[MODERATED] [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra v2 3

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra v2 3
Date: Mon,  7 May 2018 16:18:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <=?utf-8?q?=3C15a559407274841456857d4b9c732c68aac52537=2E152573?= =?utf-8?q?4796=2Egit=2Edave=2Ehansen=40intel=2Ecom=3E?=> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1525734796.git.dave.hansen@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1525734796.git.dave.hansen@intel.com>

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

When calling other programs, assume that those programs are not
trusted and mark the current program as needing mitigation.

This situation can obviously be improved by checking the calling
program to see if it needs mitigation.  That step is left as an
exercise to the reader (the folks who have actually looked at
the BPF code for more than two days in their life).

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 5dd1dcb..ee454b6 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5481,6 +5481,8 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			 * the program array.
 			 */
 			prog->cb_access = 1;
+			prog->need_mitigation = 1;
+
 			env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
 
 			/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
-- 
2.9.5
