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From: Tristan Schmelcher <tschmelcher@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel
	<user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] um: Set secure access mode for temporary file
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 15:37:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CADNZ+wTtu5gZuztSAnY9TE0fV4cVgqr534gyDUEkp0LS=Vq4Xw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <566449A3.6030504@digikod.net>

On 6 December 2015 at 09:43, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Well, I'm concerned to use umask because it is not thread-safe and drivers may use create_mem_file() in a multi-theaded context.

You are right. We should perhaps set the umask to 0700 permanently
during process start. But I am not sure if this will interfere with
other UML code.

> I prefer to stick to fchmod and handle the race-condition with O_TMPFILE unsell someone is sure that this will not create bugs :)

The fchmod call is basically useless and should probably be removed.
Even mmap only checks the file descriptor, not the file permissions. I
have pasted a test program below if you wish to confirm. AFAICT
changing the permissions after file deletion accomplishes nothing
unless the attacker bizarrely chooses to hard-link the file during the
race instead of opening it.

#include <assert.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
  int fd = open("./foo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700);
  assert(fd >= 0);
  int ret = write(fd, "bar\n", 4);
  assert(ret == 4);
  ret = fchmod(fd, 0400);
  assert(ret >= 0);
  char *buf = mmap(0, 4, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
  assert(buf);
  buf[2] = 'z';
  ret = munmap(buf, 4);
  assert(ret >= 0);
  return 0;
}

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tristan Schmelcher <tschmelcher@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel
	<user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] um: Set secure access mode for temporary file
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 15:37:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CADNZ+wTtu5gZuztSAnY9TE0fV4cVgqr534gyDUEkp0LS=Vq4Xw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <566449A3.6030504@digikod.net>

On 6 December 2015 at 09:43, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Well, I'm concerned to use umask because it is not thread-safe and drivers may use create_mem_file() in a multi-theaded context.

You are right. We should perhaps set the umask to 0700 permanently
during process start. But I am not sure if this will interfere with
other UML code.

> I prefer to stick to fchmod and handle the race-condition with O_TMPFILE unsell someone is sure that this will not create bugs :)

The fchmod call is basically useless and should probably be removed.
Even mmap only checks the file descriptor, not the file permissions. I
have pasted a test program below if you wish to confirm. AFAICT
changing the permissions after file deletion accomplishes nothing
unless the attacker bizarrely chooses to hard-link the file during the
race instead of opening it.

#include <assert.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
  int fd = open("./foo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0700);
  assert(fd >= 0);
  int ret = write(fd, "bar\n", 4);
  assert(ret == 4);
  ret = fchmod(fd, 0400);
  assert(ret >= 0);
  char *buf = mmap(0, 4, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
  assert(buf);
  buf[2] = 'z';
  ret = munmap(buf, 4);
  assert(ret >= 0);
  return 0;
}
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  reply	other threads:[~2015-12-08 20:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-29 14:03 [PATCH v2 0/2] um: Protect memory mapped file Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-29 14:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-29 14:03 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] um: Set secure access mode for temporary file Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-29 14:03   ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-12-04 17:13   ` Tristan Schmelcher
2015-12-06 11:32     ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-12-06 11:57       ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-12-06 14:43       ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-12-08 20:37         ` Tristan Schmelcher [this message]
2015-12-08 20:37           ` Tristan Schmelcher
2015-12-08 21:45           ` Richard Weinberger
2015-12-08 21:45             ` [uml-devel] " Richard Weinberger
2015-12-09 23:58             ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-29 14:03 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] um: Use race-free temporary file creation Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-29 14:03   ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-12-04 17:26   ` Tristan Schmelcher

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