* SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user
@ 2019-03-01 1:06 Marek Majkowski
2019-03-01 11:39 ` Arthur Fabre
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Marek Majkowski @ 2019-03-01 1:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ast, Daniel Borkmann, netdev
Howdy,
After some dramatic debugging, I think I managed to isolate a problem
that looks like a funny eBPF runtime regression. It seems to be
introduced somewhere after 4.14.
The eBPF in question is running on network sockets with
SO_ATTACH_BPF. The BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER code:
uint64_t a = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
uint64_t b = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
uint64_t delta = b - a;
if ((int64_t)delta > 0) {
Depending on a context, the "delta" variable is set to
a wrong value. The compiled bytecode seems fine:
Disassembly of section socket1:
bpf_prog1:
; {
0: 85 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 call 5
; uint64_t a = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
1: bf 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 r7 = r0
; uint64_t b = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
2: 85 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 call 5
3: bf 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 r6 = r0
; uint64_t delta = b - a;
4: bf 68 00 00 00 00 00 00 r8 = r6
5: 1f 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 r8 -= r7
; if ((int64_t)delta > 0) {
6: b7 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 r1 = 1
7: 6d 81 0a 00 00 00 00 00 if r1 s> r8 goto +10 XXX
The code runs fine from root. From unprivileged user though, the
value of "delta" is a wrapped negative. Both "a" and "b" are fine in
both root and non-root cases. Technically bpf_ktime_get_ns() can
go backwards, but this isn't the case here. It does seem like the
problem is with the behaiviour of ... the subtraction operation when
running from SO_ATTACH_BPF executed by non-root?
Code:
https://gist.github.com/majek/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab
git clone https://gist.github.com/majek/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab
cd d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab
make
Then:
$ sudo ./ebpf-bug
0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
1 -> 12585651690481 0x00000b72534c5bf1
2 -> 12585651690697 0x00000b72534c5cc9
3 -> 216 0x00000000000000d8
$ ./ebpf-bug
0 -> 1 0x0000000000000001
1 -> 12581437028489 0x00000b715815b889
2 -> 12581437028689 0x00000b715815b951
3 -> 18446731492272523127 0xfffff48ea7ea4777
"1" shows "a"
"2" shows "b"
"3" shows "detla"
As you see "delta" is off the scale for unprivileged user run. I
don't see any reason why root vs non-root should make any difference
for this code.
For completeness, this was tested with jit disabled:
$ cat /proc/version
Linux version 5.0.0-rc6+ (marek@mrbreeze) (gcc version 7.3.0)
$ sudo sysctl -a|grep -i jit
net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 0
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 0
The same test on 4.14 seems fine:
$ cat /proc/version
Linux version 4.14.83-cloudflare-2018.11.4 (gcc version 8.2.0 (GCC))
$ sudo ./ebpf-bug
0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
1 -> 7435203111991321 0x001a6a472052b819
2 -> 7435203111991429 0x001a6a472052b885
3 -> 108 0x000000000000006c
$ ./ebpf-bug
0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
1 -> 7435205114618775 0x001a6a4797b06397
2 -> 7435205114618883 0x001a6a4797b06403
3 -> 108 0x000000000000006c
Cheers,
Marek
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* RE: SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user
2019-03-01 1:06 SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user Marek Majkowski
@ 2019-03-01 11:39 ` Arthur Fabre
2019-03-01 12:51 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-01 14:04 ` Daniel Borkmann
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Arthur Fabre @ 2019-03-01 11:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marek; +Cc: ast, daniel, netdev, afabre
I can reproduce this on 4.19.0-3-amd64 both with, and without the JIT enabled.
Dumping the "root" and "non-root" programs with bpftool,
the subtraction instructions differ:
"non-root":
0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
1: (bf) r7 = r0
2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
3: (bf) r6 = r0
4: (bf) r8 = r6
5: (b4) w11 = -1
6: (1f) r11 -= r8
7: (4f) r11 |= r8
8: (87) r11 = -r11
9: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
10: (5f) r8 &= r11
"root":
0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
1: (bf) r7 = r0
2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
3: (bf) r6 = r0
4: (bf) r8 = r6
The remainder of the instructions are for writing the results in the map,
and the instructions are identical.
I believe the extra instructions come from "fixup_bpf_calls" in the verifier:
if (isneg)
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
if (issrc) {
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX,
off_reg);
insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
} else {
*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg,
BPF_REG_AX);
}
This was introduced by "bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic"
(https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1039606/).
I don't yet understand what's going on.
Cheers,
Arthur
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user
2019-03-01 11:39 ` Arthur Fabre
@ 2019-03-01 12:51 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-01 14:04 ` Daniel Borkmann
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2019-03-01 12:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arthur Fabre, marek; +Cc: ast, netdev
On 03/01/2019 12:39 PM, Arthur Fabre wrote:
> I can reproduce this on 4.19.0-3-amd64 both with, and without the JIT enabled.
>
> Dumping the "root" and "non-root" programs with bpftool,
> the subtraction instructions differ:
>
> "non-root":
> 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 1: (bf) r7 = r0
> 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 3: (bf) r6 = r0
> 4: (bf) r8 = r6
> 5: (b4) w11 = -1
> 6: (1f) r11 -= r8
> 7: (4f) r11 |= r8
> 8: (87) r11 = -r11
> 9: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
> 10: (5f) r8 &= r11
>
> "root":
> 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 1: (bf) r7 = r0
> 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 3: (bf) r6 = r0
> 4: (bf) r8 = r6
>
> The remainder of the instructions are for writing the results in the map,
> and the instructions are identical.
>
> I believe the extra instructions come from "fixup_bpf_calls" in the verifier:
>
> if (isneg)
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
> *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
> if (issrc) {
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX,
> off_reg);
> insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
> } else {
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg,
> BPF_REG_AX);
> }
>
> This was introduced by "bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic"
> (https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1039606/).
> I don't yet understand what's going on.
Hmm, thanks for the report, I'll take a look right away! There's no map
involved here it seems, so there shouldn't be such fixup.
Cheers,
Daniel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user
2019-03-01 11:39 ` Arthur Fabre
2019-03-01 12:51 ` Daniel Borkmann
@ 2019-03-01 14:04 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-01 14:10 ` Marek Majkowski
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2019-03-01 14:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arthur Fabre, marek; +Cc: ast, netdev
On 03/01/2019 12:39 PM, Arthur Fabre wrote:
> I can reproduce this on 4.19.0-3-amd64 both with, and without the JIT enabled.
>
> Dumping the "root" and "non-root" programs with bpftool,
> the subtraction instructions differ:
>
> "non-root":
> 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 1: (bf) r7 = r0
> 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 3: (bf) r6 = r0
> 4: (bf) r8 = r6
> 5: (b4) w11 = -1
> 6: (1f) r11 -= r8
> 7: (4f) r11 |= r8
> 8: (87) r11 = -r11
> 9: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
> 10: (5f) r8 &= r11
>
> "root":
> 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 1: (bf) r7 = r0
> 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> 3: (bf) r6 = r0
> 4: (bf) r8 = r6
>
> The remainder of the instructions are for writing the results in the map,
> and the instructions are identical.
>
> I believe the extra instructions come from "fixup_bpf_calls" in the verifier:
>
> if (isneg)
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
> *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
> if (issrc) {
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX,
> off_reg);
> insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
> } else {
> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg,
> BPF_REG_AX);
> }
>
> This was introduced by "bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic"
> (https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1039606/).
> I don't yet understand what's going on.
Ok, sigh, fix is this, sorry about the braino:
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index cdd2cb01f789..5b3cd384df1d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7629,7 +7629,8 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
u32 off_reg;
aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
- if (!aux->alu_state)
+ if (!aux->alu_state ||
+ aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
continue;
isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
And this also makes the test work again:
foo@test:/root/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7$ ./ebpf-bug
0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
1 -> 54645145816 0x0000000cb91ac0d8
2 -> 54645145860 0x0000000cb91ac104
3 -> 44 0x000000000000002c
foo@test:/root/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7$ exit
root@test:~/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7# ./ebpf-bug
0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
1 -> 57984017624 0x0000000d801de4d8
2 -> 57984017673 0x0000000d801de509
3 -> 49 0x0000000000000031
I'll cook it as proper patch in a bit along with a test case.
Thanks for reporting!
Daniel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user
2019-03-01 14:04 ` Daniel Borkmann
@ 2019-03-01 14:10 ` Marek Majkowski
2019-03-01 14:22 ` Daniel Borkmann
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Marek Majkowski @ 2019-03-01 14:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann; +Cc: Arthur Fabre, ast, netdev
Great, appreciated.
One more thing (since upgrading kernels takes time) do you think I can
amend eBPF on my side to avoid triggering this? Naive stuff like this
doesn't work sadly:
uint64_t delta = b + ~a + 1;
I tried couple more variants with uint32_t types, but to no avail. Ideas?
Marek
On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:04 PM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
>
> On 03/01/2019 12:39 PM, Arthur Fabre wrote:
> > I can reproduce this on 4.19.0-3-amd64 both with, and without the JIT enabled.
> >
> > Dumping the "root" and "non-root" programs with bpftool,
> > the subtraction instructions differ:
> >
> > "non-root":
> > 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> > 1: (bf) r7 = r0
> > 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> > 3: (bf) r6 = r0
> > 4: (bf) r8 = r6
> > 5: (b4) w11 = -1
> > 6: (1f) r11 -= r8
> > 7: (4f) r11 |= r8
> > 8: (87) r11 = -r11
> > 9: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
> > 10: (5f) r8 &= r11
> >
> > "root":
> > 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> > 1: (bf) r7 = r0
> > 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
> > 3: (bf) r6 = r0
> > 4: (bf) r8 = r6
> >
> > The remainder of the instructions are for writing the results in the map,
> > and the instructions are identical.
> >
> > I believe the extra instructions come from "fixup_bpf_calls" in the verifier:
> >
> > if (isneg)
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
> > *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
> > if (issrc) {
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX,
> > off_reg);
> > insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
> > } else {
> > *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg,
> > BPF_REG_AX);
> > }
> >
> > This was introduced by "bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic"
> > (https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1039606/).
> > I don't yet understand what's going on.
>
> Ok, sigh, fix is this, sorry about the braino:
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index cdd2cb01f789..5b3cd384df1d 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -7629,7 +7629,8 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> u32 off_reg;
>
> aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
> - if (!aux->alu_state)
> + if (!aux->alu_state ||
> + aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
> continue;
>
> isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
>
> And this also makes the test work again:
>
> foo@test:/root/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7$ ./ebpf-bug
> 0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
> 1 -> 54645145816 0x0000000cb91ac0d8
> 2 -> 54645145860 0x0000000cb91ac104
> 3 -> 44 0x000000000000002c
> foo@test:/root/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7$ exit
> root@test:~/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7# ./ebpf-bug
> 0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
> 1 -> 57984017624 0x0000000d801de4d8
> 2 -> 57984017673 0x0000000d801de509
> 3 -> 49 0x0000000000000031
>
> I'll cook it as proper patch in a bit along with a test case.
>
> Thanks for reporting!
> Daniel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user
2019-03-01 14:10 ` Marek Majkowski
@ 2019-03-01 14:22 ` Daniel Borkmann
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2019-03-01 14:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marek Majkowski; +Cc: Arthur Fabre, ast, netdev
On 03/01/2019 03:10 PM, Marek Majkowski wrote:
> Great, appreciated.
>
> One more thing (since upgrading kernels takes time) do you think I can
> amend eBPF on my side to avoid triggering this? Naive stuff like this
> doesn't work sadly:
>
> uint64_t delta = b + ~a + 1;
>
> I tried couple more variants with uint32_t types, but to no avail. Ideas?
For 32bit based add/sub this would definitely not be triggered, but only
latest LLVM supports alu32 emission. Since you guys are using inline asm
already, perhaps worth a shot.
Thanks,
Daniel
> Marek
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 3:04 PM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
>>
>> On 03/01/2019 12:39 PM, Arthur Fabre wrote:
>>> I can reproduce this on 4.19.0-3-amd64 both with, and without the JIT enabled.
>>>
>>> Dumping the "root" and "non-root" programs with bpftool,
>>> the subtraction instructions differ:
>>>
>>> "non-root":
>>> 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
>>> 1: (bf) r7 = r0
>>> 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
>>> 3: (bf) r6 = r0
>>> 4: (bf) r8 = r6
>>> 5: (b4) w11 = -1
>>> 6: (1f) r11 -= r8
>>> 7: (4f) r11 |= r8
>>> 8: (87) r11 = -r11
>>> 9: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
>>> 10: (5f) r8 &= r11
>>>
>>> "root":
>>> 0: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
>>> 1: (bf) r7 = r0
>>> 2: (85) call bpf_ktime_get_ns#74944
>>> 3: (bf) r6 = r0
>>> 4: (bf) r8 = r6
>>>
>>> The remainder of the instructions are for writing the results in the map,
>>> and the instructions are identical.
>>>
>>> I believe the extra instructions come from "fixup_bpf_calls" in the verifier:
>>>
>>> if (isneg)
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
>>> *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
>>> if (issrc) {
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX,
>>> off_reg);
>>> insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
>>> } else {
>>> *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg,
>>> BPF_REG_AX);
>>> }
>>>
>>> This was introduced by "bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic"
>>> (https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1039606/).
>>> I don't yet understand what's going on.
>>
>> Ok, sigh, fix is this, sorry about the braino:
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index cdd2cb01f789..5b3cd384df1d 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -7629,7 +7629,8 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> u32 off_reg;
>>
>> aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
>> - if (!aux->alu_state)
>> + if (!aux->alu_state ||
>> + aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
>> continue;
>>
>> isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
>>
>> And this also makes the test work again:
>>
>> foo@test:/root/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7$ ./ebpf-bug
>> 0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
>> 1 -> 54645145816 0x0000000cb91ac0d8
>> 2 -> 54645145860 0x0000000cb91ac104
>> 3 -> 44 0x000000000000002c
>> foo@test:/root/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7$ exit
>> root@test:~/d0bb75a8c62cc35bec2b342054084aab-7cc37a3a93c8b4028e977f3131feaf7f8705e6a7# ./ebpf-bug
>> 0 -> 0 0x0000000000000000
>> 1 -> 57984017624 0x0000000d801de4d8
>> 2 -> 57984017673 0x0000000d801de509
>> 3 -> 49 0x0000000000000031
>>
>> I'll cook it as proper patch in a bit along with a test case.
>>
>> Thanks for reporting!
>> Daniel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-03-01 14:22 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2019-03-01 1:06 SOCKET_FILTER regression - eBPF can't subtract when attached from unprivileged user Marek Majkowski
2019-03-01 11:39 ` Arthur Fabre
2019-03-01 12:51 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-01 14:04 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-01 14:10 ` Marek Majkowski
2019-03-01 14:22 ` Daniel Borkmann
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