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From: "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@kernel.org" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Brown, Len" <len.brown@intel.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Macieira, Thiago" <thiago.macieira@intel.com>,
	"Liu, Jing2" <jing2.liu@intel.com>,
	"Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 12/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Use feature disable (XFD) to protect dynamic user state
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 19:47:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7012BF86-4D1E-41C9-BDB7-70E8F4952144@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YR00U19168BGoRB9@zn.tnic>

[ Cut out the API comments and other obvious ones here. ]

On Aug 18, 2021, at 09:24, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 30, 2021 at 07:59:43AM -0700, Chang S. Bae wrote:
> 
>> +/**
>> + * xfd_switch - Switches the MSR IA32_XFD context if needed.
>> + * @prev:	The previous task's struct fpu pointer
>> + * @next:	The next task's struct fpu pointer
>> + */
>> +static inline void xfd_switch(struct fpu *prev, struct fpu *next)
>> +{
>> +	u64 prev_xfd_mask, next_xfd_mask;
>> +
>> +	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD) || !xfd_capable())
> 
> cpu_feature_enabled(). Use that everywhere in your patchset. But you
> know already...

Yes, I did on my local.

>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	prev_xfd_mask = prev->state_mask & xfd_capable();
>> +	next_xfd_mask = next->state_mask & xfd_capable();
> 
> This is just plain misleading:
> 
> You're *AND*ing a mask with xfd_capable?!?
> 
> Just use xfeatures_mask_user_dynamic directly instead, as already
> mentioned.

Okay.

>> +	if (unlikely(prev_xfd_mask != next_xfd_mask))
>> +		xfd_write(xfd_capable() ^ next_xfd_mask);
>> +}
> 
> Here too.
> 
> Also, I must be missing something. Let's play with some imaginary masks:
> 
> prev->state_mask = 110b
> next->state_mask = 111b
> dyn		 = 101b
> 
> ("dyn" is short for xfeatures_mask_user_dynamic)
> 
> prev_xfd_mask = 100b
> next_xfd_mask = 101b
> 
> if (unlikely(100b != 101b))
> 	xfd_write(101b ^ 101b) == xfd_write(0)
> 
> so next has bits 2 and 0 set but the xfd write zaps them so next won't
> get any more #NMs for those states.
> 
> Why?

Because the next has already fully expanded the buffer -- its state_mask
equals to feature_mask_user_dynamic.

No more XFD event is needed for the task.

>> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>> index a58800973aed..dd66d528afd8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>> @@ -1112,6 +1112,45 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_device_not_available)
>> {
>> 	unsigned long cr0 = read_cr0();
>> 
>> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD)) {
> 
> This whole thing wants to be in a separate function. Even the
> indentation level is begging for it.

Ah, it was once in a separate function until V4. Since trimmed down quite a
bit in V5, it has grown from there.

Let me fix this.

>> +		u64 xfd_err;
>> +
>> +		rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, &xfd_err);
>> +		wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, 0);
>> +
>> +		if (xfd_err) {
>> +			u64 xfd_event = xfd_err & xfd_capable();
>> +
>> +			if (WARN_ON(!xfd_event)) {
>> +				/*
>> +				 * Unexpected event is raised. But update XFD state to
>> +				 * unblock the task.
>> +				 */
>> +				xfd_write(xfd_read() & ~xfd_err);
> 
> So AFAIU, xfd_err points to some other feature which caused this
> exception.
> 
> So if that feature bit is set in XFD, you're clearing it here. Why?
> 
> So that it doesn't raise that #NM for it anymore?
> 
> This looks weird.

If this ever happens, something might be wrong with the hardware.

If the bit is not reset, it will get stuck with repeatedly unhandled #NMs,
which I think is even more terrible.

>> +			} else {
>> +				struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
>> +				int err = -1;
>> +
>> +				/*
>> +				 * Make sure not in interrupt context as handling a
>> +				 * trap from userspace.
>> +				 */
>> +				if (!WARN_ON(in_interrupt())) {
> 
> I'm guessing that's supposed to stop people from using AMX and other
> dynamic states in the kernel?

But the kernel can handle this without XFD?

Thanks,
Chang



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-18 19:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 91+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-30 14:59 [PATCH v9 00/26] x86: Support Intel Advanced Matrix Extensions Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify the initialization helper to handle both static and dynamic buffers Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify state copy helpers " Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Modify address finders " Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add a new variable to indicate dynamic user states Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add new variables to indicate dynamic XSTATE buffer size Chang S. Bae
2021-08-12 15:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Calculate and remember dynamic XSTATE buffer sizes Chang S. Bae
2021-08-12 16:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Convert the struct fpu 'state' field to a pointer Chang S. Bae
2021-08-12 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 08/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce helpers to manage the XSTATE buffer dynamically Chang S. Bae
2021-08-12 19:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-13  8:04     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-13 10:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-13 19:43         ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-18  9:28           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 19:46             ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-25 16:01               ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-30 17:07               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-30 23:39                 ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-16 18:33     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-16 18:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-30 17:45   ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-30 23:39     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 09/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Update the XSTATE save function to support dynamic states Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 10/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Update the XSTATE buffer address finder " Chang S. Bae
2021-08-18 11:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 19:47     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-30 17:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-30 23:38         ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 11/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Update the XSTATE context copy function " Chang S. Bae
2021-08-18 12:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 19:47     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 12/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Use feature disable (XFD) to protect dynamic user state Chang S. Bae
2021-08-18 16:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 17:20     ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-18 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 17:58         ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-18 18:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-24 22:51             ` Len Brown
2021-08-18 20:43         ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-18 21:04           ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-18 21:12             ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-18 22:27               ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-19  1:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-19 16:06               ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-18 21:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 21:37             ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-19  8:00               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-19 15:24                 ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-24 23:22             ` Len Brown
2021-08-30 17:31               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-17  3:48                 ` Len Brown
2021-08-18 19:47     ` Bae, Chang Seok [this message]
2021-08-24 22:21     ` Len Brown
2021-08-30 17:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-31 21:44         ` Len Brown
2021-08-24 23:17     ` Len Brown
2021-08-30 17:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-31 22:07         ` Len Brown
2021-08-31 22:11           ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-30 18:04       ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-31 22:15         ` Len Brown
2021-08-31 22:16           ` Len Brown
2021-08-31 22:39           ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-31 22:44             ` Len Brown
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 13/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Support ptracer-induced XSTATE buffer expansion Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 14/26] x86/arch_prctl: Create ARCH_SET_STATE_ENABLE/ARCH_GET_STATE_ENABLE Chang S. Bae
2021-08-06 16:46   ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-09 22:08     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-09 23:42       ` Thiago Macieira
2021-08-10  0:57         ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-13 19:44           ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 15/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Support both legacy and expanded signal XSTATE size Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 16/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Adjust the XSAVE feature table to address gaps in state component numbers Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 17/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Disable XSTATE support if an inconsistent state is detected Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 18/26] x86/cpufeatures/amx: Enumerate Advanced Matrix Extension (AMX) feature bits Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 19/26] x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 20/26] x86/fpu/amx: Initialize child's AMX state Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 21/26] x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 22/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Skip writing zeros to signal frame for dynamic user states if in INIT-state Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 23/26] selftest/x86/amx: Test cases for the AMX state management Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 24/26] x86/insn/amx: Add TILERELEASE instruction to the opcode map Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 25/26] intel_idle/amx: Add SPR support with XTILEDATA capability Chang S. Bae
2021-07-30 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-03 21:32     ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-08-03 21:38       ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-03 21:43         ` Brown, Len
2021-07-30 20:15   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-30 14:59 ` [PATCH v9 26/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add a sanity check for XFD state when saving XSTATE Chang S. Bae

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