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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Joe Konno <joe.konno@linux.intel.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Benjamin Drung <benjamin.drung@profitbricks.com>,
	Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 21:45:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXD4qCwgnDcwnybUXzVk7zyJtzHC2xzLfcZvzrXvAB8PQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3908561D78D1C84285E8C5FCA982C28F7B37942B@ORSMSX110.amr.corp.intel.com>

On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 9:09 PM, Luck, Tony <tony.luck@intel.com> wrote:
>> That said, I'm not sure how many non-root users run the toolkit to
>> extract their EFI certificates or check on the secure boot status of
>> the system, but I suspect it might be non-zero: I can see the tinfoil
>> hat people wanting at least to check the secure boot status when they
>> log in.
>
> Another fix option might be to rate limit EFI calls for non-root users (on X86
> since only we have the SMI problem). That would:
>
> 1) Avoid using memory to cache all the variables
> 2) Catch any other places where non-root users can call EFI

I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that the fact that
unprivileged users can read efi variables at all is a mistake
regardless of SMI issues.

Also, chmod() just shouldn't work on efi variables, and the mode
passed to creat() should be ignored.  After all, there's no backing
store for the mode.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-16 21:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-15 18:22 [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Joe Konno
2018-02-15 18:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Joe Konno
2018-02-20 19:18   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-20 21:18     ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:22       ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 21:32         ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:35           ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 22:01       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-20 23:30         ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 23:39           ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 23:50             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21  0:49           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21  1:05             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21  2:16               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21  9:03                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21 18:02                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 18:21                     ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-21 19:47                       ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 19:50                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 19:58                           ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 20:40                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22  1:45                               ` [PATCH] efivarfs: Limit the rate for non-root to read files Luck, Tony
2018-02-22  1:58                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22  5:34                                   ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
     [not found]                                     ` <CA+55aFy0hRexJkLbN7t31LjfGr4Ae0W5g6sBMqHHJi8aYuGKeA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                                       ` <612E894E-62C8-4155-AED8-D53702EDC8DC@intel.com>
     [not found]                                         ` <CA+55aFxeBaTbwvbWqx1MKYjKKzLUs=1O43Bx2=JaO8qrnY-8HA@mail.gmail.com>
2018-02-22 17:15                                           ` [PATCH v2] " Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:39                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 17:54                                               ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 18:07                                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 18:08                                                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-23 20:34                                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-23 19:47                                         ` [PATCH] " Peter Jones
2018-02-21 19:52                       ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Linus Torvalds
2018-02-24 20:06                   ` Alan Cox
2018-02-25 10:56                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21  0:49         ` Peter Jones
2018-02-20 23:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 18:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] efi: restrict top-level attribute permissions Joe Konno
2018-02-15 18:22   ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 10:41 ` [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 10:58     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 11:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 11:18         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 11:18           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 18:48           ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 18:48             ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 18:58             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 19:22             ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 19:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 19:51                 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 19:51                   ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 19:32               ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 19:54                 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 20:51   ` James Bottomley
2018-02-16 20:51     ` James Bottomley
2018-02-16 21:09     ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 21:09       ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 21:45       ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-02-16 21:58         ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 22:02           ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 22:02             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 22:03             ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 22:03               ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-17 18:12               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-17 18:12                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 22:05       ` Peter Jones
2018-02-17  9:36         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-17  9:36           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-17 16:17           ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-17 16:17             ` Andi Kleen

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