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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 5/5] SSB extra v2 5
Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 08:43:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e2fa9047-93be-2ad9-1d56-30167e9001b2@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1805091735360.1573@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>

On 05/09/2018 08:36 AM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> For now, it *is* generic, though.  It's whether the mitigation function
>> gets injected into the call path or not.
>>
>> Once we have multiple things we have to mitigate for at entry/exit, we
>> may need to add some other flags to the bpf_prog that say exactly what
>> mitigations we need, like a "bfp_prog->does_memory_write" that
>> explicitly tells us if we need the SSB mitigation.
> Now looking at the overhead of this SSB hardware mitigation stuff I really
> wonder what's the state on investigating software mitigations for BPF.
> 
> The magic PDF talks about that, but has anyone looked at that?

I don't know of anyone that has.  I'm fairly sure no one at Intel has
looked in detail, at least in the post-Spectre timeframe.

Frankly, I think it's mostly a waste of time to do it without having the
BPF folks deeply involved from day one.  They were not fans of the way
we (Intel) did Spectre V1 mitigations and I don't expect this to be any
different.

They were deeply opposed to LFENCE getting used, for instance.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-09 15:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-07 23:18 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra v2 0 Dave Hansen
2018-05-07 23:18 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/5] SSB extra v2 1 Dave Hansen
2018-05-07 23:18 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/5] SSB extra v2 2 Dave Hansen
2018-05-07 23:18 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra v2 3 Dave Hansen
2018-05-07 23:18 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/5] SSB extra v2 4 Dave Hansen
2018-05-07 23:18 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 5/5] SSB extra v2 5 Dave Hansen
2018-05-08  0:36 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-05-08  0:46   ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-09 15:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-09 15:43       ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-05-09 15:55         ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2018-05-09 16:03           ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-09 16:05             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-09 16:36               ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-16 15:23                 ` Jon Masters
2018-05-09 21:04         ` Linus Torvalds

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