All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
To: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] Implement /proc/pid/kill
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 23:10:47 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKOZueuBdY_b=CVk29pzn0NAt9sJtzr6yqx9Y00WCppCm1JFWQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181030223343.GB105735@joelaf.mtv.corp.google.com>

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 10:33 PM, Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 09:23:39AM +1100, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
>> On 2018-10-30, Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 07:45:01AM +1100, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
>> > [...]
>> > > > > (Unfortunately
>> > > > > there are lots of things that make it a bit difficult to use /proc/$pid
>> > > > > exclusively for introspection of a process -- especially in the context
>> > > > > of containers.)
>> > > >
>> > > > Tons of things already break without a working /proc. What do you have in mind?
>> > >
>> > > Heh, if only that was the only blocker. :P
>> > >
>> > > The basic problem is that currently container runtimes either depend on
>> > > some non-transient on-disk state (which becomes invalid on machine
>> > > reboots or dead processes and so on), or on long-running processes that
>> > > keep file descriptors required for administration of a container alive
>> > > (think O_PATH to /dev/pts/ptmx to avoid malicious container filesystem
>> > > attacks). Usually both.
>> > >
>> > > What would be really useful would be having some way of "hiding away" a
>> > > mount namespace (of the pid1 of the container) that has all of the
>> > > information and bind-mounts-to-file-descriptors that are necessary for
>> > > administration. If the container's pid1 dies all of the transient state
>> > > has disappeared automatically -- because the stashed mount namespace has
>> > > died. In addition, if this was done the way I'm thinking with (and this
>> > > is the contentious bit) hierarchical mount namespaces you could make it
>> > > so that the pid1 could not manipulate its current mount namespace to
>> > > confuse the administrative process. You would also then create an
>> > > intermediate user namespace to help with several race conditions (that
>> > > have caused security bugs like CVE-2016-9962) we've seen when joining
>> > > containers.
>> > >
>> > > Unfortunately this all depends on hierarchical mount namespaces (and
>> > > note that this would just be that NS_GET_PARENT gives you the mount
>> > > namespace that it was created in -- I'm not suggesting we redesign peers
>> > > or anything like that). This makes it basically a non-starter.
>> > >
>> > > But if, on top of this ground-work, we then referenced containers
>> > > entirely via an fd to /proc/$pid then you could also avoid PID reuse
>> > > races (as well as being able to find out implicitly whether a container
>> > > has died thanks to the error semantics of /proc/$pid). And that's the
>> > > way I would suggest doing it (if we had these other things in place).
>> >
>> > I didn't fully follow exactly what you mean. If you can explain for the
>> > layman who doesn't know much experience with containers..
>> >
>> > Are you saying that keeping open a /proc/$pid directory handle is not
>> > sufficient to prevent PID reuse while the proc entries under /proc/$pid are
>> > being looked into? If its not sufficient, then isn't that a bug? If it is
>> > sufficient, then can we not just keep the handle open while we do whatever we
>> > want under /proc/$pid ?
>>
>> Sorry, I went on a bit of a tangent about various internals of container
>> runtimes. My main point is that I would love to use /proc/$pid because
>> it makes reuse handling very trivial and is always correct, but that
>> there are things which stop us from being able to use it for everything
>> (which is what my incoherent rambling was on about).
>
> Ok thanks. So I am guessing if the following sequence works, then Dan's patch is not
> needed.
>
> 1. open /proc/<pid> directory
> 2. inspect /proc/<pid> or do whatever with <pid>
> 3. Issue the kill on <pid>
> 4. Close the /proc/<pid> directory opened in step 1.
>
> So unless I missed something, the above sequence will not cause any PID reuse
> races.

Keeping a /proc/$PID directory file descriptor open does not prevent
$PID being used to name some other process. If it could, you could
pretty quickly fill a whole system's process table. See the program
below, which demonstrates the PID collision.

I think Aleksa's larger point is that it's useful to treat processes
as other file-descriptor-named, poll-able, wait-able resources.
Consistency is important. A process is just another system resource,
and like any other system resource, you should be open to hold a file
descriptor to it and do things to that process via that file
descriptor. The precise form of this process-handle FD is up for
debate. The existing /proc/$PID directory FD is a good candidate for a
process handle FD, since it does almost all of what's needed. But
regardless of what form a process handle FD takes, we need it. I don't
see a case for continuing to treat processes in a non-unixy,
non-file-descriptor-based manner.

#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int
main()
{
    int child_pid = fork();
    if (child_pid < 0)
        abort();

    char buf[64];
    int child_procfs_fd;

    if (child_pid == 0) {
        for (;;)
            pause();
        abort();
    }

    printf("child PID is %d\n", child_pid);
    sprintf(buf, "/proc/%d", child_pid);
    child_procfs_fd = open(buf, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
    if (child_procfs_fd < 0)
        abort();
    printf("FD# of open /proc/%d is %d\n",
           child_pid,
           child_procfs_fd);
    printf("killing child with SIGKILL\n");
    kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
    if (wait(NULL) != child_pid)
        abort();
    printf("child is now dead. PROCFS FD STILL OPEN\n");
    for (;;) {
        int new_child_pid = fork();
        if (new_child_pid < 0)
            abort();
        if (new_child_pid == 0)
            _exit(0);
        // printf("new child PID: %d\n", new_child_pid);
        if (wait(NULL) != new_child_pid)
            abort();
        if (new_child_pid == child_pid) {
            printf("FOUND PID COLLISION %d\n", child_pid);
            printf("old child had pid %d. new, "
                   "different child has pid %d. "
                   "procfs directory for old child still open!\n",
                   child_pid, child_pid);
            break;
        }
    }

    return 0;
}

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-30 23:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-29 22:10 [RFC PATCH] Implement /proc/pid/kill Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30  3:21 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30  8:50   ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 10:39     ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 10:40       ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 10:48         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 11:04           ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 11:12             ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 11:19               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-31  5:00                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-30 17:01     ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30  5:00 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30  9:05   ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 20:45     ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 21:42       ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 22:23         ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 22:33           ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 22:49             ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31  0:42               ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31  1:59                 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 23:10             ` Daniel Colascione [this message]
2018-10-30 23:23               ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 23:55                 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31  2:56                 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31  4:24                   ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-01 20:40                     ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-02  9:46                       ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-02 14:34                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31  0:57               ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31  1:56                 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31  4:47   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31  4:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 12:44   ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-31 13:27     ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:10       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-31 15:16         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:49           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-11-01 11:53       ` David Laight
2018-11-01 15:50         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 14:37 ` [PATCH v2] " Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:05   ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 17:33     ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31 21:47       ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 15:59 ` [PATCH v3] " Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 17:54   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-31 18:00     ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 18:17       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-31 19:33         ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 20:06           ` Tycho Andersen
2018-11-01 11:33           ` David Laight
2018-11-12  1:19             ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 16:22 ` [RFC PATCH] " Jann Horn
2018-11-01  4:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-12 23:13 ` Pavel Machek

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAKOZueuBdY_b=CVk29pzn0NAt9sJtzr6yqx9Y00WCppCm1JFWQ@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=dancol@google.com \
    --cc=cyphar@cyphar.com \
    --cc=joel@joelfernandes.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=surenb@google.com \
    --cc=timmurray@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.