All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 22:07:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez0pRtMZs3Hc3R2+XGHRwt9nZAGZu6vDpPBMbE+Askr_+Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200622193146.2985288-4-keescook@chromium.org>

On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 9:31 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
> address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
> param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
> CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.
[...]
> +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do {                                        \
> +       if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
> +                               &randomize_kstack_offset)) {            \
> +               u32 offset = this_cpu_read(kstack_offset);              \
> +               u8 *ptr = __builtin_alloca(offset & 0x3FF);             \
> +               asm volatile("" : "=m"(*ptr));                          \
> +       }                                                               \
> +} while (0)

clang generates better code here if the mask is stack-aligned -
otherwise it needs to round the stack pointer / the offset:

$ cat alloca_align.c
#include <alloca.h>
void callee(void);

void alloca_blah(unsigned long rand) {
  asm volatile(""::"r"(alloca(rand & MASK)));
  callee();
}
$ clang -O3 -c -o alloca_align.o alloca_align.c -DMASK=0x3ff
$ objdump -d alloca_align.o
[...]
   0: 55                    push   %rbp
   1: 48 89 e5              mov    %rsp,%rbp
   4: 81 e7 ff 03 00 00    and    $0x3ff,%edi
   a: 83 c7 0f              add    $0xf,%edi
   d: 83 e7 f0              and    $0xfffffff0,%edi
  10: 48 89 e0              mov    %rsp,%rax
  13: 48 29 f8              sub    %rdi,%rax
  16: 48 89 c4              mov    %rax,%rsp
  19: e8 00 00 00 00        callq  1e <alloca_blah+0x1e>
  1e: 48 89 ec              mov    %rbp,%rsp
  21: 5d                    pop    %rbp
  22: c3                    retq
$ clang -O3 -c -o alloca_align.o alloca_align.c -DMASK=0x3f0
$ objdump -d alloca_align.o
[...]
   0: 55                    push   %rbp
   1: 48 89 e5              mov    %rsp,%rbp
   4: 48 89 e0              mov    %rsp,%rax
   7: 81 e7 f0 03 00 00    and    $0x3f0,%edi
   d: 48 29 f8              sub    %rdi,%rax
  10: 48 89 c4              mov    %rax,%rsp
  13: e8 00 00 00 00        callq  18 <alloca_blah+0x18>
  18: 48 89 ec              mov    %rbp,%rsp
  1b: 5d                    pop    %rbp
  1c: c3                    retq
$

(From a glance at the assembly, gcc seems to always assume that the
length may be misaligned.)

Maybe this should be something along the lines of
__builtin_alloca(offset & (0x3ff & ARCH_STACK_ALIGN_MASK)) (with
appropriate definitions of the stack alignment mask depending on the
architecture's choice of stack alignment for kernel code).

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-22 20:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-22 19:31 [PATCH v4 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:40   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-06-22 21:26     ` Kees Cook
2020-06-22 20:07   ` Jann Horn [this message]
2020-06-22 20:07     ` Jann Horn
2020-06-22 21:30     ` Kees Cook
2020-06-22 21:42       ` Jann Horn
2020-06-22 21:42         ` Jann Horn
2020-06-22 22:04         ` Kees Cook
2020-06-22 22:56   ` Arvind Sankar
2020-06-22 23:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-06-23  0:05       ` Arvind Sankar
2020-06-23  0:56         ` Kees Cook
2020-06-23 13:42           ` David Laight
2020-06-23 13:42             ` David Laight
2020-06-23 12:38   ` Alexander Popov
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook
2020-06-22 19:31 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook
2020-06-23  9:40   ` Mark Rutland

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CAG48ez0pRtMZs3Hc3R2+XGHRwt9nZAGZu6vDpPBMbE+Askr_+Q@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=alex.popov@linux.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.