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From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"ast@kernel.org" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"daniel@iogearbox.net" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"andrii@kernel.org" <andrii@kernel.org>,
	"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com" <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com>,
	"alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com" <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>,
	"zohar@linux.ibm.com" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"netdev@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com" 
	<linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs
Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 09:44:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEiveUcx1KHoJ421Cv+52t=0U+Uy2VF51VC_zfTSftQ4wVYOPw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACYkzJ5QgkucL3HZ4bY5Rcme4ey6U3FW4w2Gz-9rdWq0_RHvgA@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Apr 3, 2022 at 5:42 PM KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 2, 2022 at 1:55 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
...
> >
> > > Pinning
> > > them to unreachable inodes intuitively looked the
> > > way to go for achieving the stated goal.
> >
> > We can consider inodes in bpffs that are not unlinkable by root
> > in the future, but certainly not for this use case.
>
> Can this not be already done by adding a BPF_LSM program to the
> inode_unlink LSM hook?
>

Also, beside of the inode_unlink... and out of curiosity: making sysfs/bpffs/
readonly after pinning, then using bpf LSM hooks sb_mount|remount|unmount...
family combining bpf() LSM hook... isn't this enough to:
1. Restrict who can pin to bpffs without using a full MAC
2. Restrict who can delete or unmount bpf filesystem

?

-- 
https://djalal.opendz.org/

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	 "corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	 "ast@kernel.org" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"daniel@iogearbox.net" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	 "andrii@kernel.org" <andrii@kernel.org>,
	"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com" <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com>,
	 "alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com" <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>,
	"zohar@linux.ibm.com" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	 "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "netdev@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com"
	<linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com>,
	 "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	 "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs
Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 09:44:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEiveUcx1KHoJ421Cv+52t=0U+Uy2VF51VC_zfTSftQ4wVYOPw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACYkzJ5QgkucL3HZ4bY5Rcme4ey6U3FW4w2Gz-9rdWq0_RHvgA@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Apr 3, 2022 at 5:42 PM KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 2, 2022 at 1:55 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
...
> >
> > > Pinning
> > > them to unreachable inodes intuitively looked the
> > > way to go for achieving the stated goal.
> >
> > We can consider inodes in bpffs that are not unlinkable by root
> > in the future, but certainly not for this use case.
>
> Can this not be already done by adding a BPF_LSM program to the
> inode_unlink LSM hook?
>

Also, beside of the inode_unlink... and out of curiosity: making sysfs/bpffs/
readonly after pinning, then using bpf LSM hooks sb_mount|remount|unmount...
family combining bpf() LSM hook... isn't this enough to:
1. Restrict who can pin to bpffs without using a full MAC
2. Restrict who can delete or unmount bpf filesystem

?

-- 
https://djalal.opendz.org/

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-04  7:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-28 17:50 [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 01/18] bpf: Export bpf_link_inc() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 02/18] bpf-preload: Move bpf_preload.h to include/linux Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 03/18] bpf-preload: Generalize object pinning from the kernel Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 04/18] bpf-preload: Export and call bpf_obj_do_pin_kernel() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 05/18] bpf-preload: Generate static variables Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29 23:51   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-29 23:51     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-30  7:44     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-30  7:44       ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-04  0:22       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-04-04  0:22         ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-30 15:12     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-30 15:12       ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 06/18] bpf-preload: Generate free_objs_and_skel() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 07/18] bpf-preload: Generate preload() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 08/18] bpf-preload: Generate load_skel() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 09/18] bpf-preload: Generate code to pin non-internal maps Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 10/18] bpf-preload: Generate bpf_preload_ops Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 11/18] bpf-preload: Store multiple bpf_preload_ops structures in a linked list Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 12/18] bpf-preload: Implement new registration method for preloading eBPF programs Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 13/18] bpf-preload: Move pinned links and maps to a dedicated directory in bpffs Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 14/18] bpf-preload: Switch to new preload registration method Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29  2:35   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29  2:35     ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29  3:27   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29  3:27     ` kernel test robot
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 15/18] bpf-preload: Generate code of kernel module to preload Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 16/18] bpf-preload: Do kernel mount to ensure that pinned objects don't disappear Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29  2:15   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29  2:15     ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29  4:08   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29  4:08     ` kernel test robot
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 17/18] bpf-preload/selftests: Add test for automatic generation of preload methods Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 18/18] bpf-preload/selftests: Preload a test eBPF program and check pinned objects Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29 23:51 ` [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-29 23:51   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-30  7:21   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-30  7:21     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-31  2:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-03-31  2:27   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-03-31  8:25   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-31  8:25     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-01 23:55     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-04-01 23:55       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-04-02  1:03       ` KP Singh
2022-04-02  1:03         ` KP Singh
2022-04-04  7:44         ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2022-04-04  7:44           ` Djalal Harouni
2022-04-04 17:20           ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-04 17:20             ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-04 22:49             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-04-04 22:49               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-04-05  0:00               ` KP Singh
2022-04-05  0:00                 ` KP Singh
2022-04-05 13:11                 ` [POC][USER SPACE][PATCH] Introduce LSM to protect pinned objects Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 13:11                   ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 22:47                   ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 22:47                     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-06  6:55                     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-06  6:55                       ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 14:49             ` [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 14:49               ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 15:29               ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 15:29                 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 16:21                 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 16:21                   ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 16:37                   ` KP Singh
2022-04-05 16:37                     ` KP Singh
2022-04-04 17:41         ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-04 17:41           ` Roberto Sassu

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