Re: [PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms"

[Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>]

On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 9:16 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
> This reverts commit 609a3e81550b0b4ea87197b0f59455a7bcff975a which is
> commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.
>
> It shouldn't have been backported to 3.18, as we do not have
> get_random_long() in that kernel tree.

It should be possible to trivially backport
ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 to gain get_random_long().

-Kees

>
> Reported-by: Philip Müller <philm@manjaro.org>
> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Arjan van Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
> ---
>  kernel/fork.c |    2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_stru
>         set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
> -       tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
> +       tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
>  #endif
>
>         /*
>
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security