From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman) To: Dave Chinner <david-FqsqvQoI3Ljby3iVrkZq2A@public.gmane.org> Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org>, Linux Containers <containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>, linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Christian Brauner <christian-STijNZzMWpgWenYVfaLwtA@public.gmane.org> Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 21:34:35 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <87k1rlkh1g.fsf@xmission.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180529221710.GM23861@dastard> (Dave Chinner's message of "Wed, 30 May 2018 08:17:10 +1000") Dave Chinner <david-FqsqvQoI3Ljby3iVrkZq2A@public.gmane.org> writes: > Yeah, the are some fairly big process and policy things that need > to be decided here. Not just at the kernel level, but at distro and > app infrastructure level too. > > I was originally sceptical of supporting kernel filesystems via lkl, > but the desire for unprivileged mounts has not gone away and so I'm > less worried about accessing filesystems that way than I am of > letting the kernel parse untrusted images from untrusted users... There is also the more readily available libguestfs which doesn't support as many filesystems but does seem available in most linux distributions already. It already has a fuse option available with guestmount. I may have to dig in there and see how to make it available without using fusermount. > I'm not sure what the correct forum for this is - wasn't this > something the Plumbers conference was supposed to facilitate? Yes. If we all need to be in a room and talk about things. It is early enough in the planning for Plumers that we could definitely schedule a talk or a BOF for this. >> Is fusefs-lkl valuable for testing filesystems? If xfs-tests were to >> have a mode that used that used the fuse protocol for testing and >> fuzzing filesystems without the full weight of the kernel in the middle >> that might encourage people to suppor this kind of things as well. > > Getting lkl-fuse to run under fstests would be a great way to ensure > we have some level of confidence that it will do the right thing and > users can expect that it won't eat their data. I think this would > need to be a part of a recommendation for wider deploy of such a > solution... Good thought. I will have to give that a look. That does sound like a good practical test. Eric
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 21:34:35 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <87k1rlkh1g.fsf@xmission.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180529221710.GM23861@dastard> (Dave Chinner's message of "Wed, 30 May 2018 08:17:10 +1000") Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> writes: > Yeah, the are some fairly big process and policy things that need > to be decided here. Not just at the kernel level, but at distro and > app infrastructure level too. > > I was originally sceptical of supporting kernel filesystems via lkl, > but the desire for unprivileged mounts has not gone away and so I'm > less worried about accessing filesystems that way than I am of > letting the kernel parse untrusted images from untrusted users... There is also the more readily available libguestfs which doesn't support as many filesystems but does seem available in most linux distributions already. It already has a fuse option available with guestmount. I may have to dig in there and see how to make it available without using fusermount. > I'm not sure what the correct forum for this is - wasn't this > something the Plumbers conference was supposed to facilitate? Yes. If we all need to be in a room and talk about things. It is early enough in the planning for Plumers that we could definitely schedule a talk or a BOF for this. >> Is fusefs-lkl valuable for testing filesystems? If xfs-tests were to >> have a mode that used that used the fuse protocol for testing and >> fuzzing filesystems without the full weight of the kernel in the middle >> that might encourage people to suppor this kind of things as well. > > Getting lkl-fuse to run under fstests would be a great way to ensure > we have some level of confidence that it will do the right thing and > users can expect that it won't eat their data. I think this would > need to be a part of a recommendation for wider deploy of such a > solution... Good thought. I will have to give that a look. That does sound like a good practical test. Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-30 2:34 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-05-23 23:22 [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/6] vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 12:58 ` Seth Forshee 2018-05-24 22:30 ` Christian Brauner [not found] ` <20180523232538.4880-1-ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-24 12:58 ` Seth Forshee 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/6] vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems Eric W. Biederman [not found] ` <20180523232538.4880-2-ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-24 13:55 ` Seth Forshee 2018-05-24 13:55 ` Seth Forshee 2018-05-24 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman [not found] ` <87y3g92dta.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-24 17:22 ` Seth Forshee 2018-05-24 17:22 ` Seth Forshee 2018-05-24 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 19:12 ` Christian Brauner 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:41 ` [REVIEW][PATCH v2 " Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 22:30 ` Christian Brauner [not found] ` <20180523232538.4880-3-ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-23 23:41 ` Eric W. Biederman [not found] ` <87o9h6554f.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/6] vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/6] vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/6] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 6/6] fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 21:46 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Theodore Y. Ts'o 2018-05-29 15:40 ` Dongsu Park 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 15:58 ` Christian Brauner [not found] ` <20180524155803.GB19932-cl+VPiYnx/1AfugRpC6u6w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-24 16:45 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 16:45 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 17:28 ` Christian Brauner 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/6] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 15:57 ` Christian Brauner 2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 6/6] fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-24 15:59 ` Christian Brauner 2018-05-24 21:46 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Theodore Y. Ts'o 2018-05-24 23:23 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-25 3:57 ` Dave Chinner 2018-05-25 4:06 ` Darrick J. Wong 2018-05-25 4:06 ` Darrick J. Wong 2018-05-29 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-29 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-29 22:17 ` Dave Chinner 2018-05-30 2:34 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message] 2018-05-30 2:34 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-30 4:34 ` Dave Chinner [not found] ` <87k1rlkh1g.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-30 4:34 ` Dave Chinner [not found] ` <8736yar4g3.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-29 22:17 ` Dave Chinner [not found] ` <87y3g8y6x9.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-25 3:57 ` Dave Chinner [not found] ` <20180524214617.GG7712-AKGzg7BKzIDYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org> 2018-05-24 23:23 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-29 15:40 ` Dongsu Park 2018-05-23 23:22 Eric W. Biederman
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=87k1rlkh1g.fsf@xmission.com \ --to=ebiederm-as9lmozglivwk0htik3j/w@public.gmane.org \ --cc=christian-STijNZzMWpgWenYVfaLwtA@public.gmane.org \ --cc=containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org \ --cc=david-FqsqvQoI3Ljby3iVrkZq2A@public.gmane.org \ --cc=linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \ --cc=linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \ --cc=seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org \ --cc=tytso-3s7WtUTddSA@public.gmane.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.