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From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>,
	Patrick Bellasi <patrick.bellasi@arm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	notify@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] mm: Extract SLAB_QUARANTINE from KASAN
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 13:53:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAeHK+yPFoQZanzjXBty8rM9eY4thv+ThdHX7mz-sgeg147F7w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202008150939.A994680@keescook>

On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 6:52 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 06:19:21PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> > Heap spraying is an exploitation technique that aims to put controlled
> > bytes at a predetermined memory location on the heap. Heap spraying for
> > exploiting use-after-free in the Linux kernel relies on the fact that on
> > kmalloc(), the slab allocator returns the address of the memory that was
> > recently freed. Allocating a kernel object with the same size and
> > controlled contents allows overwriting the vulnerable freed object.
> >
> > Let's extract slab freelist quarantine from KASAN functionality and
> > call it CONFIG_SLAB_QUARANTINE. This feature breaks widespread heap
> > spraying technique used for exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities
> > in the kernel code.
> >
> > If this feature is enabled, freed allocations are stored in the quarantine
> > and can't be instantly reallocated and overwritten by the exploit
> > performing heap spraying.

[...]

> In doing this extraction, I wonder if function naming should be changed?
> If it's going to live a new life outside of KASAN proper, maybe call
> these functions quarantine_cache_*()? But perhaps that's too much
> churn...

If quarantine is to be used without the rest of KASAN, I'd prefer for
it to be separated from KASAN completely: move to e.g. mm/quarantine.c
and don't mention KASAN in function/config names.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-17 11:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-13 15:19 [PATCH RFC 0/2] Break heap spraying needed for exploiting use-after-free Alexander Popov
2020-08-13 15:19 ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] mm: Extract SLAB_QUARANTINE from KASAN Alexander Popov
2020-08-15 16:52   ` Kees Cook
2020-08-17 11:53     ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2020-08-17 11:53       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-08-17 17:32     ` Alexander Popov
2020-08-18 15:45       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-08-18 15:45         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-08-18 20:50         ` Alexander Popov
2020-08-15 18:54   ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-08-16 19:59     ` Pavel Machek
2020-08-17 21:03       ` Alexander Popov
2020-08-17 20:34     ` Alexander Popov
2020-08-13 15:19 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] lkdtm: Add heap spraying test Alexander Popov
2020-08-15 16:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-08-17 17:54     ` Alexander Popov
2020-08-17 18:24   ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-08-17 18:24     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-08-17 18:24     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-08-17 19:24     ` Kees Cook
2020-08-17 19:24       ` Kees Cook
2020-08-14 21:01 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Break heap spraying needed for exploiting use-after-free Alexander Popov
2020-08-15 16:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-18  9:08   ` Alexander Popov

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