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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
	 netdev@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 avagin@virtuozzo.com,  ktkhai@virtuozzo.com,  serge@hallyn.com,
	 gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2 v2] netns: restrict uevents
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 12:10:30 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <878t99opvd.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180426170324.GA10061@gmail.com> (Christian Brauner's message of "Thu, 26 Apr 2018 19:03:26 +0200")

Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com> writes:

> On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 11:47:19AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com> writes:
>> 
>> > On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 06:00:35PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >> Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com> writes:
>> >> 
>> >> > On Wed, Apr 25, 2018, 00:41 Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >  Bah. This code is obviously correct and probably wrong.
>> >> >
>> >> >  How do we deliver uevents for network devices that are outside of the
>> >> >  initial user namespace? The kernel still needs to deliver those.
>> >> >
>> >> >  The logic to figure out which network namespace a device needs to be
>> >> >  delivered to is is present in kobj_bcast_filter. That logic will almost
>> >> >  certainly need to be turned inside out. Sign not as easy as I would
>> >> >  have hoped.
>> >> >
>> >> > My first patch that we discussed put additional filtering logic into kobj_bcast_filter for that very reason. But I can move that logic
>> >> > out and come up with a new patch.
>> >> 
>> >> I may have mis-understood.
>> >> 
>> >> I heard and am still hearing additional filtering to reduce the places
>> >> the packet is delievered.
>> >> 
>> >> I am saying something needs to change to increase the number of places
>> >> the packet is delivered.
>> >> 
>> >> For the special class of devices that kobj_bcast_filter would apply to
>> >> those need to be delivered to netowrk namespaces  that are no longer on
>> >> uevent_sock_list.
>> >> 
>> >> So the code fundamentally needs to split into two paths.  Ordinary
>> >> devices that use uevent_sock_list.  Network devices that are just
>> >> delivered in their own network namespace.
>> >> 
>> >> netlink_broadcast_filtered gets to go away completely.
>> >
>> > The split *might* make sense but I think you're wrong about removing the
>> > kobj_bcast_filter. The current filter doesn't operate on the uevent
>> > socket in uevent_sock_list itself it rather operates on the sockets in
>> > mc_list. And if socket in mc_list can have a different network namespace
>> > then the uevent_socket itself then your way won't work. That's why my
>> > original patch added additional filtering in there. The way I see it we
>> > need something like:
>> 
>> We already filter the sockets in the mc_list by network namespace.
>
> Oh really? That's good to know. I haven't found where in the code this
> actually happens. I thought that when netlink_bind() is called anyone
> could register themselves in mc_list.

The code in af_netlink.c does:
> static void do_one_broadcast(struct sock *sk,
> 				    struct netlink_broadcast_data *p)
> {
> 	struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
> 	int val;
> 
> 	if (p->exclude_sk == sk)
> 		return;
> 
> 	if (nlk->portid == p->portid || p->group - 1 >= nlk->ngroups ||
> 	    !test_bit(p->group - 1, nlk->groups))
> 		return;
> 
> 	if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), p->net)) {
            ^^^^^^^^^^^^ Here
> 		if (!(nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_LISTEN_ALL_NSID))
> 			return;
                ^^^^^^^^^^^ Here
> 
> 		if (!peernet_has_id(sock_net(sk), p->net))
> 			return;
> 
> 		if (!file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, p->net->user_ns,
> 				     CAP_NET_BROADCAST))
> 			return;
> 	}

Which if you are not a magic NETLINK_F_LISTEN_ALL_NSID socket filters
you out if you are the wrong network namespace.


>> When a packet is transmitted with netlink_broadcast it is only
>> transmitted within a single network namespace.
>> 
>> Even in the case of a NETLINK_F_LISTEN_ALL_NSID socket the skb is tagged
>> with it's source network namespace so no confusion will result, and the
>> permission checks have been done to make it safe. So you can safely
>> ignore that case.  Please ignore that case.  It only needs to be
>> considered if refactoring af_netlink.c
>> 
>> When I added netlink_broadcast_filtered I imagined that we would need
>> code that worked across network namespaces that worked for different
>> namespaces.   So it looked like we would need the level of granularity
>> that you can get with netlink_broadcast_filtered.  It turns out we don't
>> and that it was a case of over design.  As the only split we care about
>> is per network namespace there is no need for
>> netlink_broadcast_filtered.
>> 
>> > init_user_ns_broadcast_filtered(uevent_sock_list, kobj_bcast_filter);
>> > user_ns_broadcast_filtered(uevent_sock_list,kobj_bcast_filter);
>> >
>> > The question that remains is whether we can rely on the network
>> > namespace information we can gather from the kobject_ns_type_operations
>> > to decide where we want to broadcast that event to. So something
>> > *like*:
>> 
>> We can.  We already do.  That is what kobj_bcast_filter implements.
>> 
>> > 	ops = kobj_ns_ops(kobj);
>> > 	if (!ops && kobj->kset) {
>> > 		struct kobject *ksobj = &kobj->kset->kobj;
>> > 		if (ksobj->parent != NULL)
>> > 			ops = kobj_ns_ops(ksobj->parent);
>> > 	}
>> >
>> > 	if (ops && ops->netlink_ns && kobj->ktype->namespace)
>> > 		if (ops->type == KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET)
>> > 			net = kobj->ktype->namespace(kobj);
>> 
>> Please note the only entry in the enumeration in the kobj_ns_type
>> enumeration other than KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE is KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET.  So the
>> check for ops->type in this case is redundant.
>
> Yes, I know the reason for doing it explicitly is to block the case
> where kobjects get tagged with other namespaces. So we'd need to be
> vigilant should that ever happen but fine.

It is fine to keep the check.

I was intending to point out that it is much more likely that we remove
the enumeration and remove some of the extra abstraction, than another
namespace is implemented there.

>> That is something else that could be simplifed.  At the time it was the
>> necessary to get the sysfs changes merged.
>> 
>> > 	if (!net || net->user_ns == &init_user_ns)
>> > 		ret = init_user_ns_broadcast(env, action_string, devpath);
>> > 	else
>> > 		ret = user_ns_broadcast(net->uevent_sock->sk, env,
>> > 					action_string, devpath);
>> 
>> Almost.
>> 
>> 	if (!net)
>>         	kobject_uevent_net_broadcast(kobj, env, action_string,
>>         					dev_path);
>> 	else
>>         	netlink_broadcast(net->uevent_sock->sk, skb, 0, 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> 
>> 
>> I am handwaving to get the skb in the netlink_broadcast case but that
>> should be enough for you to see what I am thinking.
>
> I have added a helper alloc_uevent_skb() that can be used in both cases.
>
> static struct sk_buff *alloc_uevent_skb(struct kobj_uevent_env *env,
> 					const char *action_string,
> 					const char *devpath)
> {
> 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
> 	char *scratch;
> 	size_t len;
>
> 	/* allocate message with maximum possible size */
> 	len = strlen(action_string) + strlen(devpath) + 2;
> 	skb = alloc_skb(len + env->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
> 	if (!skb)
> 		return NULL;
>
> 	/* add header */
> 	scratch = skb_put(skb, len);
> 	sprintf(scratch, "%s@%s", action_string, devpath);
>
> 	skb_put_data(skb, env->buf, env->buflen);
>
> 	NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = 1;
>
> 	return skb;
> }
>
>> 
>> My only concern with the above is that we almost certainly need to fix
>> the credentials on the skb so that userspace does not drop the packet
>> sent to a network namespace because it has the credentials that will
>> cause userspace to drop the packet today.
>> 
>> But it should be straight forward to look at net->user_ns, to fix the
>> credentials.
>
> Yes, afaict, the only thing that needs to be updated is the uid.

I suspect there may also be a gid.

Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-26 17:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-24 20:43 [PATCH net-next 0/2 v2] netns: uevent performance tweaks Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 20:43 ` [PATCH net-next 1/2 v2] netns: restrict uevents Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 21:54   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-24 21:54     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-24 22:40   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-24 22:40     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-24 22:47     ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 23:00       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-24 23:00         ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-26 16:13         ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-26 16:47           ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-26 16:47             ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-26 17:03             ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-26 17:10               ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2018-04-26 17:10                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-26 21:27                 ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-27  0:35                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-27  0:35                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-27  8:41                     ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 22:54     ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 20:43 ` [PATCH net-next 2/2 v2] netns: isolate seqnums to use per-netns locks Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 21:52   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-24 22:20     ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-24 22:52       ` Eric W. Biederman

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