From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deac on <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 07:28:22 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
>
> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
general. The issues that immediately come to mind are:
- Performance and DoS potential. UC will have bizarre, architecture-
and platform-dependent performance characteristics. For all I know,
even the access semantics might be architecture dependent. I'm not
convinced it's possible to write portable code in C using the uncached
feature. I'm also concerned that certain operation (unaligned locks,
for example, and possibly any locked access) will trigger bus locks on
x86, which, depending on CPU and kernel config will either DoS all
other CPUs or send signals. (Or cause the hypervisor to terminate or
otherwise penalize the the VM, which would be nasty.)
- Correctness. I have reports that different x86 hypervisors do
different things with UC mappings, including treating them as regular
WB mappings. So the memory type you get out when you ask for
"uncached" might not actually be uncached.
UC is really an MMIO feature, not a "protect my data" feature.
Abusing it to protect data is certainly interesting, but I'm far from
convinced that it's wise. I'm especially unconvinced that
monkey-patching a program to use uncached memory when it expects
regular malloced memory is a reasonable thing to do.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 07:28:22 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
>
> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
general. The issues that immediately come to mind are:
- Performance and DoS potential. UC will have bizarre, architecture-
and platform-dependent performance characteristics. For all I know,
even the access semantics might be architecture dependent. I'm not
convinced it's possible to write portable code in C using the uncached
feature. I'm also concerned that certain operation (unaligned locks,
for example, and possibly any locked access) will trigger bus locks on
x86, which, depending on CPU and kernel config will either DoS all
other CPUs or send signals. (Or cause the hypervisor to terminate or
otherwise penalize the the VM, which would be nasty.)
- Correctness. I have reports that different x86 hypervisors do
different things with UC mappings, including treating them as regular
WB mappings. So the memory type you get out when you ask for
"uncached" might not actually be uncached.
UC is really an MMIO feature, not a "protect my data" feature.
Abusing it to protect data is certainly interesting, but I'm far from
convinced that it's wise. I'm especially unconvinced that
monkey-patching a program to use uncached memory when it expects
regular malloced memory is a reasonable thing to do.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 07:28:22 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
>
> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
general. The issues that immediately come to mind are:
- Performance and DoS potential. UC will have bizarre, architecture-
and platform-dependent performance characteristics. For all I know,
even the access semantics might be architecture dependent. I'm not
convinced it's possible to write portable code in C using the uncached
feature. I'm also concerned that certain operation (unaligned locks,
for example, and possibly any locked access) will trigger bus locks on
x86, which, depending on CPU and kernel config will either DoS all
other CPUs or send signals. (Or cause the hypervisor to terminate or
otherwise penalize the the VM, which would be nasty.)
- Correctness. I have reports that different x86 hypervisors do
different things with UC mappings, including treating them as regular
WB mappings. So the memory type you get out when you ask for
"uncached" might not actually be uncached.
UC is really an MMIO feature, not a "protect my data" feature.
Abusing it to protect data is certainly interesting, but I'm far from
convinced that it's wise. I'm especially unconvinced that
monkey-patching a program to use uncached memory when it expects
regular malloced memory is a reasonable thing to do.
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 07:28:22 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
>
> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
general. The issues that immediately come to mind are:
- Performance and DoS potential. UC will have bizarre, architecture-
and platform-dependent performance characteristics. For all I know,
even the access semantics might be architecture dependent. I'm not
convinced it's possible to write portable code in C using the uncached
feature. I'm also concerned that certain operation (unaligned locks,
for example, and possibly any locked access) will trigger bus locks on
x86, which, depending on CPU and kernel config will either DoS all
other CPUs or send signals. (Or cause the hypervisor to terminate or
otherwise penalize the the VM, which would be nasty.)
- Correctness. I have reports that different x86 hypervisors do
different things with UC mappings, including treating them as regular
WB mappings. So the memory type you get out when you ask for
"uncached" might not actually be uncached.
UC is really an MMIO feature, not a "protect my data" feature.
Abusing it to protect data is certainly interesting, but I'm far from
convinced that it's wise. I'm especially unconvinced that
monkey-patching a program to use uncached memory when it expects
regular malloced memory is a reasonable thing to do.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 07:28:22 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
>
> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
general. The issues that immediately come to mind are:
- Performance and DoS potential. UC will have bizarre, architecture-
and platform-dependent performance characteristics. For all I know,
even the access semantics might be architecture dependent. I'm not
convinced it's possible to write portable code in C using the uncached
feature. I'm also concerned that certain operation (unaligned locks,
for example, and possibly any locked access) will trigger bus locks on
x86, which, depending on CPU and kernel config will either DoS all
other CPUs or send signals. (Or cause the hypervisor to terminate or
otherwise penalize the the VM, which would be nasty.)
- Correctness. I have reports that different x86 hypervisors do
different things with UC mappings, including treating them as regular
WB mappings. So the memory type you get out when you ask for
"uncached" might not actually be uncached.
UC is really an MMIO feature, not a "protect my data" feature.
Abusing it to protect data is certainly interesting, but I'm far from
convinced that it's wise. I'm especially unconvinced that
monkey-patching a program to use uncached memory when it expects
regular malloced memory is a reasonable thing to do.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-23 15:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-23 9:54 [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 2/9] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 3/9] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 5/9] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 6/9] secretmem: add memcg accounting Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 7/9] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 8/9] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 9/9] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-11-23 15:28 ` [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
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