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From: Dominic Raferd <dominic@timedicer.co.uk>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot bit errors
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 14:44:50 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAF9Mo3+G8S8E_Vz8+3yGTiBgGUm+UHMDzAV-VVSQSs22ugUF_A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <odni46$efq$1@blaine.gmane.org>

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On 25 April 2017 at 14:14, Robert Nichols <rnicholsNOSPAM@comcast.net>
wrote:

> On 04/24/2017 06:49 PM, protagonist wrote:
>
>> However, I assume it is likely that a determined attacker running as
>> root might be able to extract the master key from RAM if the encrypted
>> volume in question is still open at the time of attack, so technically,
>> there would be a way to do this without the password.
>>
>
> It's trivial. Just run "dmsetup table --showkeys" on the device.


Wowzer. 'cryptsetup luksDump <device> --dump-master-key' can also provide
this info but it requires a passphrase, which 'dmsetup table --showkeys'
does not. So must we assume that anyone who has ever had root access while
the encrypted device is mounted can thereafter ​break through the
encryption regardless of passphrases? At least until cryptsetup-reencrypt
is run on the device, which is a big step.

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-25 13:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <a6e54426-5188-d4c7-ee7b-6f022b84bf22@depressiverobots.com>
2017-04-21 14:26 ` [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt from apparently healthy SSD protagonist
2017-04-21 23:25   ` David Christensen
2017-04-22  0:25   ` Arno Wagner
2017-04-22 13:33     ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-22 13:45       ` Arno Wagner
2017-04-22 18:02         ` [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of bit errors protagonist
2017-04-23 20:03           ` [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot " protagonist
2017-04-24  5:50             ` Dominic Raferd
2017-04-24 13:26               ` protagonist
2017-04-24 17:00                 ` Dominic Raferd
2017-04-24 17:44                   ` Michael Kjörling
2017-04-24 23:49                   ` protagonist
2017-04-25 13:14                     ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-25 13:44                       ` Dominic Raferd [this message]
2017-04-25 14:37                         ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-25 14:43                           ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-25 14:45                           ` Ondrej Kozina
2017-04-25 16:16                         ` Sven Eschenberg
2017-04-25 16:30                           ` Milan Broz
2017-04-25 17:09                             ` Sven Eschenberg
2017-04-26 14:45                               ` Hendrik Brueckner
2017-04-26 18:46                                 ` Milan Broz
2017-04-28 15:51             ` protagonist
2017-04-30 15:06               ` protagonist
2017-04-30 18:39                 ` Arno Wagner
2017-11-24 11:57 Jindrich Kolman
2017-11-24 16:15 ` protagonist

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