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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] pid: add pidctl()
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 21:34:00 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1ZVKgwfQDYT1k4pB4-8Y8Ywv12dabh5KFFxtKmT-e7Cw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKOZueuYMKdkt8BoSj1+p7=mpe2PA8r7xT5QiF6q3cTK+6HsAA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 9:15 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:42 PM Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 6:57 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
[...]
> > Yes, but everything in /proc is not equivalent to an attribute, or an
> > option, and depending on its configuration, you may not want to allow
> > processes to even be able to see /proc for any PIDs other than those
> > running as their own user (hidepid). This means, even if this new
> > system call is added, to respect hidepid, it must, depending on if
> > /proc is mounted (and what hidepid is set to, and what gid= is set
> > to), return EPERM, because then there is a discrepancy between how the
> > two entrypoints to acquire a process handle do access control.
>
> That's why I proposed that this translation mechanism accept a procfs
> root directory --- so you'd specify *which* procfs you want and let
> the kernel apply whatever hidepid access restrictions it wants.
[...]
> > > and 2) it's
> > > "fail unsafe": IMHO, most users in practice will skip the line marked
> > > "LIVENESS CHECK", and as a result, their code will appear to work but
> > > contain subtle race conditions. An explicit interface to translate
> > > from a (PIDFD, PROCFS_ROOT) tuple to a /proc/pid directory file
> > > descriptor would be both more efficient and fail-safe.
> > >
> > > [1] as a separate matter, it'd be nice to have a batch version of close(2).
> >
> > Since /proc is full of gunk,
>
> People keep saying /proc is bad, but I haven't seen any serious
> proposals for a clean replacement. :-)
>
> > how about adding more to it and making
> > the magic symlink of /proc/self/fd for the pidfd to lead to the dirfd
> > of the /proc entry of the process it maps to, when one uses
> > O_DIRECTORY while opening it? Otherwise, it behaves as it does today.
> > It would be equivalent to opening the proc entry with usual access
> > restrictions (and hidepid made to work) but without the races, and
> > because for processes outside your and children pid ns, it shouldn't
> > work anyway, and since they wouldn't have their entry on this procfs
> > instance, it would all just fit in nicely?
>
> Thanks. That'll work. It's a bit magical, but /proc/self/fd is magical
> anyway, so that's okay.

Please don't do that. /proc/$pid/fd refers to the set of file
descriptors the process has open, and semantically doesn't have much
to do with the identity of the process. If you want to have a procfs
directory entry for getting a pidfd, please add a new entry. (Although
I don't see the point in adding a new procfs entry for this when you
could instead have an ioctl or syscall operating on the procfs
directory fd.)

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarat>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] pid: add pidctl()
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 21:34:00 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1ZVKgwfQDYT1k4pB4-8Y8Ywv12dabh5KFFxtKmT-e7Cw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKOZueuYMKdkt8BoSj1+p7=mpe2PA8r7xT5QiF6q3cTK+6HsAA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 9:15 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:42 PM Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 6:57 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
[...]
> > Yes, but everything in /proc is not equivalent to an attribute, or an
> > option, and depending on its configuration, you may not want to allow
> > processes to even be able to see /proc for any PIDs other than those
> > running as their own user (hidepid). This means, even if this new
> > system call is added, to respect hidepid, it must, depending on if
> > /proc is mounted (and what hidepid is set to, and what gid= is set
> > to), return EPERM, because then there is a discrepancy between how the
> > two entrypoints to acquire a process handle do access control.
>
> That's why I proposed that this translation mechanism accept a procfs
> root directory --- so you'd specify *which* procfs you want and let
> the kernel apply whatever hidepid access restrictions it wants.
[...]
> > > and 2) it's
> > > "fail unsafe": IMHO, most users in practice will skip the line marked
> > > "LIVENESS CHECK", and as a result, their code will appear to work but
> > > contain subtle race conditions. An explicit interface to translate
> > > from a (PIDFD, PROCFS_ROOT) tuple to a /proc/pid directory file
> > > descriptor would be both more efficient and fail-safe.
> > >
> > > [1] as a separate matter, it'd be nice to have a batch version of close(2).
> >
> > Since /proc is full of gunk,
>
> People keep saying /proc is bad, but I haven't seen any serious
> proposals for a clean replacement. :-)
>
> > how about adding more to it and making
> > the magic symlink of /proc/self/fd for the pidfd to lead to the dirfd
> > of the /proc entry of the process it maps to, when one uses
> > O_DIRECTORY while opening it? Otherwise, it behaves as it does today.
> > It would be equivalent to opening the proc entry with usual access
> > restrictions (and hidepid made to work) but without the races, and
> > because for processes outside your and children pid ns, it shouldn't
> > work anyway, and since they wouldn't have their entry on this procfs
> > instance, it would all just fit in nicely?
>
> Thanks. That'll work. It's a bit magical, but /proc/self/fd is magical
> anyway, so that's okay.

Please don't do that. /proc/$pid/fd refers to the set of file
descriptors the process has open, and semantically doesn't have much
to do with the identity of the process. If you want to have a procfs
directory entry for getting a pidfd, please add a new entry. (Although
I don't see the point in adding a new procfs entry for this when you
could instead have an ioctl or syscall operating on the procfs
directory fd.)

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-25 20:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-25 16:20 [PATCH 0/4] pid: add pidctl() Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 16:20 ` [PATCH 1/4] Make anon_inodes unconditional Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 16:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] pid: add pidctl() Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 17:20   ` Mika Penttilä
2019-03-25 19:59     ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 19:59       ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 18:18   ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 18:18     ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 19:58     ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 19:58       ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-26 16:07     ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-26 16:07       ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-26 16:15       ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-26 16:15         ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 16:20 ` [PATCH 3/4] signal: support pidctl() with pidfd_send_signal() Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 18:28   ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 18:28     ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 20:05     ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 20:05       ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 18:39   ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 18:39     ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 19:41     ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 19:41       ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 16:20 ` [PATCH 4/4] tests: add pidctl() tests Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 16:48 ` [PATCH 0/4] pid: add pidctl() Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 16:48   ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 17:05   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2019-03-25 17:07     ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 17:07       ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 17:36   ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 17:36     ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 17:53     ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 17:53       ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 18:19       ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 18:19         ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 18:57         ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 18:57           ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 19:42           ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 19:42             ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 20:14             ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 20:14               ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 20:34               ` Jann Horn [this message]
2019-03-25 20:34                 ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 20:40                 ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 20:40                   ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 21:14                   ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 21:14                     ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 21:15                   ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 21:15                     ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 20:40                 ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 20:40                   ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 20:15     ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 20:15       ` Christian Brauner
2019-03-25 21:11       ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 21:11         ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 21:17         ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 21:17           ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 21:19         ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 21:19           ` Jann Horn
2019-03-25 21:43           ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 21:43             ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 21:54             ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 21:54               ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 22:07               ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 22:07                 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 22:37                 ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 22:37                   ` Jonathan Kowalski
2019-03-25 23:14                   ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 23:14                     ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-26  3:03               ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-26  3:03                 ` Joel Fernandes
2019-03-25 16:56 ` David Howells
2019-03-25 16:56   ` David Howells
2019-03-25 16:58   ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 16:58     ` Daniel Colascione
2019-03-25 23:39   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-25 23:39     ` Andy Lutomirski

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