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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Joe Konno <joe.konno@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] efivarfs: Limit the rate for non-root to read files
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 20:34:15 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVrJWQNYcXFt4YQ-1EXFqMojiVTZhXR8zFoF+H0ZmfPjw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu8q-9enjK=WLiB5tWvRKQu9+xh=dCqBtB6X9wazKuYiMA@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 6:08 PM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 22 February 2018 at 18:07, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Luck, Tony <tony.luck@intel.com> wrote:
>>> With the new "while/nap" change there would still be one message
>>> per second, but the number of callbacks suppressed should be 1
>>> (unless the user has many threads doing reads).
>>>
>>> Maybe it is good to know that an application is doing something
>>> stupid and we should drop that line from the patch and let the
>>> warnings flow?
>>
>> I think the "one message per second" is fine.
>>
>> Looks good. Do I get this through the EFI tree, or should I just take
>> it directly?
>>
>
> Please take it directly if everybody is happy with it.
>
> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

I don't like this at all.  We're coming up with a bizarre ad-hoc hack
to work around the fact that we're allowing any unprivileged user can
call into firmware.  Let's just require privilege.  As I understand
it, Windows already requires privilege, and Windows is *right*.

Let's apply the original patch, not my patch.  Then, if it causes
problems with sealtotp, either users can chmod the relevant file or we
can add a gross hack in the kernel to make that particular file 0644
*and print a warning* if the file exists.  Then users can bug mjg to
fix sealtotp to use a privileged helper or systemd service or whatever
and rename the file at the same time.

But I read the sealtotp manual, and I don't see the point of using an
EFI var for sealtotp in the first place.  sealtotp supports TPM NV
storage, EFI vars, and plain old files.  I get why TPM NV makes
logical sense (sealtotp is a TPM thing), and using a plain old file
seems entirely reasonable.  I don't see why anyone would prefer an EFI
variable.

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-23 20:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-15 18:22 [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Joe Konno
2018-02-15 18:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Joe Konno
2018-02-20 19:18   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-20 21:18     ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:22       ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 21:32         ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:35           ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 22:01       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-20 23:30         ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 23:39           ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 23:50             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21  0:49           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21  1:05             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21  2:16               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21  9:03                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21 18:02                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 18:21                     ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-21 19:47                       ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 19:50                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 19:58                           ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 20:40                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22  1:45                               ` [PATCH] efivarfs: Limit the rate for non-root to read files Luck, Tony
2018-02-22  1:58                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22  5:34                                   ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
     [not found]                                     ` <CA+55aFy0hRexJkLbN7t31LjfGr4Ae0W5g6sBMqHHJi8aYuGKeA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                                       ` <612E894E-62C8-4155-AED8-D53702EDC8DC@intel.com>
     [not found]                                         ` <CA+55aFxeBaTbwvbWqx1MKYjKKzLUs=1O43Bx2=JaO8qrnY-8HA@mail.gmail.com>
2018-02-22 17:15                                           ` [PATCH v2] " Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:39                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 17:54                                               ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 18:07                                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 18:08                                                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-23 20:34                                                     ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-02-23 19:47                                         ` [PATCH] " Peter Jones
2018-02-21 19:52                       ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Linus Torvalds
2018-02-24 20:06                   ` Alan Cox
2018-02-25 10:56                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21  0:49         ` Peter Jones
2018-02-20 23:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 18:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] efi: restrict top-level attribute permissions Joe Konno
2018-02-15 18:22   ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 10:41 ` [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 10:58     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 11:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 11:18         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 11:18           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 18:48           ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 18:48             ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 18:58             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 19:22             ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 19:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 19:51                 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 19:51                   ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 19:32               ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 19:54                 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 20:51   ` James Bottomley
2018-02-16 20:51     ` James Bottomley
2018-02-16 21:09     ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 21:09       ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 21:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 21:58         ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 22:02           ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 22:02             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 22:03             ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 22:03               ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-17 18:12               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-17 18:12                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 22:05       ` Peter Jones
2018-02-17  9:36         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-17  9:36           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-17 16:17           ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-17 16:17             ` Andi Kleen

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