From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Josh Armour <jarmour@google.com>, "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org" <ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org> Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] security-related TODO items? Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 12:58:00 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CALCETrWj8_D_YL4PKZGbxx4HSZHyoctdvfriUVhE=x+NpQYLtw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c1822e5b-9352-c1ab-ee98-e492ef6e156a@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:32 AM, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote: > Hello. > > Can I read archive of the discussion of this topic from the beginning? > I felt that this topic might be an opportunity of proposing my execute handler > approach. It should be in the linux-mm archives. > > In TOMOYO LSM (out of tree version), administrator can specify a program > called execute handler which should be executed on behalf of a program > requested by execve(). The specified program performs validation (e.g. whether > argv[]/envp[] are appropriate) and setup (e.g. redirect file handles) before > executing the program requested by execve(). > > Conceptually execute handler is something like > > #!/bin/sh > test ... || exit 1 > test ... || exit 1 > test ... || exit 1 > exec ... > > which would in practice be implemented using C like > https://osdn.net/projects/tomoyo/scm/svn/blobs/head/tags/ccs-tools/1.8.5p1/usr_lib_ccs/audit-exec-param.c . > It is not difficult to implement the kernel side as well. > The difference is that that last exec means that the kernel is still exposed to any bugs in its ELF parser. Moving that to user mode would reduce the attack surface.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Josh Armour <jarmour@google.com>, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org" <ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org> Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] security-related TODO items? Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 12:58:00 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CALCETrWj8_D_YL4PKZGbxx4HSZHyoctdvfriUVhE=x+NpQYLtw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c1822e5b-9352-c1ab-ee98-e492ef6e156a@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:32 AM, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote: > Hello. > > Can I read archive of the discussion of this topic from the beginning? > I felt that this topic might be an opportunity of proposing my execute handler > approach. It should be in the linux-mm archives. > > In TOMOYO LSM (out of tree version), administrator can specify a program > called execute handler which should be executed on behalf of a program > requested by execve(). The specified program performs validation (e.g. whether > argv[]/envp[] are appropriate) and setup (e.g. redirect file handles) before > executing the program requested by execve(). > > Conceptually execute handler is something like > > #!/bin/sh > test ... || exit 1 > test ... || exit 1 > test ... || exit 1 > exec ... > > which would in practice be implemented using C like > https://osdn.net/projects/tomoyo/scm/svn/blobs/head/tags/ccs-tools/1.8.5p1/usr_lib_ccs/audit-exec-param.c . > It is not difficult to implement the kernel side as well. > The difference is that that last exec means that the kernel is still exposed to any bugs in its ELF parser. Moving that to user mode would reduce the attack surface. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-24 20:58 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-01-20 22:38 [Ksummit-discuss] security-related TODO items? Kees Cook 2017-01-21 0:14 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-21 0:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-01-21 1:10 ` Matthew Wilcox 2017-01-21 1:47 ` Josh Triplett 2017-01-23 10:02 ` Alexey Dobriyan 2017-01-23 10:48 ` David Howells 2017-01-23 20:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-23 20:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-24 10:32 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-01-24 20:58 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message] 2017-01-24 20:58 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-23 20:36 ` David Howells 2017-01-23 20:36 ` David Howells 2017-01-23 20:59 ` Matthew Wilcox 2017-01-23 20:59 ` Matthew Wilcox 2017-01-23 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-23 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-23 23:26 ` Greg Ungerer 2017-01-23 23:26 ` Greg Ungerer 2017-01-23 20:15 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-01-24 2:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-24 10:03 ` Eric W. Biederman 2017-01-24 21:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-01-24 21:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2017-01-24 10:38 ` Alexey Dobriyan 2017-01-24 10:38 ` Alexey Dobriyan [not found] ` <CAEiveUcTQK84qFNpYoET-cpSXJe0KYtnYQtp0uTPz=z0tc3W9A@mail.gmail.com> 2017-03-07 16:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-02-02 21:12 ` David Howells
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