From: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>,
Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>,
Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 22:11:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABqSeASrwXwSHHAsVwjG6vCLbfXpkp+42HWW27MUK2zgMnAu8w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202009241647.2239747F0@keescook>
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 6:56 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > This file is guarded by CONFIG_PROC_SECCOMP_CACHE with a default
> The question of permissions is my central concern here: who should see
> this? Some contained processes have been intentionally blocked from
> self-introspection so even the "standard" high bar of "ptrace attach
> allowed?" can't always be sufficient.
>
> My compromise about filter visibility in the past was saying that
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required (see seccomp_get_filter()). I'm nervous to
> weaken this. (There is some work that hasn't been sent upstream yet that
> is looking to expose the filter _contents_ via /proc that has been
> nervous too.)
>
> Now full contents vs "allow"/"filter" are certainly different things,
> but I don't feel like I've got enough evidence to show that this
> introspection would help debugging enough to justify the partially
> imagined safety of not exposing it to potential attackers.
Agreed. I'm inclined to make it CONFIG_DEBUG_SECCOMP_CACHE and guarded
by a CAP just to make it "debug only".
> I suspect it _is_ the right thing to do (just look at my own RFC's
> "debug" patch), but I'd like this to be well justified in the commit
> log.
>
> And yes, while it does hide behind a CONFIG, I'd still want it justified,
> especially since distros have a tendency to just turn everything on
> anyway. ;)
Is there something to stop a config from being enabled in an
allyesconfig? I remember seeing something like that. Else if someone
is manually selecting we can add a help text with a big banner...
> But behavior-wise, yeah, I like it; I'm fine with human-readable and
> full AUDIT_ARCH values. (Though, as devil's advocate again, to repeat
> Jann's own words back: do we want to add this only to have a new UAPI to
> support going forward?)
Is this something we want to keep stable?
YiFei Zhu
_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>,
Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 22:11:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABqSeASrwXwSHHAsVwjG6vCLbfXpkp+42HWW27MUK2zgMnAu8w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202009241647.2239747F0@keescook>
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 6:56 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > This file is guarded by CONFIG_PROC_SECCOMP_CACHE with a default
> The question of permissions is my central concern here: who should see
> this? Some contained processes have been intentionally blocked from
> self-introspection so even the "standard" high bar of "ptrace attach
> allowed?" can't always be sufficient.
>
> My compromise about filter visibility in the past was saying that
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required (see seccomp_get_filter()). I'm nervous to
> weaken this. (There is some work that hasn't been sent upstream yet that
> is looking to expose the filter _contents_ via /proc that has been
> nervous too.)
>
> Now full contents vs "allow"/"filter" are certainly different things,
> but I don't feel like I've got enough evidence to show that this
> introspection would help debugging enough to justify the partially
> imagined safety of not exposing it to potential attackers.
Agreed. I'm inclined to make it CONFIG_DEBUG_SECCOMP_CACHE and guarded
by a CAP just to make it "debug only".
> I suspect it _is_ the right thing to do (just look at my own RFC's
> "debug" patch), but I'd like this to be well justified in the commit
> log.
>
> And yes, while it does hide behind a CONFIG, I'd still want it justified,
> especially since distros have a tendency to just turn everything on
> anyway. ;)
Is there something to stop a config from being enabled in an
allyesconfig? I remember seeing something like that. Else if someone
is manually selecting we can add a help text with a big banner...
> But behavior-wise, yeah, I like it; I'm fine with human-readable and
> full AUDIT_ARCH values. (Though, as devil's advocate again, to repeat
> Jann's own words back: do we want to add this only to have a new UAPI to
> support going forward?)
Is this something we want to keep stable?
YiFei Zhu
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-25 3:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 302+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-21 5:35 [RFC PATCH seccomp 0/2] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 1/2] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 17:47 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-21 17:47 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-21 18:38 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-21 18:38 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-21 23:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 23:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-22 0:25 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-22 0:25 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-22 0:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-22 0:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 2/2] seccomp/cache: Cache filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 18:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-21 18:08 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-21 22:50 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 22:50 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 22:57 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-21 22:57 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-21 23:08 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 23:08 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array Kees Cook
2020-09-25 0:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 0:15 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-25 0:15 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-25 0:18 ` Al Viro
2020-09-25 0:18 ` Al Viro
2020-09-25 0:24 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-25 0:24 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-25 1:27 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 1:27 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 3:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 3:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 3:28 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 3:28 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 16:39 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 16:39 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 5:48 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 0/2] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls Sargun Dhillon
2020-09-21 5:48 ` Sargun Dhillon
2020-09-21 7:13 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 7:13 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 8:30 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-21 8:30 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-21 8:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 8:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 13:51 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-21 13:51 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-21 15:27 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 15:27 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 16:39 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-21 16:39 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-21 22:57 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 22:57 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-21 19:16 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-21 19:16 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-21 19:35 ` Hubertus Franke
2020-09-21 19:45 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-21 19:45 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-23 19:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 19:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 22:54 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-23 22:54 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 6:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 6:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 0/6] " YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 3/6] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 4/6] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 0/6] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 19:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 19:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-27 9:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-10-27 9:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-10-27 19:08 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-27 19:08 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-28 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-28 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-28 8:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-10-28 8:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-10-28 9:34 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-28 9:34 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 13:47 ` David Laight
2020-09-24 13:47 ` David Laight
2020-09-24 14:16 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 14:16 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 14:20 ` David Laight
2020-09-24 14:20 ` David Laight
2020-09-24 14:37 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 14:37 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 16:02 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 16:02 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 3/6] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 3:04 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 3:04 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 16:45 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 16:45 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 19:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 19:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-25 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-25 20:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 20:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-25 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-25 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-26 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-26 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-26 1:23 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-26 1:23 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-26 2:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-26 2:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-26 4:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-26 4:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 4/6] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 23:46 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 23:46 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 1:55 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 1:55 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 23:47 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 23:47 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 1:35 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 1:35 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 23:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 23:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 3:11 ` YiFei Zhu [this message]
2020-09-25 3:11 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 3:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 3:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 0/5] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 1/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 21:21 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 21:21 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 21:33 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-30 21:33 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 23:15 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-30 23:15 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 22:24 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-30 22:24 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 22:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 22:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-01 11:28 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 11:28 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 21:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-01 21:08 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-01 11:52 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 11:52 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 21:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-01 21:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-02 11:08 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-02 11:08 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 4:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 4:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 5:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 5:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 3/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 21:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 21:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 0:17 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 0:17 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 5:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 5:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 22:00 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-30 22:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 23:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 23:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-01 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 16:05 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-01 16:05 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-01 16:18 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-01 16:18 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-30 22:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 22:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 23:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-09-30 23:08 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-30 23:21 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-30 23:21 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 0/5] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-09 23:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 23:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-09 22:47 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 22:47 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 3/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-09 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-09 18:32 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 18:32 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-09 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot
2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot
2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot
2020-10-09 21:45 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-09 21:45 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-09 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-09 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-10 13:26 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-10 13:26 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-13 0:31 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-13 0:31 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-22 20:52 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-22 20:52 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-22 22:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-22 22:32 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-22 23:40 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-22 23:40 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-24 2:51 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-24 2:51 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-30 12:18 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-30 12:18 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-11-03 13:00 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-11-03 13:00 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-11-04 0:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-11-04 0:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-11-04 11:40 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-11-04 11:40 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-11-04 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2020-11-04 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 0/5]seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-12 6:42 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-12 6:42 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-12 6:46 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-12 6:46 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 3/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu
2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-10-12 6:49 ` Jann Horn via Containers
2020-10-12 6:49 ` Jann Horn
2020-12-17 12:14 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-12-17 12:14 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-12-17 18:34 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-12-17 18:34 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-12-18 12:35 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-12-18 12:35 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-10-27 19:14 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 0/5]seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results Kees Cook
2020-10-27 19:14 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CABqSeASrwXwSHHAsVwjG6vCLbfXpkp+42HWW27MUK2zgMnAu8w@mail.gmail.com \
--to=zhuyifei1999@gmail.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu \
--cc=frankeh@us.ibm.com \
--cc=gscrivan@redhat.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jianyan2@illinois.edu \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=tobin@ibm.com \
--cc=torrella@illinois.edu \
--cc=tyxu@illinois.edu \
--cc=vrothber@redhat.com \
--cc=wad@chromium.org \
--cc=yifeifz2@illinois.edu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.