From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 16:10:28 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSao7DGtskbDMax8hN+PhQr8homFXUGjm+c7NtEUCtKhg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201212180251.9943-9-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> On Sat, Dec 12, 2020 at 1:03 PM Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > > SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data > at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided > by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem > provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate > the policy contents at runtime. > > Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook > ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can > be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of > the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry. > > Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA > to enable measuring SELinux data. > > To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: > > 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments > to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. > For example, > BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data > > 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy > measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinux > > Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy: > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run > the following commands and verify the output hash values match. > > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 > > grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 > > Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading > the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe > system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get > the expected hash. > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> > --- > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +- > security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + > security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +++- > security/selinux/measure.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++---- > 5 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c ... > diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile > index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/Makefile > +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile > @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o > > selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o > > +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o Naming things is hard, I get that, but I would prefer if we just called this file "ima.c" or something similar. The name "measure.c" implies a level of abstraction or general use which simply doesn't exist here. Let's help make it a bit more obvious what should belong in this file. > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h > index 3cc8bab31ea8..18ee65c98446 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h > @@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, > struct selinux_policy *policy); > int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, > void **data, size_t *len); > - > +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, > + void **data, size_t *len); > int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, > unsigned int req_cap); > > @@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); > extern void hashtab_cache_init(void); > extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA > +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state); > +#else > +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state) > +{ > +} > +#endif If you are going to put the SELinux/IMA function(s) into a separate source file, please put the function declarations into a separate header file too. For example, look at security/selinux/include/{netif,netnode,netport,etc.}.h. > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..b7e24358e11d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later > +/* > + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. > + */ > +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> > +#include <linux/ktime.h> > +#include <linux/ima.h> > +#include "security.h" > + > +/* > + * This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to > + * the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA > + * hook to measure the given SELinux data. > + * > + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have > + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). > + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence > + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" > + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. > + * > + * For example, > + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. > + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. > + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it > + * (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, > + * is different in this call. > + */ > +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix) > +{ > + struct timespec64 cur_time; > + > + ktime_get_real_ts64(&cur_time); > + return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, > + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); > +} Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only called from selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice from a reuse standpoint? Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth mentioning. > +/* > + * selinux_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy > + * > + * @state: selinux state struct > + * > + * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held. > + */ > +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state) Similar to the name of this source file, let's make it clear this is for IMA. How about calling this selinux_ima_measure_state() or similar? > +{ > + void *policy = NULL; > + char *policy_event_name = NULL; > + size_t policy_len; > + int rc = 0; > + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); Why bother with the initialized variable? Unless I'm missing something it is only used once in the code below. > + /* > + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. > + */ > + if (!initialized) > + goto out; > + > + policy_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash"); > + if (!policy_event_name) { > + pr_err("SELinux: %s: event name for policy not allocated.\n", > + __func__); > + rc = -ENOMEM; This function doesn't return an error code, why bother with setting the rc variable here? > + goto out; > + } > + > + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); > + if (rc) { > + pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc); > + goto out; > + } > + > + ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", policy_event_name, > + policy, policy_len, true); > + > + vfree(policy); > + > +out: > + kfree(policy_event_name); > +} > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > index 9704c8a32303..dfa2e00894ae 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > @@ -2180,6 +2180,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state, > selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); > selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); > selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); > + selinux_measure_state(state); > } > > void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, > @@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, > } > #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ > > +/** > + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. > + * @policy: SELinux policy > + * @data: binary policy data > + * @len: length of data in bytes > + * > + */ > +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy, > + void *data, size_t *len) Let's just call this "security_read_policy()". > +{ > + int rc; > + struct policy_file fp; > + > + fp.data = data; > + fp.len = *len; > + > + rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data; > + return 0; > +} > + > /** > * security_read_policy - read the policy. > + * @state: selinux_state > * @data: binary policy data > * @len: length of data in bytes > * > @@ -3885,8 +3911,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, > void **data, size_t *len) > { > struct selinux_policy *policy; > - int rc; > - struct policy_file fp; > > policy = rcu_dereference_protected( > state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); > @@ -3898,14 +3922,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, > if (!*data)> -- > 2.17.1 > > return -ENOMEM; > > - fp.data = *data; > - fp.len = *len; > + return security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len); > +} > > - rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); > - if (rc) > - return rc; > +/** > + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. > + * @state: selinux_state > + * @data: binary policy data > + * @len: length of data in bytes > + * > + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. > + * This function is for internal use only and should not > + * be used for returning data to user space. > + * > + * This function must be called with policy_mutex held. > + */ > +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, > + void **data, size_t *len) Let's call this "security_read_state_kernel()". > +{ > + struct selinux_policy *policy; > + int rc = 0; See below, the rc variable is not needed. > - *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; > - return 0; > + policy = rcu_dereference_protected( > + state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); > + if (!policy) { > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; Jumping to the out label is a little silly since it is just a return; do a "return -EINVAL;" here instead. > + } > + > + *len = policy->policydb.len; > + *data = vmalloc(*len); > + if (!*data) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + goto out; Same as above, "return -ENOMEM;" please. > + } > > + rc = security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len); You should be able to do "return security_read_selinux_policy(...);" here. > + > +out: > + return rc; > } -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 16:10:28 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSao7DGtskbDMax8hN+PhQr8homFXUGjm+c7NtEUCtKhg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201212180251.9943-9-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> On Sat, Dec 12, 2020 at 1:03 PM Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > > SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data > at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided > by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem > provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate > the policy contents at runtime. > > Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook > ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can > be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of > the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry. > > Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA > to enable measuring SELinux data. > > To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: > > 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments > to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. > For example, > BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data > > 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy > measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinux > > Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy: > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run > the following commands and verify the output hash values match. > > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 > > grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 > > Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading > the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe > system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get > the expected hash. > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> > --- > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +- > security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + > security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +++- > security/selinux/measure.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++---- > 5 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c ... > diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile > index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/Makefile > +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile > @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o > > selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o > > +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o Naming things is hard, I get that, but I would prefer if we just called this file "ima.c" or something similar. The name "measure.c" implies a level of abstraction or general use which simply doesn't exist here. Let's help make it a bit more obvious what should belong in this file. > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h > index 3cc8bab31ea8..18ee65c98446 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h > @@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, > struct selinux_policy *policy); > int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, > void **data, size_t *len); > - > +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, > + void **data, size_t *len); > int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, > unsigned int req_cap); > > @@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); > extern void hashtab_cache_init(void); > extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA > +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state); > +#else > +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state) > +{ > +} > +#endif If you are going to put the SELinux/IMA function(s) into a separate source file, please put the function declarations into a separate header file too. For example, look at security/selinux/include/{netif,netnode,netport,etc.}.h. > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..b7e24358e11d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later > +/* > + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. > + */ > +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> > +#include <linux/ktime.h> > +#include <linux/ima.h> > +#include "security.h" > + > +/* > + * This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to > + * the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA > + * hook to measure the given SELinux data. > + * > + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have > + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). > + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence > + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" > + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. > + * > + * For example, > + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. > + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. > + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it > + * (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, > + * is different in this call. > + */ > +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix) > +{ > + struct timespec64 cur_time; > + > + ktime_get_real_ts64(&cur_time); > + return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, > + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); > +} Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only called from selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice from a reuse standpoint? Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth mentioning. > +/* > + * selinux_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy > + * > + * @state: selinux state struct > + * > + * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held. > + */ > +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state) Similar to the name of this source file, let's make it clear this is for IMA. How about calling this selinux_ima_measure_state() or similar? > +{ > + void *policy = NULL; > + char *policy_event_name = NULL; > + size_t policy_len; > + int rc = 0; > + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); Why bother with the initialized variable? Unless I'm missing something it is only used once in the code below. > + /* > + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. > + */ > + if (!initialized) > + goto out; > + > + policy_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash"); > + if (!policy_event_name) { > + pr_err("SELinux: %s: event name for policy not allocated.\n", > + __func__); > + rc = -ENOMEM; This function doesn't return an error code, why bother with setting the rc variable here? > + goto out; > + } > + > + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); > + if (rc) { > + pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc); > + goto out; > + } > + > + ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", policy_event_name, > + policy, policy_len, true); > + > + vfree(policy); > + > +out: > + kfree(policy_event_name); > +} > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > index 9704c8a32303..dfa2e00894ae 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > @@ -2180,6 +2180,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state, > selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); > selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); > selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); > + selinux_measure_state(state); > } > > void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, > @@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, > } > #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ > > +/** > + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. > + * @policy: SELinux policy > + * @data: binary policy data > + * @len: length of data in bytes > + * > + */ > +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy, > + void *data, size_t *len) Let's just call this "security_read_policy()". > +{ > + int rc; > + struct policy_file fp; > + > + fp.data = data; > + fp.len = *len; > + > + rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data; > + return 0; > +} > + > /** > * security_read_policy - read the policy. > + * @state: selinux_state > * @data: binary policy data > * @len: length of data in bytes > * > @@ -3885,8 +3911,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, > void **data, size_t *len) > { > struct selinux_policy *policy; > - int rc; > - struct policy_file fp; > > policy = rcu_dereference_protected( > state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); > @@ -3898,14 +3922,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, > if (!*data)> -- > 2.17.1 > > return -ENOMEM; > > - fp.data = *data; > - fp.len = *len; > + return security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len); > +} > > - rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); > - if (rc) > - return rc; > +/** > + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. > + * @state: selinux_state > + * @data: binary policy data > + * @len: length of data in bytes > + * > + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. > + * This function is for internal use only and should not > + * be used for returning data to user space. > + * > + * This function must be called with policy_mutex held. > + */ > +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, > + void **data, size_t *len) Let's call this "security_read_state_kernel()". > +{ > + struct selinux_policy *policy; > + int rc = 0; See below, the rc variable is not needed. > - *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; > - return 0; > + policy = rcu_dereference_protected( > + state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); > + if (!policy) { > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; Jumping to the out label is a little silly since it is just a return; do a "return -EINVAL;" here instead. > + } > + > + *len = policy->policydb.len; > + *data = vmalloc(*len); > + if (!*data) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + goto out; Same as above, "return -ENOMEM;" please. > + } > > + rc = security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len); You should be able to do "return security_read_selinux_policy(...);" here. > + > +out: > + return rc; > } -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-23 21:11 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-12-12 18:02 [PATCH v9 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 13:06 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 13:06 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 18:48 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 18:48 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 0:03 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 0:03 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 18:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 18:53 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-06 5:00 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-06 5:00 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 13:04 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 13:04 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:01 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:01 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:16 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:19 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:19 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 19:20 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 19:20 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-13 1:21 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-13 1:21 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 13:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 13:48 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:12 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:12 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 19:20 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 19:20 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-13 1:21 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-13 1:21 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 14:29 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 14:29 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:28 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:28 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 14:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 14:41 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:30 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:30 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-23 21:10 ` Paul Moore [this message] 2020-12-23 21:10 ` Paul Moore 2021-01-04 23:30 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2021-01-04 23:30 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2021-01-05 2:13 ` Paul Moore 2021-01-05 2:13 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore 2021-01-05 5:24 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2021-01-05 5:24 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
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