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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Vitaly Buka <vitalybuka@google.com>,
	linux-toolchains <linux-toolchains@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 43/45] namei: initialize parameters passed to step_into()
Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2022 10:20:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=V_vDVFNSJTOErNhzk7n=GRjZ_6U6Z=M-Jdmi=ekbS5+g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YsJWCREA5xMfmmqx@ZenIV>

On Mon, Jul 4, 2022 at 4:53 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jul 02, 2022 at 10:23:16AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
> > Al - can you please take a quick look?
>
> FWIW, trying to write a coherent documentation had its usual effect...
> The thing is, we don't really need to fetch the inode that early.
> All we really care about is that in RCU mode ->d_seq gets sampled
> before we fetch ->d_inode *and* we don't treat "it looks negative"
> as hard -ENOENT in case of ->d_seq mismatch.
>
> Which can be bloody well left to step_into().  So we don't need
> to pass it inode argument at all - just dentry and seq.  Makes
> a bunch of functions simpler as well...
>
> It does *not* deal with the "uninitialized" seq argument in
> !RCU case; I'll handle that in the followup, but that's a separate
> story, IMO (and very clearly a false positive).

I can confirm that your patch fixes KMSAN reports on inode, yet the
following reports still persist:

=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in walk_component+0x5e7/0x6c0 fs/namei.c:1996
 walk_component+0x5e7/0x6c0 fs/namei.c:1996
 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2445
 path_lookupat+0x27d/0x6f0 fs/namei.c:2468
 filename_lookup+0x24c/0x800 fs/namei.c:2497
 kern_path+0x79/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:2587
 init_stat+0x72/0x13f fs/init.c:132
 clean_path+0x74/0x24c init/initramfs.c:339
 do_name+0x12d/0xc17 init/initramfs.c:371
 write_buffer init/initramfs.c:457
 unpack_to_rootfs+0x49a/0xd9e init/initramfs.c:510
 do_populate_rootfs+0x57/0x40f init/initramfs.c:699
 async_run_entry_fn+0x8f/0x400 kernel/async.c:127
 process_one_work+0xb27/0x13e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
 worker_thread+0x1076/0x1d60 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
 kthread+0x31b/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:376
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 ??:?

Local variable seq created at:
 walk_component+0x46/0x6c0 fs/namei.c:1981
 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2445
 path_lookupat+0x27d/0x6f0 fs/namei.c:2468

CPU: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Tainted: G    B
5.19.0-rc4-00059-gcf2d25715943-dirty #103
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
=====================================================

What makes you think they are false positives? Is the scenario I
described above:

"""
In particular, if the call to lookup_fast() in walk_component()
returns NULL, and lookup_slow() returns a valid dentry, then the
`seq` and `inode` will remain uninitialized until the call to
step_into()
"""

impossible?

> Cumulative diff follows; splitup is in #work.namei.  Comments?
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 1f28d3f463c3..7f4f61ade9e3 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_down);
>   * we meet a managed dentry that would need blocking.
>   */
>  static bool __follow_mount_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
> -                              struct inode **inode, unsigned *seqp)
> +                              unsigned *seqp)
>  {
>         struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
>         unsigned int flags = dentry->d_flags;
> @@ -1497,13 +1497,6 @@ static bool __follow_mount_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
>                                 dentry = path->dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
>                                 nd->state |= ND_JUMPED;
>                                 *seqp = read_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
> -                               *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> -                               /*
> -                                * We don't need to re-check ->d_seq after this
> -                                * ->d_inode read - there will be an RCU delay
> -                                * between mount hash removal and ->mnt_root
> -                                * becoming unpinned.
> -                                */
>                                 flags = dentry->d_flags;
>                                 continue;
>                         }
> @@ -1515,8 +1508,7 @@ static bool __follow_mount_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
>  }
>
>  static inline int handle_mounts(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
> -                         struct path *path, struct inode **inode,
> -                         unsigned int *seqp)
> +                         struct path *path, unsigned int *seqp)
>  {
>         bool jumped;
>         int ret;
> @@ -1525,9 +1517,7 @@ static inline int handle_mounts(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
>         path->dentry = dentry;
>         if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
>                 unsigned int seq = *seqp;
> -               if (unlikely(!*inode))
> -                       return -ENOENT;
> -               if (likely(__follow_mount_rcu(nd, path, inode, seqp)))
> +               if (likely(__follow_mount_rcu(nd, path, seqp)))
>                         return 0;
>                 if (!try_to_unlazy_next(nd, dentry, seq))
>                         return -ECHILD;
> @@ -1547,7 +1537,6 @@ static inline int handle_mounts(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
>                 if (path->mnt != nd->path.mnt)
>                         mntput(path->mnt);
>         } else {
> -               *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
>                 *seqp = 0; /* out of RCU mode, so the value doesn't matter */
>         }
>         return ret;
> @@ -1607,9 +1596,7 @@ static struct dentry *__lookup_hash(const struct qstr *name,
>         return dentry;
>  }
>
> -static struct dentry *lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
> -                                 struct inode **inode,
> -                                 unsigned *seqp)
> +static struct dentry *lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned *seqp)
>  {
>         struct dentry *dentry, *parent = nd->path.dentry;
>         int status = 1;
> @@ -1628,22 +1615,11 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
>                         return NULL;
>                 }
>
> -               /*
> -                * This sequence count validates that the inode matches
> -                * the dentry name information from lookup.
> -                */
> -               *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> -               if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&dentry->d_seq, seq)))
> -                       return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
> -
> -               /*
> +               /*
>                  * This sequence count validates that the parent had no
>                  * changes while we did the lookup of the dentry above.
> -                *
> -                * The memory barrier in read_seqcount_begin of child is
> -                *  enough, we can use __read_seqcount_retry here.
>                  */
> -               if (unlikely(__read_seqcount_retry(&parent->d_seq, nd->seq)))
> +               if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&parent->d_seq, nd->seq)))
>                         return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
>
>                 *seqp = seq;
> @@ -1838,13 +1814,21 @@ static const char *pick_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link,
>   * for the common case.
>   */
>  static const char *step_into(struct nameidata *nd, int flags,
> -                    struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, unsigned seq)
> +                    struct dentry *dentry, unsigned seq)
>  {
>         struct path path;
> -       int err = handle_mounts(nd, dentry, &path, &inode, &seq);
> +       struct inode *inode;
> +       int err = handle_mounts(nd, dentry, &path, &seq);
>
>         if (err < 0)
>                 return ERR_PTR(err);
> +       inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
> +       if (unlikely(!inode)) {
> +               if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) &&
> +                   read_seqcount_retry(&path.dentry->d_seq, seq))
> +                       return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
> +               return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> +       }
>         if (likely(!d_is_symlink(path.dentry)) ||
>            ((flags & WALK_TRAILING) && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)) ||
>            (flags & WALK_NOFOLLOW)) {
> @@ -1870,9 +1854,7 @@ static const char *step_into(struct nameidata *nd, int flags,
>         return pick_link(nd, &path, inode, seq, flags);
>  }
>
> -static struct dentry *follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd,
> -                                       struct inode **inodep,
> -                                       unsigned *seqp)
> +static struct dentry *follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned *seqp)
>  {
>         struct dentry *parent, *old;
>
> @@ -1895,7 +1877,6 @@ static struct dentry *follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd,
>         }
>         old = nd->path.dentry;
>         parent = old->d_parent;
> -       *inodep = parent->d_inode;
>         *seqp = read_seqcount_begin(&parent->d_seq);
>         if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&old->d_seq, nd->seq)))
>                 return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
> @@ -1910,9 +1891,7 @@ static struct dentry *follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd,
>         return NULL;
>  }
>
> -static struct dentry *follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd,
> -                                struct inode **inodep,
> -                                unsigned *seqp)
> +static struct dentry *follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned *seqp)
>  {
>         struct dentry *parent;
>
> @@ -1937,7 +1916,6 @@ static struct dentry *follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd,
>                 return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
>         }
>         *seqp = 0;
> -       *inodep = parent->d_inode;
>         return parent;
>
>  in_root:
> @@ -1952,7 +1930,6 @@ static const char *handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
>         if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
>                 const char *error = NULL;
>                 struct dentry *parent;
> -               struct inode *inode;
>                 unsigned seq;
>
>                 if (!nd->root.mnt) {
> @@ -1961,17 +1938,17 @@ static const char *handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
>                                 return error;
>                 }
>                 if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
> -                       parent = follow_dotdot_rcu(nd, &inode, &seq);
> +                       parent = follow_dotdot_rcu(nd, &seq);
>                 else
> -                       parent = follow_dotdot(nd, &inode, &seq);
> +                       parent = follow_dotdot(nd, &seq);
>                 if (IS_ERR(parent))
>                         return ERR_CAST(parent);
>                 if (unlikely(!parent))
>                         error = step_into(nd, WALK_NOFOLLOW,
> -                                        nd->path.dentry, nd->inode, nd->seq);
> +                                        nd->path.dentry, nd->seq);
>                 else
>                         error = step_into(nd, WALK_NOFOLLOW,
> -                                        parent, inode, seq);
> +                                        parent, seq);
>                 if (unlikely(error))
>                         return error;
>
> @@ -1995,7 +1972,6 @@ static const char *handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
>  static const char *walk_component(struct nameidata *nd, int flags)
>  {
>         struct dentry *dentry;
> -       struct inode *inode;
>         unsigned seq;
>         /*
>          * "." and ".." are special - ".." especially so because it has
> @@ -2007,7 +1983,7 @@ static const char *walk_component(struct nameidata *nd, int flags)
>                         put_link(nd);
>                 return handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
>         }
> -       dentry = lookup_fast(nd, &inode, &seq);
> +       dentry = lookup_fast(nd, &seq);
>         if (IS_ERR(dentry))
>                 return ERR_CAST(dentry);
>         if (unlikely(!dentry)) {
> @@ -2017,7 +1993,7 @@ static const char *walk_component(struct nameidata *nd, int flags)
>         }
>         if (!(flags & WALK_MORE) && nd->depth)
>                 put_link(nd);
> -       return step_into(nd, flags, dentry, inode, seq);
> +       return step_into(nd, flags, dentry, seq);
>  }
>
>  /*
> @@ -2473,8 +2449,7 @@ static int handle_lookup_down(struct nameidata *nd)
>  {
>         if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU))
>                 dget(nd->path.dentry);
> -       return PTR_ERR(step_into(nd, WALK_NOFOLLOW,
> -                       nd->path.dentry, nd->inode, nd->seq));
> +       return PTR_ERR(step_into(nd, WALK_NOFOLLOW, nd->path.dentry, nd->seq));
>  }
>
>  /* Returns 0 and nd will be valid on success; Retuns error, otherwise. */
> @@ -3394,7 +3369,6 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
>         int open_flag = op->open_flag;
>         bool got_write = false;
>         unsigned seq;
> -       struct inode *inode;
>         struct dentry *dentry;
>         const char *res;
>
> @@ -3410,7 +3384,7 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
>                 if (nd->last.name[nd->last.len])
>                         nd->flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
>                 /* we _can_ be in RCU mode here */
> -               dentry = lookup_fast(nd, &inode, &seq);
> +               dentry = lookup_fast(nd, &seq);
>                 if (IS_ERR(dentry))
>                         return ERR_CAST(dentry);
>                 if (likely(dentry))
> @@ -3464,7 +3438,7 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
>  finish_lookup:
>         if (nd->depth)
>                 put_link(nd);
> -       res = step_into(nd, WALK_TRAILING, dentry, inode, seq);
> +       res = step_into(nd, WALK_TRAILING, dentry, seq);
>         if (unlikely(res))
>                 nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
>         return res;



-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
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  reply	other threads:[~2022-07-04  8:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 147+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-01 14:22 [PATCH v4 00/45] Add KernelMemorySanitizer infrastructure Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/45] x86: add missing include to sparsemem.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/45] stackdepot: reserve 5 extra bits in depot_stack_handle_t Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/45] instrumented.h: allow instrumenting both sides of copy_from_user() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/45] x86: asm: instrument usercopy in get_user() and __put_user_size() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02  3:47   ` kernel test robot
2022-07-15 14:03     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-15 14:03       ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 10:45   ` kernel test robot
2022-07-15 16:44     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-15 16:44       ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 13:09   ` kernel test robot
2022-07-07 10:13   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-07 17:33     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/45] asm-generic: instrument usercopy in cacheflush.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/45] kmsan: add ReST documentation Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-07 12:34   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-15  7:42     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-15  8:52       ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/45] kmsan: introduce __no_sanitize_memory and __no_kmsan_checks Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/45] kmsan: mark noinstr as __no_sanitize_memory Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/45] x86: kmsan: pgtable: reduce vmalloc space Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-11 16:12   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/45] libnvdimm/pfn_dev: increase MAX_STRUCT_PAGE_SIZE Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-11 16:26   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03  9:41     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-03  9:44     ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-05 22:08       ` Dan Williams
2023-01-09  9:51         ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-09 22:06           ` Dan Williams
2023-01-10  5:56             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-10  6:55               ` Dan Williams
2023-01-10  8:48                 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-10  8:52                   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-10  8:53                   ` Eric Dumazet
2023-01-10  8:55                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-10 15:35                       ` Steven Rostedt
2023-01-10  9:14                     ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-30  8:34         ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-30 18:57           ` Dan Williams
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/45] kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02  0:18   ` Hillf Danton
2022-08-03 17:25     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-11 16:49   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 18:14     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-13 10:04   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 17:45     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/45] kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported common kernel code Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 11:54   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/45] MAINTAINERS: add entry for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 12:06   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 16:39     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/45] mm: kmsan: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 12:20   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 10:30     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/45] mm: kmsan: call KMSAN hooks from SLUB code Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:13   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 16:31     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/45] kmsan: handle task creation and exiting Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:17   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 15:47     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/45] init: kmsan: call KMSAN initialization routines Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:05   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 20:07     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-03  9:08       ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/45] instrumented.h: add KMSAN support Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:51   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 11:17     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/45] kmsan: unpoison @tlb in arch_tlb_gather_mmu() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-13  9:28   ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/45] kmsan: add iomap support Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/45] Input: libps2: mark data received in __ps2_command() as initialized Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/45] dma: kmsan: unpoison DMA mappings Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/45] virtio: kmsan: check/unpoison scatterlist in vring_map_one_sg() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 24/45] kmsan: handle memory sent to/from USB Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 25/45] kmsan: add tests for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:16   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 17:29     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 26/45] kmsan: disable strscpy() optimization under KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 27/45] crypto: kmsan: disable accelerated configs " Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 28/45] kmsan: disable physical page merging in biovec Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 29/45] block: kmsan: skip bio block merging logic for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-13 10:22   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 17:47     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 30/45] kcov: kmsan: unpoison area->list in kcov_remote_area_put() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 31/45] security: kmsan: fix interoperability with auto-initialization Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 32/45] objtool: kmsan: list KMSAN API functions as uaccess-safe Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 33/45] x86: kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported code Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:43   ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 10:52     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 34/45] x86: kmsan: skip shadow checks in __switch_to() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 35/45] x86: kmsan: handle open-coded assembly in lib/iomem.c Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 36/45] x86: kmsan: use __msan_ string functions where possible Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 37/45] x86: kmsan: sync metadata pages on page fault Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 38/45] x86: kasan: kmsan: support CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM on x86, enable it for KASAN/KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 39/45] x86: fs: kmsan: disable CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 40/45] x86: kmsan: don't instrument stack walking functions Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 41/45] entry: kmsan: introduce kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 42/45] bpf: kmsan: initialize BPF registers with zeroes Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 43/45] namei: initialize parameters passed to step_into() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 17:23   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-03  3:59     ` Al Viro
2022-07-04  2:52     ` Al Viro
2022-07-04  8:20       ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2022-07-04 13:44         ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 13:55           ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 15:49           ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 16:03             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-04 16:33               ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 18:23             ` Segher Boessenkool
2022-07-04 16:00           ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 16:47             ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 17:36       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 19:02         ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 19:16           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 19:55             ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 20:24               ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 20:46                 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 20:51                   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 21:04                     ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:13                       ` [PATCH 1/7] __follow_mount_rcu(): verify that mount_lock remains unchanged Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:14                         ` [PATCH 2/7] follow_dotdot{,_rcu}(): change calling conventions Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:14                         ` [PATCH 3/7] namei: stash the sampled ->d_seq into nameidata Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:15                         ` [PATCH 4/7] step_into(): lose inode argument Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:15                         ` [PATCH 5/7] follow_dotdot{,_rcu}(): don't bother with inode Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:16                         ` [PATCH 6/7] lookup_fast(): " Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:17                         ` [PATCH 7/7] step_into(): move fetching ->d_inode past handle_mounts() Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:19                         ` [PATCH 1/7] __follow_mount_rcu(): verify that mount_lock remains unchanged Al Viro
2022-07-05  0:06                           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-05  3:48                             ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 20:47                 ` [PATCH v4 43/45] namei: initialize parameters passed to step_into() Linus Torvalds
2022-08-08 16:37   ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 44/45] mm: fs: initialize fsdata passed to write_begin/write_end interface Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 20:07   ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-07-04 20:30     ` Al Viro
2022-08-25 15:39     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-25 16:33       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-08-25 21:57         ` Segher Boessenkool
2022-08-26 19:41           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-08-31 13:32             ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-25 22:13         ` Segher Boessenkool
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 45/45] x86: kmsan: enable KMSAN builds for x86 Alexander Potapenko

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