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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/9] x86/cet: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 08:47:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWwGCZ+Fbk+O8T6S48teHj60bQQiHQ49=SsKUOpm8VLBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180607143705.3531-3-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:40 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER.
>
> An application has shadow stack protection when all the following are
> true:
>
>   (1) The kernel has X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER enabled,
>   (2) The running processor supports the shadow stack,
>   (3) The application is built with shadow stack enabled tools & libs
>       and, and at runtime, all dependent shared libs can support shadow
>       stack.
>
> If this kernel config option is enabled, but (2) or (3) above is not
> true, the application runs without the shadow stack protection.
> Existing legacy applications will continue to work without the shadow
> stack protection.
>
> The user-mode shadow stack protection is only implemented for the
> 64-bit kernel.  Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the
> compatibility mode.
>

The 64-bit only part seems entirely reasonable.  So please make the
code 64-bit only :)

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/9] x86/cet: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 08:47:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWwGCZ+Fbk+O8T6S48teHj60bQQiHQ49=SsKUOpm8VLBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180607143705.3531-3-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:40 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER.
>
> An application has shadow stack protection when all the following are
> true:
>
>   (1) The kernel has X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER enabled,
>   (2) The running processor supports the shadow stack,
>   (3) The application is built with shadow stack enabled tools & libs
>       and, and at runtime, all dependent shared libs can support shadow
>       stack.
>
> If this kernel config option is enabled, but (2) or (3) above is not
> true, the application runs without the shadow stack protection.
> Existing legacy applications will continue to work without the shadow
> stack protection.
>
> The user-mode shadow stack protection is only implemented for the
> 64-bit kernel.  Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the
> compatibility mode.
>

The 64-bit only part seems entirely reasonable.  So please make the
code 64-bit only :)
--
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-06-07 15:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-07 14:36 [PATCH 0/9] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (2) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:36 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:36 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:36   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 15:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 15:46     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  4:17   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:17     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:17     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:18   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:18     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:18     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:36 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/cet: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:36   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 15:47   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-06-07 15:47     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 15:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 15:58       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:28       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:28         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 14:36 ` [PATCH 3/9] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:36   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 4/9] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  3:53   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  3:53     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  3:53     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 5/9] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  5:15   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  5:15     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  5:15     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86/mm: Introduce ptep_set_wrprotect_flush and related functions Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:24   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:24     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:21     ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:21       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:24       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:24         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:29     ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 20:29       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 20:36       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:36         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  0:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08  0:59         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08  1:20         ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-08  1:20           ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-08  4:43   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:43     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:43     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08 14:13   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08 14:13     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08 14:13     ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:26   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:26     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:46     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:46       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:56     ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 16:56       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86/cet: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 9/9] x86/cet: Handle THP/HugeTLB shadow stack page copying Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37   ` Yu-cheng Yu

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