From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 16:44:07 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKe5hZtrUJ7SJ2WTcJvKXftgkAkPjxmvoVjewbC3Kqg9Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXNe5Ow0cxLACzVpx3HdR_b_XCB3_VUtsAphVjCQpRZwA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Nov 24, 2015 1:38 PM, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>> One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
>> the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
>> making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
>> attack surface.
>>
>> Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
>> again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
>> thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
>> into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
>> which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.
>>
>> This introduces __read_only as a way to mark such memory, and adds some
>> documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking.
>
> Obligatory bikeshed: __ro_after_init, please. It's barely longer,
> and it directly explains what's going on. __read_only makes me think
> that it's really read-only and could, for example, actually be in ROM.
I'm fine with that. Anyone else want to chime in before I send a v2?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 16:44:07 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKe5hZtrUJ7SJ2WTcJvKXftgkAkPjxmvoVjewbC3Kqg9Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXNe5Ow0cxLACzVpx3HdR_b_XCB3_VUtsAphVjCQpRZwA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Nov 24, 2015 1:38 PM, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>> One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
>> the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
>> making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
>> attack surface.
>>
>> Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
>> again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
>> thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
>> into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
>> which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.
>>
>> This introduces __read_only as a way to mark such memory, and adds some
>> documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking.
>
> Obligatory bikeshed: __ro_after_init, please. It's barely longer,
> and it directly explains what's going on. __read_only makes me think
> that it's really read-only and could, for example, actually be in ROM.
I'm fine with that. Anyone else want to chime in before I send a v2?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-25 0:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-24 21:38 [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:44 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-11-25 0:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 15:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 15:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:05 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 23:32 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:32 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:32 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 9:13 ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 10:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 11:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 15:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2015-11-25 11:05 ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 8:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 9:57 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 9:57 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 10:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 12:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 12:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-27 8:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 15:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 15:29 ` PaX Team
2015-11-27 16:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27 16:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29 8:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 11:15 ` PaX Team
2015-11-29 11:15 ` PaX Team
2015-11-29 15:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 18:05 ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-29 18:05 ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-30 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 8:01 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 16:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-26 16:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-26 16:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27 7:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 7:59 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 7:59 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 20:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27 20:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 21:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-30 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-30 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:31 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 18:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 18:54 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 19:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 19:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
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