* [XEN PATCH v1 02/15] x86/hvm: guard AMD-V and Intel VT-x hvm_function_table initializers
@ 2024-04-16 6:22 Sergiy Kibrik
2024-04-18 11:18 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sergiy Kibrik @ 2024-04-16 6:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Xenia Ragiadakou, Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper,
Roger Pau Monné,
Xenia Ragiadakou, Stefano Stabellini, Sergiy Kibrik
From: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@gmail.com>
Since start_svm() is AMD-V specific while start_vmx() is Intel VT-x specific,
one can be excluded from build completely with CONFIG_SVM and CONFIG_VMX,
respectively.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 0ce45b177c..3edbe03caf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ static int __init cf_check hvm_enable(void)
{
const struct hvm_function_table *fns = NULL;
- if ( cpu_has_vmx )
+ if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx )
fns = start_vmx();
- else if ( cpu_has_svm )
+ else if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SVM) && cpu_has_svm )
fns = start_svm();
if ( fns == NULL )
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [XEN PATCH v1 02/15] x86/hvm: guard AMD-V and Intel VT-x hvm_function_table initializers
2024-04-16 6:22 [XEN PATCH v1 02/15] x86/hvm: guard AMD-V and Intel VT-x hvm_function_table initializers Sergiy Kibrik
@ 2024-04-18 11:18 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-19 8:19 ` Sergiy Kibrik
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-04-18 11:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergiy Kibrik
Cc: Xenia Ragiadakou, Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné,
Xenia Ragiadakou, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel
On 16.04.2024 08:22, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ static int __init cf_check hvm_enable(void)
> {
> const struct hvm_function_table *fns = NULL;
>
> - if ( cpu_has_vmx )
> + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx )
> fns = start_vmx();
> - else if ( cpu_has_svm )
> + else if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SVM) && cpu_has_svm )
> fns = start_svm();
Do we have or do we foresee any uses of cpu_has_{vmx,svm} that are relevant
when CONFIG_{VMX,SVM}=n respectively? If not, I'd prefer if the IS_ENABLED()
would be folded right into the definitions of cpu_has_{vmx,svm}, as is
already done for a few other CONFIG_*.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [XEN PATCH v1 02/15] x86/hvm: guard AMD-V and Intel VT-x hvm_function_table initializers
2024-04-18 11:18 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2024-04-19 8:19 ` Sergiy Kibrik
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sergiy Kibrik @ 2024-04-19 8:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné,
Xenia Ragiadakou, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel
18.04.24 14:18, Jan Beulich:
> On 16.04.2024 08:22, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>> @@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ static int __init cf_check hvm_enable(void)
>> {
>> const struct hvm_function_table *fns = NULL;
>>
>> - if ( cpu_has_vmx )
>> + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx )
>> fns = start_vmx();
>> - else if ( cpu_has_svm )
>> + else if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SVM) && cpu_has_svm )
>> fns = start_svm();
>
> Do we have or do we foresee any uses of cpu_has_{vmx,svm} that are relevant
> when CONFIG_{VMX,SVM}=n respectively? If not, I'd prefer if the IS_ENABLED()
> would be folded right into the definitions of cpu_has_{vmx,svm}, as is
> already done for a few other CONFIG_*.
>
> Jan
looks nice, will do it
-Sergiy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2024-04-16 6:22 [XEN PATCH v1 02/15] x86/hvm: guard AMD-V and Intel VT-x hvm_function_table initializers Sergiy Kibrik
2024-04-18 11:18 ` Jan Beulich
2024-04-19 8:19 ` Sergiy Kibrik
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