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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: New LSM hooks
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 12:06:04 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6598f48a-f50f-1976-f766-126c0a43f7d9@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e1492ac6-d1b2-ce2b-c0df-1f30601747ad@schaufler-ca.com>

On 2/6/19 11:30 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/5/2019 5:11 PM, James Morris wrote:
>> On Tue, 5 Feb 2019, Paul Moore wrote:
>>
>>> I believe that will always be a problem, no matter what we do.  The
>>> point I was trying to make was that everyone, especially the
>>> maintainers, need to watch for this when patches are posted and make
>>> sure the patch author posts to the LSM list in addition to any of the
>>> relevant LSM specific lists.
>> Right, and there is no way a new LSM hook should ever be added to the
>> kernel without review and ack/signoffs from folks on the LSM list
>> (especially those who are maintainers of in-tree LSMs).
>>
>> Casey, do you have any examples of this happening?
> 
> overlayfs (according to my records - which may be flawed)
> is a prime example. Inifiniband hooks were reviewed/acked
> for SELinux, but there was never an attempt made to work
> with other security module maintainers. Yes, they were posted
> to LSM, but under the title "SELinux support for Infiniband".

overlayfs hooks were also posted to and discussed on lsm list, including 
comments from you.  Admittedly the cover patch said Overlayfs SELinux 
Support but the individual patches for the hooks were "security, 
overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files" and 
"security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for 
overlay file".

In either case, did you request a change that was ignored?



  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-06 17:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-05 17:40 New LSM hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-02-05 18:15 ` Paul Moore
2019-02-05 20:04   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06  0:01     ` Paul Moore
2019-02-06  1:11       ` James Morris
2019-02-06 13:20         ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-06 17:24           ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 17:44             ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-06 18:18               ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 16:30         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 17:06           ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-02-06 17:44             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 17:48               ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-05 18:28 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-05 19:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-05 19:58     ` Paul Moore
2019-02-05 20:10     ` Edwin Zimmerman

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