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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure hashtable function
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 00:47:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9pjoAHwTg_8hg9basCRvXq9JxfRduxmq8uMKCRi-YROtg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e574d97f-e0b4-f5e2-6d60-88d3ce185249@stressinduktion.org>

On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 10:45 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> By the way, if you target net-next, it is currently closed. So no need
> to hurry.

Honestly I have no idea what I'm targeting. The hash function touches
lib/. The secure_seq stuff touches net/. The rng stuff touches
random.c. Shall this be for net-next? For lib-next (doesn't exist)?
For tytso-next? Since a lot of feedback has come from netdev people, I
suspect net-next is the correct answer. In that case, I'll ask Ted for
his sign-off to touch random.c, and then we'll get this queued up in
net-next. Please correct me if this doesn't actually resemble how
things work around here...

Jason

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure hashtable function
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 00:47:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9pjoAHwTg_8hg9basCRvXq9JxfRduxmq8uMKCRi-YROtg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e574d97f-e0b4-f5e2-6d60-88d3ce185249@stressinduktion.org>

On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 10:45 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> By the way, if you target net-next, it is currently closed. So no need
> to hurry.

Honestly I have no idea what I'm targeting. The hash function touches
lib/. The secure_seq stuff touches net/. The rng stuff touches
random.c. Shall this be for net-next? For lib-next (doesn't exist)?
For tytso-next? Since a lot of feedback has come from netdev people, I
suspect net-next is the correct answer. In that case, I'll ask Ted for
his sign-off to touch random.c, and then we'll get this queued up in
net-next. Please correct me if this doesn't actually resemble how
things work around here...

Jason

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-12-15 23:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-12-15 21:25 [PATCH v2 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure hashtable function Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 21:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 21:25 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 21:45 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 21:45   ` [kernel-hardening] " Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 21:45   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 23:43   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 23:43     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 23:43     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-16  0:03     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-16  0:03       ` [kernel-hardening] " Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-16  0:03       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 23:47   ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2016-12-15 23:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 23:47     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-12-14  3:59 Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-14 11:21 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-14 13:10   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-14 15:09     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-14 19:47       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15  7:57     ` Herbert Xu
2016-12-14 12:46 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-14 22:03   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-14 23:29     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15  8:31       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 11:04     ` David Laight
2016-12-15 11:04       ` David Laight
2016-12-15 12:23       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 12:23         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 12:28         ` David Laight
2016-12-15 12:28           ` David Laight
2016-12-15 12:50           ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 12:50             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 13:56             ` David Laight
2016-12-15 13:56               ` David Laight
2016-12-15 14:56               ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 14:56                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 15:41                 ` David Laight
2016-12-15 15:41                   ` David Laight
2016-12-15 15:53                   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 15:53                     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 18:50                     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 18:50                       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 20:31                       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 20:31                         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 20:43                         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 20:43                           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-15 21:04                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-12-15 21:04                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-12-15 21:09                             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 21:09                               ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 21:17                           ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 21:17                             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2016-12-15 21:09                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-12-15 21:09                         ` Peter Zijlstra

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