_data) {
>>  		*nr += 1;
>> -		data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>  		if (!data) {
>>  			ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  			goto out;
>>  		}
>>  		pa_data = data->next;
>> -		iounmap(data);
>> +		memunmap(data);
>>  	}
>>
>>  out:
>>
>
> It would be better that these cleanup patches are sent separately.

Bjorn suggested something along the same line so I've combined all the
changes from ioremap to memremap as a single pre-patch in the series.
I could send them separately if needed.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
>
> Thanks
> Dave
>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
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Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-17 20:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 355+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-16 15:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/28] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 17:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 17:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/28] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 11:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 15:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/28] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 18:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 18:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 20:06         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/28] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 11:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/28] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 12:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 12:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 12:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 14:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/28] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 15:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 15:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:18     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 12:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 12:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-22 18:13     ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-23 23:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-22 18:13     ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/28] x86: Extend the early_memremap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 15:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 15:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 18:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 19:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 19:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/28] x86: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 20:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 20:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03  9:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/28] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/28] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return defined EFI mem types Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 12:05   ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-21 12:05     ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-21 12:05     ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-23 17:27     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 17:27       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 17:27       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-24  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-24  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-23 21:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 10:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 10:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:04         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  6:55   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/28] Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 22:58   ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-17 22:58     ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-23 21:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-23 21:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/28] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-25 17:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 17:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 17:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 17:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/28] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:59     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:59     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 17:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 17:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 17:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-02-27 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 17:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 17:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/28] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/28] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-27 18:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 18:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:28     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/28] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/28] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/28] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:04   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:04     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:04     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:09   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:09     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:09     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 20:09     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-03-17 20:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 20:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:57   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:57     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:57     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01  9:25       ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:25         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:25         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-06 17:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  8:12           ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  8:12             ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  8:12             ` Dave Young
2017-02-28 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 10:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 10:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/28] x86: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 17:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 18:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 18:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 16:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 16:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 16:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 17:42       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 17:42         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 17:42         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-18 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov
2017-02-18 18:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:42   ` Rik van Riel
2017-02-21 17:42     ` Rik van Riel
2017-02-21 17:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01  9:17 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 17:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky

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