From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Christoffer Dall" <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
"James Hogan" <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@redhat.com>,
"Christoffer Dall" <cdall@linaro.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 15:34:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86h8umasg1.fsf@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171026134547.23664-2-pbonzini@redhat.com> (Paolo Bonzini's message of "Thu, 26 Oct 2017 15:45:46 +0200")
On Thu, Oct 26 2017 at 3:45:46 pm BST, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> On x86, ARM and s390, struct kvm_vcpu_arch has a usercopy region
> taht is read and written by the KVM_GET/SET_CPUID2 ioctls (x86)
> or KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG (ARM/s390). Without whitelisting the area,
> KVM is completely broken on those architectures with usercopy hardening
> enabled.
>
> For now, allow writing to the entire struct on all architectures.
> The KVM tree will not refine this to an architecture-specific
> subset of struct kvm_vcpu_arch.
>
> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@redhat.com>
> Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
M.
--
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Christoffer Dall" <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
"James Hogan" <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@redhat.com>,
"Christoffer Dall" <cdall@linaro.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 15:34:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86h8umasg1.fsf@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171026134547.23664-2-pbonzini@redhat.com> (Paolo Bonzini's message of "Thu, 26 Oct 2017 15:45:46 +0200")
On Thu, Oct 26 2017 at 3:45:46 pm BST, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> On x86, ARM and s390, struct kvm_vcpu_arch has a usercopy region
> taht is read and written by the KVM_GET/SET_CPUID2 ioctls (x86)
> or KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG (ARM/s390). Without whitelisting the area,
> KVM is completely broken on those architectures with usercopy hardening
> enabled.
>
> For now, allow writing to the entire struct on all architectures.
> The KVM tree will not refine this to an architecture-specific
> subset of struct kvm_vcpu_arch.
>
> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@redhat.com>
> Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
M.
--
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-26 14:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-26 13:45 [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: fixes for the kernel-hardening tree Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-26 13:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-26 13:45 ` [PATCH 1/2] kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-26 13:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-26 14:13 ` Cornelia Huck
2017-10-26 14:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Cornelia Huck
2017-10-26 14:21 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-26 14:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-10-26 14:34 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2017-10-26 14:34 ` Marc Zyngier
2017-10-26 14:51 ` Christian Borntraeger
2017-10-26 14:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2017-10-30 23:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-10-30 23:51 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-26 13:45 ` [PATCH 2/2] kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-26 13:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-26 13:48 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-26 13:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-30 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-30 20:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-12-01 8:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-12-01 8:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-27 5:25 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: fixes for the kernel-hardening tree Paul Mackerras
2017-10-27 5:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Mackerras
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