From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 09:17:14 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CACT4Y+aXNmQzp6J+mP+ELj8kUHmRPkibc1--KtV9a3ud_X8miw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200907134055.2878499-5-elver@google.com> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:41 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote: > > From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> > > Inserts KFENCE hooks into the SLAB allocator. > > We note the addition of the 'orig_size' argument to slab_alloc*() > functions, to be able to pass the originally requested size to KFENCE. > When KFENCE is disabled, there is no additional overhead, since these > functions are __always_inline. > > Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> > --- > mm/slab.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ > mm/slab_common.c | 6 +++++- > 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c > index 3160dff6fd76..30aba06ae02b 100644 > --- a/mm/slab.c > +++ b/mm/slab.c > @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ > #include <linux/seq_file.h> > #include <linux/notifier.h> > #include <linux/kallsyms.h> > +#include <linux/kfence.h> > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/sysctl.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > @@ -3206,7 +3207,7 @@ static void *____cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, > } > > static __always_inline void * > -slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, > +slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, size_t orig_size, > unsigned long caller) > { > unsigned long save_flags; > @@ -3219,6 +3220,10 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, > if (unlikely(!cachep)) > return NULL; > > + ptr = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags); > + if (unlikely(ptr)) > + goto out_hooks; > + > cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags); > local_irq_save(save_flags); > > @@ -3251,6 +3256,7 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, > if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && ptr) > memset(ptr, 0, cachep->object_size); > > +out_hooks: > slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &ptr); > return ptr; > } > @@ -3288,7 +3294,7 @@ __do_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags) > #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */ > > static __always_inline void * > -slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > +slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t orig_size, unsigned long caller) > { > unsigned long save_flags; > void *objp; > @@ -3299,6 +3305,10 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > if (unlikely(!cachep)) > return NULL; > > + objp = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags); > + if (unlikely(objp)) > + goto leave; > + > cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags); > local_irq_save(save_flags); > objp = __do_cache_alloc(cachep, flags); > @@ -3309,6 +3319,7 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && objp) > memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size); > > +leave: > slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &objp); > return objp; > } > @@ -3414,6 +3425,11 @@ static void cache_flusharray(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct array_cache *ac) > static __always_inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp, > unsigned long caller) > { > + if (kfence_free(objp)) { > + kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags); > + return; > + } > + > /* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */ > if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_)) > return; > @@ -3479,7 +3495,7 @@ void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp, > */ > void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags) > { > - void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_); > + void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_); It's kinda minor, but since we are talking about malloc fast path: will passing 0 instead of cachep->object_size (here and everywhere else) and then using cachep->object_size on the slow path if 0 is passed as size improve codegen? > trace_kmem_cache_alloc(_RET_IP_, ret, > cachep->object_size, cachep->size, flags); > @@ -3512,7 +3528,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, > > local_irq_disable(); > for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { > - void *objp = __do_cache_alloc(s, flags); > + void *objp = kfence_alloc(s, s->object_size, flags) ?: __do_cache_alloc(s, flags); > > if (unlikely(!objp)) > goto error; > @@ -3545,7 +3561,7 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t size) > { > void *ret; > > - ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_); > + ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, _RET_IP_); > > ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags); > trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, > @@ -3571,7 +3587,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace); > */ > void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid) > { > - void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_); > + void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_); > > trace_kmem_cache_alloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, > cachep->object_size, cachep->size, > @@ -3589,7 +3605,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, > { > void *ret; > > - ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_); > + ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, size, _RET_IP_); > > ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags); > trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, > @@ -3650,7 +3666,7 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags, > cachep = kmalloc_slab(size, flags); > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(cachep))) > return cachep; > - ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, caller); > + ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, caller); > > ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags); > trace_kmalloc(caller, ret, > @@ -4138,18 +4154,24 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, > bool to_user) > { > struct kmem_cache *cachep; > - unsigned int objnr; > + unsigned int objnr = 0; > unsigned long offset; > + bool is_kfence = is_kfence_address(ptr); > > ptr = kasan_reset_tag(ptr); > > /* Find and validate object. */ > cachep = page->slab_cache; > - objnr = obj_to_index(cachep, page, (void *)ptr); > - BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num); > + if (!is_kfence) { > + objnr = obj_to_index(cachep, page, (void *)ptr); > + BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num); > + } > > /* Find offset within object. */ > - offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep); > + if (is_kfence_address(ptr)) > + offset = ptr - kfence_object_start(ptr); > + else > + offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep); > > /* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */ > if (offset >= cachep->useroffset && > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index f9ccd5dc13f3..6e35e273681a 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > #include <linux/memory.h> > #include <linux/cache.h> > #include <linux/compiler.h> > +#include <linux/kfence.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > @@ -448,6 +449,9 @@ static int shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) > /* free asan quarantined objects */ > kasan_cache_shutdown(s); > > + if (!kfence_shutdown_cache(s)) > + return -EBUSY; > + > if (__kmem_cache_shutdown(s) != 0) > return -EBUSY; > > @@ -1171,7 +1175,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1)) > return 0; > > - size = __ksize(objp); > + size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp); > /* > * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, > * so we need to unpoison this area. > -- > 2.28.0.526.ge36021eeef-goog >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 09:17:14 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CACT4Y+aXNmQzp6J+mP+ELj8kUHmRPkibc1--KtV9a3ud_X8miw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200907134055.2878499-5-elver@google.com> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:41 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote: > > From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> > > Inserts KFENCE hooks into the SLAB allocator. > > We note the addition of the 'orig_size' argument to slab_alloc*() > functions, to be able to pass the originally requested size to KFENCE. > When KFENCE is disabled, there is no additional overhead, since these > functions are __always_inline. > > Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> > --- > mm/slab.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ > mm/slab_common.c | 6 +++++- > 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c > index 3160dff6fd76..30aba06ae02b 100644 > --- a/mm/slab.c > +++ b/mm/slab.c > @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ > #include <linux/seq_file.h> > #include <linux/notifier.h> > #include <linux/kallsyms.h> > +#include <linux/kfence.h> > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/sysctl.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > @@ -3206,7 +3207,7 @@ static void *____cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, > } > > static __always_inline void * > -slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, > +slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, size_t orig_size, > unsigned long caller) > { > unsigned long save_flags; > @@ -3219,6 +3220,10 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, > if (unlikely(!cachep)) > return NULL; > > + ptr = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags); > + if (unlikely(ptr)) > + goto out_hooks; > + > cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags); > local_irq_save(save_flags); > > @@ -3251,6 +3256,7 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, > if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && ptr) > memset(ptr, 0, cachep->object_size); > > +out_hooks: > slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &ptr); > return ptr; > } > @@ -3288,7 +3294,7 @@ __do_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags) > #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */ > > static __always_inline void * > -slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > +slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t orig_size, unsigned long caller) > { > unsigned long save_flags; > void *objp; > @@ -3299,6 +3305,10 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > if (unlikely(!cachep)) > return NULL; > > + objp = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags); > + if (unlikely(objp)) > + goto leave; > + > cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags); > local_irq_save(save_flags); > objp = __do_cache_alloc(cachep, flags); > @@ -3309,6 +3319,7 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && objp) > memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size); > > +leave: > slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &objp); > return objp; > } > @@ -3414,6 +3425,11 @@ static void cache_flusharray(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct array_cache *ac) > static __always_inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp, > unsigned long caller) > { > + if (kfence_free(objp)) { > + kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags); > + return; > + } > + > /* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */ > if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_)) > return; > @@ -3479,7 +3495,7 @@ void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp, > */ > void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags) > { > - void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_); > + void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_); It's kinda minor, but since we are talking about malloc fast path: will passing 0 instead of cachep->object_size (here and everywhere else) and then using cachep->object_size on the slow path if 0 is passed as size improve codegen? > trace_kmem_cache_alloc(_RET_IP_, ret, > cachep->object_size, cachep->size, flags); > @@ -3512,7 +3528,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, > > local_irq_disable(); > for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { > - void *objp = __do_cache_alloc(s, flags); > + void *objp = kfence_alloc(s, s->object_size, flags) ?: __do_cache_alloc(s, flags); > > if (unlikely(!objp)) > goto error; > @@ -3545,7 +3561,7 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t size) > { > void *ret; > > - ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_); > + ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, _RET_IP_); > > ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags); > trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, > @@ -3571,7 +3587,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace); > */ > void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid) > { > - void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_); > + void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_); > > trace_kmem_cache_alloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, > cachep->object_size, cachep->size, > @@ -3589,7 +3605,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, > { > void *ret; > > - ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_); > + ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, size, _RET_IP_); > > ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags); > trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, > @@ -3650,7 +3666,7 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags, > cachep = kmalloc_slab(size, flags); > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(cachep))) > return cachep; > - ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, caller); > + ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, caller); > > ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags); > trace_kmalloc(caller, ret, > @@ -4138,18 +4154,24 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, > bool to_user) > { > struct kmem_cache *cachep; > - unsigned int objnr; > + unsigned int objnr = 0; > unsigned long offset; > + bool is_kfence = is_kfence_address(ptr); > > ptr = kasan_reset_tag(ptr); > > /* Find and validate object. */ > cachep = page->slab_cache; > - objnr = obj_to_index(cachep, page, (void *)ptr); > - BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num); > + if (!is_kfence) { > + objnr = obj_to_index(cachep, page, (void *)ptr); > + BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num); > + } > > /* Find offset within object. */ > - offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep); > + if (is_kfence_address(ptr)) > + offset = ptr - kfence_object_start(ptr); > + else > + offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep); > > /* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */ > if (offset >= cachep->useroffset && > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index f9ccd5dc13f3..6e35e273681a 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > #include <linux/memory.h> > #include <linux/cache.h> > #include <linux/compiler.h> > +#include <linux/kfence.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > @@ -448,6 +449,9 @@ static int shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) > /* free asan quarantined objects */ > kasan_cache_shutdown(s); > > + if (!kfence_shutdown_cache(s)) > + return -EBUSY; > + > if (__kmem_cache_shutdown(s) != 0) > return -EBUSY; > > @@ -1171,7 +1175,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1)) > return 0; > > - size = __ksize(objp); > + size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp); > /* > * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, > * so we need to unpoison this area. > -- > 2.28.0.526.ge36021eeef-goog > _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-11 7:17 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-09-07 13:40 [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 01/10] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 15:41 ` Jonathan Cameron 2020-09-07 15:41 ` Jonathan Cameron 2020-09-07 16:38 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 16:38 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 16:38 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 14:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 14:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 14:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 15:06 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 15:06 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 15:06 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 15:48 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 15:48 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 15:48 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 16:22 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 16:22 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 16:22 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 15:42 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 15:42 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 15:42 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 16:19 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-10 16:19 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-10 16:19 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-10 17:11 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 17:11 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 17:11 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-10 17:41 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 17:41 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 17:41 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-10 20:25 ` Paul E. McKenney 2020-09-10 20:25 ` Paul E. McKenney 2020-09-15 13:57 ` SeongJae Park 2020-09-15 13:57 ` SeongJae Park 2020-09-15 14:14 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-15 14:14 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-15 14:26 ` SeongJae Park 2020-09-15 14:26 ` SeongJae Park 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 02/10] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86 Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 17:31 ` kernel test robot 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 03/10] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64 Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-09 15:13 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-09 15:13 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-09 15:13 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 7:17 ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message] 2020-09-11 7:17 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:17 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 12:24 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 12:24 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 12:24 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 13:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 13:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 13:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 05/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 06/10] kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 16:11 ` kernel test robot 2020-09-11 7:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 13:00 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 13:00 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 13:00 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 07/10] kfence, kmemleak: make KFENCE compatible with KMEMLEAK Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 11:53 ` Catalin Marinas 2020-09-08 11:53 ` Catalin Marinas 2020-09-08 12:29 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-08 12:29 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-08 12:29 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 08/10] kfence, lockdep: make KFENCE compatible with lockdep Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 09/10] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 15:33 ` Andrey Konovalov 2020-09-07 15:33 ` Andrey Konovalov 2020-09-07 15:33 ` Andrey Konovalov 2020-09-07 16:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 16:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 16:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 17:55 ` Andrey Konovalov 2020-09-07 17:55 ` Andrey Konovalov 2020-09-07 17:55 ` Andrey Konovalov 2020-09-07 18:16 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 18:16 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 18:16 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 15:54 ` Dave Hansen 2020-09-08 15:54 ` Dave Hansen 2020-09-08 16:14 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 16:14 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 7:14 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:14 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:14 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:46 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 7:46 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 7:46 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 10/10] kfence: add test suite Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-07 18:37 ` kernel test robot 2020-09-08 11:48 ` [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Vlastimil Babka 2020-09-08 11:48 ` Vlastimil Babka 2020-09-08 12:16 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-08 12:16 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-08 12:16 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-09-08 14:40 ` Vlastimil Babka 2020-09-08 14:40 ` Vlastimil Babka 2020-09-08 15:21 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 15:21 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 14:52 ` Dave Hansen 2020-09-08 14:52 ` Dave Hansen 2020-09-08 15:31 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 15:31 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 15:36 ` Vlastimil Babka 2020-09-08 15:36 ` Vlastimil Babka 2020-09-08 15:56 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 15:56 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 7:35 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:35 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 7:35 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 12:03 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 12:03 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 12:03 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 13:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 13:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 13:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov 2020-09-11 13:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 13:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 13:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 16:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 16:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-11 16:33 ` Marco Elver 2020-09-08 15:37 ` Dave Hansen 2020-09-08 15:37 ` Dave Hansen 2020-09-08 1:45 [PATCH RFC 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB kernel test robot
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