From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: New LSM hooks
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 09:24:18 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ca70d18c-3576-fce9-a65b-faf585a536b2@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <84c96e67-6668-b954-0a6b-2bccb00c124c@tycho.nsa.gov>
On 2/6/2019 5:20 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 2/5/19 8:11 PM, James Morris wrote:
>> On Tue, 5 Feb 2019, Paul Moore wrote:
>>
>>> I believe that will always be a problem, no matter what we do. The
>>> point I was trying to make was that everyone, especially the
>>> maintainers, need to watch for this when patches are posted and make
>>> sure the patch author posts to the LSM list in addition to any of the
>>> relevant LSM specific lists.
>>
>> Right, and there is no way a new LSM hook should ever be added to the
>> kernel without review and ack/signoffs from folks on the LSM list
>> (especially those who are maintainers of in-tree LSMs).
>>
>> Casey, do you have any examples of this happening?
>
> Most of the times I've seen that it has come from vfs folks or other subsystems as part of some major reworking of that subsystem rather than from security module developers, e.g. the mount hooks overhaul.
David Howells did contact me directly on the mount hook
changes well in advance. I'm more concerned with special
purpose hooks like we have for binder, kernfs, nfs, tun,
Infiniband and bpf. I'm not saying that we never need to
provide hooks with a single user, but you do have to
wonder about security_ismaclabel().
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-06 17:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-05 17:40 New LSM hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-02-05 18:15 ` Paul Moore
2019-02-05 20:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 0:01 ` Paul Moore
2019-02-06 1:11 ` James Morris
2019-02-06 13:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-06 17:24 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-02-06 17:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-06 18:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 16:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 17:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-06 17:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-06 17:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-05 18:28 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-05 19:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-05 19:58 ` Paul Moore
2019-02-05 20:10 ` Edwin Zimmerman
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