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From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 14:28:47 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACPcB9egBRmP82-NKCRFyJ6b8=CNkn9fuCjCFw0m-VU_vk3z8A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACPcB9fiVUCfSBe05FOkKuMbzYnMjjKj50L3ydotSFSp5iL+kg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 9:42 PM Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 8:37 PM Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 01/18/19 at 08:34pm, Dave Young wrote:
> > > On 01/18/19 at 06:53am, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2019-01-18 at 17:17 +0800, Kairui Song wrote:
> > > > > This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the
> > > > > reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform
> > > > > keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could
> > > > > use this keyring as well.
> > > >
> > > > Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific,
> > > > but are normally generic.  My review included a couple of generic
> > > > suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the
> > > > term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".
> > > >
> > > > After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So
> > > > other components could use this keyring as well".  Really?!  How the
> > > > platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others
> > > > to convince Linus.  At least for now, please limit its usage to
> > > > verifying the PE signed kernel image.  If this patch set needs to be
> > > > reposted, please remove all references to "other components".
> > > >
> > > > Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"?  Dave, you
> > > > Acked the original post.  Can I include it?  Can we get some
> > > > additional Ack's on these patches?
> > >
> > > It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.
> >
> > Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update
> >
> > > Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > > Dave
>
> Thanks for the review again, will update the patch using IS_ENABLED
> along with update the cover letter shortly.
>
> --
> Best Regards,
> Kairui Song

Hi, before I update it again, most part of the new
platform_trusted_keyring related code is following how
secondary_trusted_keyring is implemented (surrounded by ifdefs). I
thought this could reduce unused code when the keyring is not enabled.
Else, all ifdef could be simply removed, when platform_keyring is not
enabled, the platform_trusted_keys will always be NULL, and
verify_pkcs7_signature will simply return NOKEY if anyone try to use
platform keyring.

Any suggestions? Or I can just remove the ifdef in
security/integrity/digsig.c and make set_platform_trusted_keys a
inline empty function in system_keyring.h.

-- 
Best Regards,
Kairui Song

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 22:28:47 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACPcB9egBRmP82-NKCRFyJ6b8=CNkn9fuCjCFw0m-VU_vk3z8A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACPcB9fiVUCfSBe05FOkKuMbzYnMjjKj50L3ydotSFSp5iL+kg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 9:42 PM Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 8:37 PM Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 01/18/19 at 08:34pm, Dave Young wrote:
> > > On 01/18/19 at 06:53am, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2019-01-18 at 17:17 +0800, Kairui Song wrote:
> > > > > This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the
> > > > > reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform
> > > > > keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could
> > > > > use this keyring as well.
> > > >
> > > > Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific,
> > > > but are normally generic.  My review included a couple of generic
> > > > suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the
> > > > term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".
> > > >
> > > > After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So
> > > > other components could use this keyring as well".  Really?!  How the
> > > > platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others
> > > > to convince Linus.  At least for now, please limit its usage to
> > > > verifying the PE signed kernel image.  If this patch set needs to be
> > > > reposted, please remove all references to "other components".
> > > >
> > > > Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"?  Dave, you
> > > > Acked the original post.  Can I include it?  Can we get some
> > > > additional Ack's on these patches?
> > >
> > > It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.
> >
> > Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update
> >
> > > Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > > Dave
>
> Thanks for the review again, will update the patch using IS_ENABLED
> along with update the cover letter shortly.
>
> --
> Best Regards,
> Kairui Song

Hi, before I update it again, most part of the new
platform_trusted_keyring related code is following how
secondary_trusted_keyring is implemented (surrounded by ifdefs). I
thought this could reduce unused code when the keyring is not enabled.
Else, all ifdef could be simply removed, when platform_keyring is not
enabled, the platform_trusted_keys will always be NULL, and
verify_pkcs7_signature will simply return NOKEY if anyone try to use
platform keyring.

Any suggestions? Or I can just remove the ifdef in
security/integrity/digsig.c and make set_platform_trusted_keys a
inline empty function in system_keyring.h.

-- 
Best Regards,
Kairui Song

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
To: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	bauerman@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 22:28:47 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACPcB9egBRmP82-NKCRFyJ6b8=CNkn9fuCjCFw0m-VU_vk3z8A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACPcB9fiVUCfSBe05FOkKuMbzYnMjjKj50L3ydotSFSp5iL+kg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 9:42 PM Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 8:37 PM Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 01/18/19 at 08:34pm, Dave Young wrote:
> > > On 01/18/19 at 06:53am, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2019-01-18 at 17:17 +0800, Kairui Song wrote:
> > > > > This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the
> > > > > reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform
> > > > > keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could
> > > > > use this keyring as well.
> > > >
> > > > Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific,
> > > > but are normally generic.  My review included a couple of generic
> > > > suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the
> > > > term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".
> > > >
> > > > After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So
> > > > other components could use this keyring as well".  Really?!  How the
> > > > platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others
> > > > to convince Linus.  At least for now, please limit its usage to
> > > > verifying the PE signed kernel image.  If this patch set needs to be
> > > > reposted, please remove all references to "other components".
> > > >
> > > > Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"?  Dave, you
> > > > Acked the original post.  Can I include it?  Can we get some
> > > > additional Ack's on these patches?
> > >
> > > It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.
> >
> > Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update
> >
> > > Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > > Dave
>
> Thanks for the review again, will update the patch using IS_ENABLED
> along with update the cover letter shortly.
>
> --
> Best Regards,
> Kairui Song

Hi, before I update it again, most part of the new
platform_trusted_keyring related code is following how
secondary_trusted_keyring is implemented (surrounded by ifdefs). I
thought this could reduce unused code when the keyring is not enabled.
Else, all ifdef could be simply removed, when platform_keyring is not
enabled, the platform_trusted_keys will always be NULL, and
verify_pkcs7_signature will simply return NOKEY if anyone try to use
platform keyring.

Any suggestions? Or I can just remove the ifdef in
security/integrity/digsig.c and make set_platform_trusted_keys a
inline empty function in system_keyring.h.

-- 
Best Regards,
Kairui Song

_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  reply	other threads:[~2019-01-18 14:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-18  9:17 [PATCH v4 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17 ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17 ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 14:35   ` Nayna
2019-01-18 14:35     ` Nayna
2019-01-18 14:35     ` Nayna
2019-01-18 15:01     ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 15:01       ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 15:01       ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18  9:17   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 11:53 ` [PATCH v4 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image Mimi Zohar
2019-01-18 11:53   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-18 11:53   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-18 12:07   ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 12:07     ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 12:07     ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 12:34   ` Dave Young
2019-01-18 12:34     ` Dave Young
2019-01-18 12:34     ` Dave Young
2019-01-18 12:37     ` Dave Young
2019-01-18 12:37       ` Dave Young
2019-01-18 12:37       ` Dave Young
2019-01-18 13:42       ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 13:42         ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 13:42         ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 14:28         ` Kairui Song [this message]
2019-01-18 14:28           ` Kairui Song
2019-01-18 14:28           ` Kairui Song
2019-01-21  9:08           ` Kairui Song
2019-01-21  9:08             ` Kairui Song
2019-01-21  9:08             ` Kairui Song

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