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From: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	<netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org>, <yusongping@huawei.com>,
	<anton.sirazetdinov@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 15/15] samples/landlock: adds network demo
Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 16:33:20 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7a5671cd-6bf3-9d17-ef17-ac9129386447@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <179ac2ee-37ff-92da-c381-c2c716725045@digikod.net>



5/17/2022 12:19 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> 
> 
> On 16/05/2022 17:20, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> This commit adds network demo. It's possible to
>> allow a sandoxer to bind/connect to a list of
>> particular ports restricting networks actions to
>> the rest of ports.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * Adds ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND" and
>> ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT" variables
>> to insert TCP ports.
>> * Renames populate_ruleset() to populate_ruleset_fs().
>> * Adds populate_ruleset_net() and parse_port_num() helpers.
>> * Refactoring main() to support network sandboxing.
>>
>> ---
>>   samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>   security/landlock/ruleset.h  |   4 +-
>>   2 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
>> index 3e404e51ec64..4006c42eec1c 100644
>> --- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
>> +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
>> @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int 
>> ruleset_fd,
>>
>>   #define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"
>>   #define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
>> +#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
>> +#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
>>   #define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":"
>>
>>   static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
>> @@ -71,6 +73,20 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char 
>> ***const path_list)
>>       return num_paths;
>>   }
>>
>> +static int parse_port_num(char *env_port)
>> +{
>> +    int i, num_ports = 0;
>> +
>> +    if (env_port) {
>> +        num_ports++;
>> +        for (i = 0; env_port[i]; i++) {
>> +            if (env_port[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0])
>> +                num_ports++;
>> +        }
>> +    }
>> +    return num_ports;
>> +}
>> +
>>   /* clang-format off */
>>
>>   #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
>> @@ -80,7 +96,7 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char 
>> ***const path_list)
>>
>>   /* clang-format on */
>>
>> -static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int 
>> ruleset_fd,
>> +static int populate_ruleset_fs(const char *const env_var, const int 
>> ruleset_fd,
>>                   const __u64 allowed_access)
>>   {
>>       int num_paths, i, ret = 1;
>> @@ -142,6 +158,49 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const 
>> env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>>       return ret;
>>   }
>>
>> +static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var,
>> +                const int ruleset_fd,
>> +                const __u64 allowed_access)
>> +{
>> +    int num_ports, i, ret = 1;
>> +    char *env_port_name;
>> +    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>> +        .allowed_access = 0,
>> +        .port = 0,
>> +    };
>> +
>> +    env_port_name = getenv(env_var);
>> +    if (!env_port_name) {
>> +        /* Prevents users to forget a setting. */
>> +        fprintf(stderr, "Missing environment variable %s\n", env_var);
>> +        return 1;
> 
> I think network ports should be optional to be able to test without that 
> (and not break compatibility). You can pass &ruleset_attr as argument to 
> update it accordingly:
> - without environment variable: no network restriction;
> - with empty environment variable: all connect (or bind) denied;
> - otherwise: only allow the listed ports.
> 
   Great. That makes sense. Cause anyway fs restrictions are major ones.
> 
>> +    }
>> +    env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name);
>> +    unsetenv(env_var);
>> +    num_ports = parse_port_num(env_port_name);
>> +
>> +    if (num_ports == 1 && (strtok(env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN) == 
>> NULL)) {
>> +        ret = 0;
>> +        goto out_free_name;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++) {
>> +        net_service.allowed_access = allowed_access;
>> +        net_service.port = atoi(strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN));
>> +        if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> +                    &net_service, 0)) {
>> +            fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the ruleset with port 
>> \"%d\": %s\n",
>> +                    net_service.port, strerror(errno));
>> +            goto out_free_name;
>> +        }
>> +    }
>> +    ret = 0;
>> +
>> +out_free_name:
>> +    free(env_port_name);
>> +    return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>>   /* clang-format off */
>>
>>   #define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
>> @@ -173,19 +232,24 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], 
>> char *const *const envp)
>>       char *const *cmd_argv;
>>       int ruleset_fd, abi;
>>       __u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
>> -          access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | 
>> ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
>> +          access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | 
>> ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE,
>> +          access_net_tcp = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> +                    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
>>       struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>>           .handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
>> +        .handled_access_net = access_net_tcp,
>>       };
>>
>>       if (argc < 2) {
>>           fprintf(stderr,
>> -            "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n",
>> -            ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
>> +            "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\"%s "
>> +            "<cmd> [args]...\n\n", ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME,
>> +            ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
>>           fprintf(stderr,
>>               "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n");
>> -        fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, "
>> -                "each separated by a colon:\n");
>> +        fprintf(stderr,
>> +            "Environment variables containing paths and ports "
>> +            "each separated by a colon:\n");
>>           fprintf(stderr,
>>               "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only 
>> way.\n",
>>               ENV_FS_RO_NAME);
>> @@ -193,11 +257,19 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], 
>> char *const *const envp)
>>               "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write 
>> way.\n",
>>               ENV_FS_RW_NAME);
>>           fprintf(stderr,
>> -            "\nexample:\n"
>> +            "* %s: list of ports allowed to bind (server).\n",
>> +            ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
>> +        fprintf(stderr,
>> +            "* %s: list of ports allowed to connect (client).\n",
>> +            ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
> 
> This is good and will be better with clang-format. ;)

   Yep. I will fix it. Thanks.
> 
>> +        fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n"
>>               "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
>>               "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
>> +            "%s=\"15000:16000\" "
> 
> Bind ports example should reference unprivileged ports such as "9418" 
> (git, not well-known but OK).
> 
  Ok. I will change it
> 
>> +            "%s=\"10000:12000\" "
> 
> Connect ports example should reference well-known ports such as "80:443".
> 
   Ditto.
>>               "%s bash -i\n",
>> -            ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
>> +            ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
>> +            ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
>>           return 1;
>>       }
>>
>> @@ -234,16 +306,25 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], 
>> char *const *const envp)
>>
>>       ruleset_fd =
>>           landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 
>> 0);
>> +
> 
> Why?

   Oh. Sorry. My mistake. I will fix it as it was.
> 
> 
>>       if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
>>           perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
>>           return 1;
>>       }
>> -    if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
>> +    if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro))
>>           goto err_close_ruleset;
>> -    }
> 
> Why? I know that checkpatch.pl prints a warning for that but I 
> delibirately chooe to use curly braces even for "if" statements with one 
> line because it is safer. This code may be copied/pasted and I'd like 
> others to avoid introducing goto-fail-like issues.
> 

  It was done just to reduce the number of checkpatch.pl warnings.
  If you want it to be formated in your way I will fix it.
> 
> 
>> -    if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
>> +
>> +    if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw))
>>           goto err_close_ruleset;
>> -    }
>> +
>> +    if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ruleset_fd,
>> +                 LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP))
> 
> So please use curly braces here too.

   Ok. No problems.
> 
>> +        goto err_close_ruleset;
>> +
>> +    if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ruleset_fd,
>> +                 LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP))
>> +        goto err_close_ruleset;
>> +
>>       if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
>>           perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
>>           goto err_close_ruleset;
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
>> index 916b30b31c06..e1ff40f238a6 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
>> @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
>>   #include "limits.h"
>>   #include "object.h"
>>
>> -typedef u16 access_mask_t;
>> +typedef u32 access_mask_t;
> 
> What‽

   You are right. I will move this changes to another commit, related 
the kernel updates. I might have forgotten to rebase this change and 
left it in sandboxer patch. Thank you..
> 
> 
>>
>>   /* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
>>   static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
>> @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
>>                * layers are set once and never changed for the
>>                * lifetime of the ruleset.
>>                */
>> -            u32 access_masks[];
>> +            access_mask_t access_masks[];
>>           };
>>       };
>>   };
>> -- 
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-19 13:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-16 15:20 [PATCH v5 00/15] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 01/15] landlock: access mask renaming Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  8:12   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-18  9:16     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 02/15] landlock: landlock_find/insert_rule refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 03/15] landlock: merge and inherit function refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  8:14   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-18  9:18     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 04/15] landlock: helper functions refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 17:14   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-16 17:43     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 18:28       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-18  9:14         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 05/15] landlock: landlock_add_rule syscall refactoring Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  8:04   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-17  8:10     ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19  9:24       ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19  9:23     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 14:37       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:35         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 06/15] landlock: user space API network support Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 07/15] landlock: add support network rules Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  8:27   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19  9:27     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 14:42       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:36         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 08/15] landlock: TCP network hooks implementation Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  8:51   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 11:40     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 09/15] seltests/landlock: add tests for bind() hooks Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 21:11   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 12:10     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 14:29       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:34         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 10/15] seltests/landlock: add tests for connect() hooks Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 11/15] seltests/landlock: connect() with AF_UNSPEC tests Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  8:55   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 12:31     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:00       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:40         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:02       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:42         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 12/15] seltests/landlock: rules overlapping test Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 17:41   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 12:24     ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-19 15:04       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:55         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 13/15] seltests/landlock: ruleset expanding test Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 14/15] seltests/landlock: invalid user input data test Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-16 15:20 ` [PATCH v5 15/15] samples/landlock: adds network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-17  9:19   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-19 13:33     ` Konstantin Meskhidze [this message]
2022-05-19 15:09       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-24  8:41         ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2022-05-20 10:48 ` [PATCH v5 00/15] Network support for Landlock - UDP discussion Mickaël Salaün
2022-05-25  9:41   ` Konstantin Meskhidze

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