From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Abderrahmane Benbachir <abderrahmane.benbachir@polymtl.ca>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 11:35:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJyL7FuLRj1XxujpGs9=wUQgS4dRfeGB+HUBqy4mkEBhQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180926123522.4080d9eb@vmware.local.home>
On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 9:35 AM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Sep 2018 17:18:07 -0700
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc417 ("init, tracing: instrument
>> security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls
>> are about to no longer resemble regular init calls.
>
> I'm not against the change, but how much are they going to "no longer
> resemble regular init calls"?
My take on "regular" init calls is that they're always run, link-time
ordered, etc. The changes proposed here will make it so not all
initialization are run depending on runtime configurations, ordering
will be flexible, etc.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 11:35:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJyL7FuLRj1XxujpGs9=wUQgS4dRfeGB+HUBqy4mkEBhQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180926123522.4080d9eb@vmware.local.home>
On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 9:35 AM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Sep 2018 17:18:07 -0700
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc417 ("init, tracing: instrument
>> security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls
>> are about to no longer resemble regular init calls.
>
> I'm not against the change, but how much are they going to "no longer
> resemble regular init calls"?
My take on "regular" init calls is that they're always run, link-time
ordered, etc. The changes proposed here will make it so not all
initialization are run depending on runtime configurations, ordering
will be flexible, etc.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-26 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:53 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:56 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:57 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:06 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:07 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-01 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 19:59 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:08 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:10 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:12 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:13 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:15 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 21:47 ` James Morris
2018-10-01 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:20 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:53 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:22 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:34 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 22:27 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 22:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 23:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:44 ` John Johansen
2018-10-01 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-01 21:47 ` John Johansen
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 15:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
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