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* [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
@ 2018-06-18 19:27 ` Mark Salyzyn
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Mark Salyzyn @ 2018-06-18 19:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Mark Salyzyn, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, Vivek Goyal,
	linux-unionfs, linux-doc

All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
overlay the creator context.

A module bool parameter and mount option caller_credentials is added
to set the default, and to act as a presence check for this "feature".
The module parameter is used to change the default behavior, But
since I can not break user API, I have to preserve the original
behavior as default.

On MAC security model expect to set the caller_credentials to Y as
part of early initialization to preserve security model when the
option of iether caller_credentials or creator_credentials is not
explicitly specified in the mount.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

v2:
- forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error
- wording in commit message was too adversarial and needed correction
---
 Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt |  7 +++++++
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                  |  3 ++-
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c                      | 12 ++++++++----
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/overlayfs/namei.c                    |  9 ++++++---
 fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h                |  1 +
 fs/overlayfs/readdir.c                  |  6 ++++--
 fs/overlayfs/super.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/overlayfs/util.c                     |  8 ++++++--
 9 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
index 72615a2c0752..4328be5cdaa9 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
@@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged.  Other content
 such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
 directory only.  These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
 
+credentials
+-----------
+
+All access to the upper, lower and work directories is the creator's
+credentials.  If caller_credentials is set, then the access caller's
+instance credentials will be used.
+
 whiteouts and opaque directories
 --------------------------------
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index ddaddb4ce4c3..abc21844f712 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
 		dput(parent);
 		dput(next);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
index f480b1a2cd2e..8b75e0899ee1 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
 		if (!attr->hardlink) {
 			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
-					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name,
+					old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(),
 					override_cred);
 			if (err) {
 				put_cred(override_cred);
@@ -577,7 +578,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
 	}
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -824,7 +826,8 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
 		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
 	else
 		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (!err) {
 		if (is_dir)
 			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -1150,7 +1153,8 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
 out_unlock:
 	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	ovl_nlink_end(new, locked);
 out_drop_write:
 	ovl_drop_write(old);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index ed16a898caeb..222678b6e67e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
 		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		if (old_cred)
+			revert_creds(old_cred);
 		if (!err)
 			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
 		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
@@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
 		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
 
 out:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 		mask |= MAY_READ;
 	}
 	err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return p;
 }
 
@@ -302,7 +306,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
 		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 out_drop_write:
 	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
@@ -320,7 +325,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return res;
 }
 
@@ -344,7 +350,8 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
 		return res;
 
@@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
 	acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return acl;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
index c993dd8db739..c8b84d262ec2 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect;
 	}
 
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	dput(index);
 	kfree(stack);
 	kfree(d.redirect);
@@ -1043,7 +1044,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	kfree(upperredirect);
 out:
 	kfree(d.redirect);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
@@ -1097,7 +1099,8 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
 			dput(this);
 		}
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return positive;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
index 41655a7d6894..7e17db561a04 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {
 	const char *redirect_mode;
 	bool index;
 	bool nfs_export;
+	bool caller_credentials;
 	int xino;
 };
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
index ef1fe42ff7bb..af3874d589ad 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd)
 		}
 		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index 704b37311467..184688ab35cb 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def,
 		 "Auto enable xino feature");
 
+static bool __read_mostly ovl_caller_credentials;
+module_param_named(caller_credentials, ovl_caller_credentials, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_caller_credentials,
+		 "Use caller credentials rather than creator credentials for accesses");
+
 static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -376,6 +381,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)
 						"on" : "off");
 	if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def())
 		seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]);
+	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
+		seq_puts(m, ",caller_credentials");
+	else
+		seq_puts(m, ",creator_credentials");
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ enum {
 	OPT_XINO_ON,
 	OPT_XINO_OFF,
 	OPT_XINO_AUTO,
+	OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,
+	OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,
 	OPT_ERR,
 };
 
@@ -429,6 +440,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = {
 	{OPT_XINO_ON,			"xino=on"},
 	{OPT_XINO_OFF,			"xino=off"},
 	{OPT_XINO_AUTO,			"xino=auto"},
+	{OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,	"creator_credentials"},
+	{OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,	"caller_credentials"},
 	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
 };
 
@@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
 	if (!config->redirect_mode)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	config->caller_credentials = ovl_caller_credentials;
 	while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) {
 		int token;
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -555,6 +569,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
 			config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO;
 			break;
 
+		case OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS:
+			config->caller_credentials = false;
+			break;
+
+		case OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS:
+			config->caller_credentials = true;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p);
 			return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index 6f1078028c66..538802289511 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
 
+	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
+		return NULL;
 	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
 }
 
@@ -630,7 +632,8 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked)
 	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
 	 */
 	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 out:
 	if (err)
@@ -650,7 +653,8 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked)
 
 			old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
-			revert_creds(old_cred);
+			if (old_cred)
+				revert_creds(old_cred);
 		}
 
 		mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock);
-- 
2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
@ 2018-06-18 19:27 ` Mark Salyzyn
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Mark Salyzyn @ 2018-06-18 19:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Mark Salyzyn, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, Vivek Goyal,
	linux-unionfs, linux-doc

All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
overlay the creator context.

A module bool parameter and mount option caller_credentials is added
to set the default, and to act as a presence check for this "feature".
The module parameter is used to change the default behavior, But
since I can not break user API, I have to preserve the original
behavior as default.

On MAC security model expect to set the caller_credentials to Y as
part of early initialization to preserve security model when the
option of iether caller_credentials or creator_credentials is not
explicitly specified in the mount.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

v2:
- forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error
- wording in commit message was too adversarial and needed correction
---
 Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt |  7 +++++++
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                  |  3 ++-
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c                      | 12 ++++++++----
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/overlayfs/namei.c                    |  9 ++++++---
 fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h                |  1 +
 fs/overlayfs/readdir.c                  |  6 ++++--
 fs/overlayfs/super.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/overlayfs/util.c                     |  8 ++++++--
 9 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
index 72615a2c0752..4328be5cdaa9 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
@@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged.  Other content
 such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
 directory only.  These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
 
+credentials
+-----------
+
+All access to the upper, lower and work directories is the creator's
+credentials.  If caller_credentials is set, then the access caller's
+instance credentials will be used.
+
 whiteouts and opaque directories
 --------------------------------
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index ddaddb4ce4c3..abc21844f712 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
 		dput(parent);
 		dput(next);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
index f480b1a2cd2e..8b75e0899ee1 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
 		if (!attr->hardlink) {
 			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
-					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name,
+					old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(),
 					override_cred);
 			if (err) {
 				put_cred(override_cred);
@@ -577,7 +578,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
 	}
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -824,7 +826,8 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
 		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
 	else
 		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (!err) {
 		if (is_dir)
 			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -1150,7 +1153,8 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
 out_unlock:
 	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	ovl_nlink_end(new, locked);
 out_drop_write:
 	ovl_drop_write(old);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index ed16a898caeb..222678b6e67e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
 		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		if (old_cred)
+			revert_creds(old_cred);
 		if (!err)
 			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
 		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
@@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
 		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
 
 out:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 		mask |= MAY_READ;
 	}
 	err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return p;
 }
 
@@ -302,7 +306,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
 		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 out_drop_write:
 	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
@@ -320,7 +325,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return res;
 }
 
@@ -344,7 +350,8 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
 		return res;
 
@@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
 	acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return acl;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
index c993dd8db739..c8b84d262ec2 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 		OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect;
 	}
 
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	dput(index);
 	kfree(stack);
 	kfree(d.redirect);
@@ -1043,7 +1044,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	kfree(upperredirect);
 out:
 	kfree(d.redirect);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
@@ -1097,7 +1099,8 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
 			dput(this);
 		}
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return positive;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
index 41655a7d6894..7e17db561a04 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {
 	const char *redirect_mode;
 	bool index;
 	bool nfs_export;
+	bool caller_credentials;
 	int xino;
 };
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
index ef1fe42ff7bb..af3874d589ad 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd)
 		}
 		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index 704b37311467..184688ab35cb 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def,
 		 "Auto enable xino feature");
 
+static bool __read_mostly ovl_caller_credentials;
+module_param_named(caller_credentials, ovl_caller_credentials, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_caller_credentials,
+		 "Use caller credentials rather than creator credentials for accesses");
+
 static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -376,6 +381,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)
 						"on" : "off");
 	if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def())
 		seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]);
+	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
+		seq_puts(m, ",caller_credentials");
+	else
+		seq_puts(m, ",creator_credentials");
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ enum {
 	OPT_XINO_ON,
 	OPT_XINO_OFF,
 	OPT_XINO_AUTO,
+	OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,
+	OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,
 	OPT_ERR,
 };
 
@@ -429,6 +440,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = {
 	{OPT_XINO_ON,			"xino=on"},
 	{OPT_XINO_OFF,			"xino=off"},
 	{OPT_XINO_AUTO,			"xino=auto"},
+	{OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,	"creator_credentials"},
+	{OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,	"caller_credentials"},
 	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
 };
 
@@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
 	if (!config->redirect_mode)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	config->caller_credentials = ovl_caller_credentials;
 	while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) {
 		int token;
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -555,6 +569,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
 			config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO;
 			break;
 
+		case OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS:
+			config->caller_credentials = false;
+			break;
+
+		case OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS:
+			config->caller_credentials = true;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p);
 			return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index 6f1078028c66..538802289511 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
 
+	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
+		return NULL;
 	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
 }
 
@@ -630,7 +632,8 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked)
 	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
 	 */
 	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	if (old_cred)
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 out:
 	if (err)
@@ -650,7 +653,8 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked)
 
 			old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
-			revert_creds(old_cred);
+			if (old_cred)
+				revert_creds(old_cred);
 		}
 
 		mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock);
-- 
2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
  2018-06-18 19:27 ` Mark Salyzyn
@ 2018-06-18 19:32   ` Mark Salyzyn
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Mark Salyzyn @ 2018-06-18 19:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, Vivek Goyal, linux-unionfs, linux-doc

On 06/18/2018 12:27 PM, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
> overlay the creator context.
<sigh> been typing overlay far too many times, muscle memory struck!

"overlap the creator context."

-- Mark

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
@ 2018-06-18 19:32   ` Mark Salyzyn
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Mark Salyzyn @ 2018-06-18 19:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, Vivek Goyal, linux-unionfs, linux-doc

On 06/18/2018 12:27 PM, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
> overlay the creator context.
<sigh> been typing overlay far too many times, muscle memory struck!

"overlap the creator context."

-- Mark
--
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
  2018-06-18 19:27 ` Mark Salyzyn
@ 2018-06-18 22:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2018-06-18 22:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mark Salyzyn
  Cc: linux-kernel, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, Vivek Goyal,
	linux-unionfs, linux-doc

Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> writes:

> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
> overlay the creator context.

Sigh.  You gave Vivek a reasonable description of what is going on
and then you did not repeat it here.  Your patch description
very much needs to be fixed.

As I read your patch there you are removing an override in credentials.
Presumably that override is needed for the fileystem to function.

If that override is needed to function your patch is incorrect
because it breaks things for no reason.

If that override is not needed it should be safe to explain why
and simply remove it from overlayfs.

I don't see any real explanations in this change description.
So this appears to be an incompletely thought out change.


Mostly this looks like someone tried to use the principle of least
privilege in your Android implementation and got it wrong.  Having given
the mounter of overlayfs too few privileges this appears to be an
attempt to get overlayfs to pay the cost of an implementation mistake in
the Android security model.

That seems like a very unreasonable thing to do.

> A module bool parameter and mount option caller_credentials is added
> to set the default, and to act as a presence check for this "feature".
> The module parameter is used to change the default behavior, But
> since I can not break user API, I have to preserve the original
> behavior as default.

Changes to the user API are allowed if no one cares.  Who cares?
Why is your change viable at all?

> On MAC security model expect to set the caller_credentials to Y as
> part of early initialization to preserve security model when the
> option of iether caller_credentials or creator_credentials is not
> explicitly specified in the mount.

Not an any random MAC security model.  On a strange Android MAC security
model.


> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>
> v2:
> - forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error
> - wording in commit message was too adversarial and needed correction
> ---
>  Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt |  7 +++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                  |  3 ++-
>  fs/overlayfs/dir.c                      | 12 ++++++++----
>  fs/overlayfs/inode.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
>  fs/overlayfs/namei.c                    |  9 ++++++---
>  fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h                |  1 +
>  fs/overlayfs/readdir.c                  |  6 ++++--
>  fs/overlayfs/super.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/util.c                     |  8 ++++++--
>  9 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> index 72615a2c0752..4328be5cdaa9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> @@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged.  Other content
>  such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
>  directory only.  These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
>  
> +credentials
> +-----------
> +
> +All access to the upper, lower and work directories is the creator's
> +credentials.  If caller_credentials is set, then the access caller's
> +instance credentials will be used.
> +
>  whiteouts and opaque directories
>  --------------------------------
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> index ddaddb4ce4c3..abc21844f712 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> @@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
>  		dput(parent);
>  		dput(next);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> index f480b1a2cd2e..8b75e0899ee1 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> @@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
>  		if (!attr->hardlink) {
>  			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> -					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> +					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name,
> +					old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(),
>  					override_cred);
>  			if (err) {
>  				put_cred(override_cred);
> @@ -577,7 +578,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
>  	}
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return err;
>  }
>  
> @@ -824,7 +826,8 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
>  		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
>  	else
>  		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (!err) {
>  		if (is_dir)
>  			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
> @@ -1150,7 +1153,8 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
>  out_unlock:
>  	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	ovl_nlink_end(new, locked);
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(old);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> index ed16a898caeb..222678b6e67e 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
>  		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
> +		if (old_cred)
> +			revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		if (!err)
>  			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
>  		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
> @@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
>  		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
>  
>  out:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  		mask |= MAY_READ;
>  	}
>  	err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return p;
>  }
>  
> @@ -302,7 +306,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
>  		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
> @@ -320,7 +325,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return res;
>  }
>  
> @@ -344,7 +350,8 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
>  		return res;
>  
> @@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
>  	acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return acl;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index c993dd8db739..c8b84d262ec2 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect;
>  	}
>  
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	dput(index);
>  	kfree(stack);
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> @@ -1043,7 +1044,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	kfree(upperredirect);
>  out:
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return ERR_PTR(err);
>  }
>  
> @@ -1097,7 +1099,8 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>  			dput(this);
>  		}
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return positive;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> index 41655a7d6894..7e17db561a04 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {
>  	const char *redirect_mode;
>  	bool index;
>  	bool nfs_export;
> +	bool caller_credentials;
>  	int xino;
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> index ef1fe42ff7bb..af3874d589ad 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> @@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd)
>  		}
>  		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index 704b37311467..184688ab35cb 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def,
>  		 "Auto enable xino feature");
>  
> +static bool __read_mostly ovl_caller_credentials;
> +module_param_named(caller_credentials, ovl_caller_credentials, bool, 0644);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_caller_credentials,
> +		 "Use caller credentials rather than creator credentials for accesses");
> +
>  static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe)
>  {
>  	unsigned int i;
> @@ -376,6 +381,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)
>  						"on" : "off");
>  	if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def())
>  		seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]);
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		seq_puts(m, ",caller_credentials");
> +	else
> +		seq_puts(m, ",creator_credentials");
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ enum {
>  	OPT_XINO_ON,
>  	OPT_XINO_OFF,
>  	OPT_XINO_AUTO,
> +	OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,
> +	OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,
>  	OPT_ERR,
>  };
>  
> @@ -429,6 +440,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = {
>  	{OPT_XINO_ON,			"xino=on"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_OFF,			"xino=off"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_AUTO,			"xino=auto"},
> +	{OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,	"creator_credentials"},
> +	{OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,	"caller_credentials"},
>  	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  	if (!config->redirect_mode)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> +	config->caller_credentials = ovl_caller_credentials;
>  	while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) {
>  		int token;
>  		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> @@ -555,6 +569,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  			config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO;
>  			break;
>  
> +		case OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = false;
> +			break;
> +
> +		case OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = true;
> +			break;
> +
>  		default:
>  			pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p);
>  			return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> index 6f1078028c66..538802289511 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
>  
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		return NULL;
>  	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
>  }
>  
> @@ -630,7 +632,8 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked)
>  	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
>  	 */
>  	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out:
>  	if (err)
> @@ -650,7 +653,8 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked)
>  
>  			old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> -			revert_creds(old_cred);
> +			if (old_cred)
> +				revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		}
>  
>  		mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
@ 2018-06-18 22:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2018-06-18 22:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mark Salyzyn
  Cc: linux-kernel, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, Vivek Goyal,
	linux-unionfs, linux-doc

Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> writes:

> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
> overlay the creator context.

Sigh.  You gave Vivek a reasonable description of what is going on
and then you did not repeat it here.  Your patch description
very much needs to be fixed.

As I read your patch there you are removing an override in credentials.
Presumably that override is needed for the fileystem to function.

If that override is needed to function your patch is incorrect
because it breaks things for no reason.

If that override is not needed it should be safe to explain why
and simply remove it from overlayfs.

I don't see any real explanations in this change description.
So this appears to be an incompletely thought out change.


Mostly this looks like someone tried to use the principle of least
privilege in your Android implementation and got it wrong.  Having given
the mounter of overlayfs too few privileges this appears to be an
attempt to get overlayfs to pay the cost of an implementation mistake in
the Android security model.

That seems like a very unreasonable thing to do.

> A module bool parameter and mount option caller_credentials is added
> to set the default, and to act as a presence check for this "feature".
> The module parameter is used to change the default behavior, But
> since I can not break user API, I have to preserve the original
> behavior as default.

Changes to the user API are allowed if no one cares.  Who cares?
Why is your change viable at all?

> On MAC security model expect to set the caller_credentials to Y as
> part of early initialization to preserve security model when the
> option of iether caller_credentials or creator_credentials is not
> explicitly specified in the mount.

Not an any random MAC security model.  On a strange Android MAC security
model.


> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>
> v2:
> - forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error
> - wording in commit message was too adversarial and needed correction
> ---
>  Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt |  7 +++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                  |  3 ++-
>  fs/overlayfs/dir.c                      | 12 ++++++++----
>  fs/overlayfs/inode.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
>  fs/overlayfs/namei.c                    |  9 ++++++---
>  fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h                |  1 +
>  fs/overlayfs/readdir.c                  |  6 ++++--
>  fs/overlayfs/super.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/util.c                     |  8 ++++++--
>  9 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> index 72615a2c0752..4328be5cdaa9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> @@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged.  Other content
>  such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
>  directory only.  These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
>  
> +credentials
> +-----------
> +
> +All access to the upper, lower and work directories is the creator's
> +credentials.  If caller_credentials is set, then the access caller's
> +instance credentials will be used.
> +
>  whiteouts and opaque directories
>  --------------------------------
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> index ddaddb4ce4c3..abc21844f712 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> @@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
>  		dput(parent);
>  		dput(next);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> index f480b1a2cd2e..8b75e0899ee1 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> @@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
>  		if (!attr->hardlink) {
>  			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> -					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> +					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name,
> +					old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(),
>  					override_cred);
>  			if (err) {
>  				put_cred(override_cred);
> @@ -577,7 +578,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
>  	}
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return err;
>  }
>  
> @@ -824,7 +826,8 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
>  		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
>  	else
>  		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (!err) {
>  		if (is_dir)
>  			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
> @@ -1150,7 +1153,8 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
>  out_unlock:
>  	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	ovl_nlink_end(new, locked);
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(old);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> index ed16a898caeb..222678b6e67e 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
>  		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
> +		if (old_cred)
> +			revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		if (!err)
>  			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
>  		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
> @@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
>  		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
>  
>  out:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  		mask |= MAY_READ;
>  	}
>  	err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return p;
>  }
>  
> @@ -302,7 +306,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
>  		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
> @@ -320,7 +325,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return res;
>  }
>  
> @@ -344,7 +350,8 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
>  		return res;
>  
> @@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
>  	acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return acl;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index c993dd8db739..c8b84d262ec2 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect;
>  	}
>  
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	dput(index);
>  	kfree(stack);
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> @@ -1043,7 +1044,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	kfree(upperredirect);
>  out:
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return ERR_PTR(err);
>  }
>  
> @@ -1097,7 +1099,8 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>  			dput(this);
>  		}
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return positive;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> index 41655a7d6894..7e17db561a04 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {
>  	const char *redirect_mode;
>  	bool index;
>  	bool nfs_export;
> +	bool caller_credentials;
>  	int xino;
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> index ef1fe42ff7bb..af3874d589ad 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> @@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd)
>  		}
>  		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index 704b37311467..184688ab35cb 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def,
>  		 "Auto enable xino feature");
>  
> +static bool __read_mostly ovl_caller_credentials;
> +module_param_named(caller_credentials, ovl_caller_credentials, bool, 0644);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_caller_credentials,
> +		 "Use caller credentials rather than creator credentials for accesses");
> +
>  static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe)
>  {
>  	unsigned int i;
> @@ -376,6 +381,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)
>  						"on" : "off");
>  	if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def())
>  		seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]);
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		seq_puts(m, ",caller_credentials");
> +	else
> +		seq_puts(m, ",creator_credentials");
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ enum {
>  	OPT_XINO_ON,
>  	OPT_XINO_OFF,
>  	OPT_XINO_AUTO,
> +	OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,
> +	OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,
>  	OPT_ERR,
>  };
>  
> @@ -429,6 +440,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = {
>  	{OPT_XINO_ON,			"xino=on"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_OFF,			"xino=off"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_AUTO,			"xino=auto"},
> +	{OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,	"creator_credentials"},
> +	{OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,	"caller_credentials"},
>  	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  	if (!config->redirect_mode)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> +	config->caller_credentials = ovl_caller_credentials;
>  	while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) {
>  		int token;
>  		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> @@ -555,6 +569,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  			config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO;
>  			break;
>  
> +		case OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = false;
> +			break;
> +
> +		case OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = true;
> +			break;
> +
>  		default:
>  			pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p);
>  			return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> index 6f1078028c66..538802289511 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
>  
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		return NULL;
>  	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
>  }
>  
> @@ -630,7 +632,8 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked)
>  	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
>  	 */
>  	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out:
>  	if (err)
> @@ -650,7 +653,8 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked)
>  
>  			old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> -			revert_creds(old_cred);
> +			if (old_cred)
> +				revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		}
>  
>  		mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock);
--
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
  2018-06-18 22:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
@ 2018-06-19  5:39     ` Amir Goldstein
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Amir Goldstein @ 2018-06-19  5:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric W. Biederman
  Cc: Mark Salyzyn, linux-kernel, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vivek Goyal, overlayfs, linux-doc

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 1:05 AM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> writes:
>
>> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
>> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
>> overlay the creator context.
>
> Sigh.  You gave Vivek a reasonable description of what is going on
> and then you did not repeat it here.  Your patch description
> very much needs to be fixed.
>
> As I read your patch there you are removing an override in credentials.
> Presumably that override is needed for the fileystem to function.
>
> If that override is needed to function your patch is incorrect
> because it breaks things for no reason.
>
> If that override is not needed it should be safe to explain why
> and simply remove it from overlayfs.
>

Eric is correct about override being needed for filesystem to function
because overlayfs calls mknod and sets trusted xattr.

Alas, overlayfs makes an assumption that if mounter has credentials
to mount, it also has credentials for those other things, which so far,
nobody complained about AFAIK.

There was one complain though about abusing SYS_CAP_RESOURCE
of mounter to exceed underlying ext4 quotas, so that capability has been
recently revoked unconditionally from the override creds - that makes a user
with SYS_CAP_RESOURCE also incapable of exceeding underlying ext4
quotas (a good thing IMO, but that is arguable).

Ideally, the correct solution would be to "merge" the mounter creds and
caller creds and use different combinations of the two in different cases,
but that would complicate the code and the test matrix considerably.

> I don't see any real explanations in this change description.
> So this appears to be an incompletely thought out change.
>
>
> Mostly this looks like someone tried to use the principle of least
> privilege in your Android implementation and got it wrong.  Having given
> the mounter of overlayfs too few privileges this appears to be an
> attempt to get overlayfs to pay the cost of an implementation mistake in
> the Android security model.
>
> That seems like a very unreasonable thing to do.
>

To the best of my knowledge, the Android sepolicy rules for init have been
like that for a very long time. I am not sure why Eric claims the unreasonable
claim. Not sure who the users of overlayfs are going to be though and if
it is possible to guaranty that they have capabilities to mknod and set trusted
xattr (needed for removing dirs among other things).

As it is, the patch is simple enough and only makes an existing functionality
optional, so if it *really* solves the Android use case, and there is
*really* no
other "reasonable" way to configure Android sepolicy, I rather have this patch
than the more "correct" implementation.

Two comments about the patch in case we are going forward with it:

1. I would use the same convention for Kconfig/module param/mount option
as used for other overlayfs defaults, i.e. override_creds=on/off and Kconfig
default which defaults to the legacy behavior.

2. with override_creds=off, all the checks being done during mount become
irrelevant (e.g. mounter can set trusted xattr), so either skip them and issue
a warning saying that we really hope mounter knows what it is doing, or
I don't know what.

Thanks,
Amir.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
@ 2018-06-19  5:39     ` Amir Goldstein
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Amir Goldstein @ 2018-06-19  5:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric W. Biederman
  Cc: Mark Salyzyn, linux-kernel, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vivek Goyal, overlayfs, linux-doc

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 1:05 AM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> writes:
>
>> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
>> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
>> overlay the creator context.
>
> Sigh.  You gave Vivek a reasonable description of what is going on
> and then you did not repeat it here.  Your patch description
> very much needs to be fixed.
>
> As I read your patch there you are removing an override in credentials.
> Presumably that override is needed for the fileystem to function.
>
> If that override is needed to function your patch is incorrect
> because it breaks things for no reason.
>
> If that override is not needed it should be safe to explain why
> and simply remove it from overlayfs.
>

Eric is correct about override being needed for filesystem to function
because overlayfs calls mknod and sets trusted xattr.

Alas, overlayfs makes an assumption that if mounter has credentials
to mount, it also has credentials for those other things, which so far,
nobody complained about AFAIK.

There was one complain though about abusing SYS_CAP_RESOURCE
of mounter to exceed underlying ext4 quotas, so that capability has been
recently revoked unconditionally from the override creds - that makes a user
with SYS_CAP_RESOURCE also incapable of exceeding underlying ext4
quotas (a good thing IMO, but that is arguable).

Ideally, the correct solution would be to "merge" the mounter creds and
caller creds and use different combinations of the two in different cases,
but that would complicate the code and the test matrix considerably.

> I don't see any real explanations in this change description.
> So this appears to be an incompletely thought out change.
>
>
> Mostly this looks like someone tried to use the principle of least
> privilege in your Android implementation and got it wrong.  Having given
> the mounter of overlayfs too few privileges this appears to be an
> attempt to get overlayfs to pay the cost of an implementation mistake in
> the Android security model.
>
> That seems like a very unreasonable thing to do.
>

To the best of my knowledge, the Android sepolicy rules for init have been
like that for a very long time. I am not sure why Eric claims the unreasonable
claim. Not sure who the users of overlayfs are going to be though and if
it is possible to guaranty that they have capabilities to mknod and set trusted
xattr (needed for removing dirs among other things).

As it is, the patch is simple enough and only makes an existing functionality
optional, so if it *really* solves the Android use case, and there is
*really* no
other "reasonable" way to configure Android sepolicy, I rather have this patch
than the more "correct" implementation.

Two comments about the patch in case we are going forward with it:

1. I would use the same convention for Kconfig/module param/mount option
as used for other overlayfs defaults, i.e. override_creds=on/off and Kconfig
default which defaults to the legacy behavior.

2. with override_creds=off, all the checks being done during mount become
irrelevant (e.g. mounter can set trusted xattr), so either skip them and issue
a warning saying that we really hope mounter knows what it is doing, or
I don't know what.

Thanks,
Amir.
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
  2018-06-18 19:27 ` Mark Salyzyn
@ 2018-06-19 14:16   ` Vivek Goyal
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Vivek Goyal @ 2018-06-19 14:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mark Salyzyn
  Cc: linux-kernel, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, linux-unionfs, linux-doc

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:27:19PM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
> overlay the creator context.
> 
> A module bool parameter and mount option caller_credentials is added
> to set the default, and to act as a presence check for this "feature".
> The module parameter is used to change the default behavior, But
> since I can not break user API, I have to preserve the original
> behavior as default.
> 
> On MAC security model expect to set the caller_credentials to Y as
> part of early initialization to preserve security model when the
> option of iether caller_credentials or creator_credentials is not
> explicitly specified in the mount.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> 
> v2:
> - forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error
> - wording in commit message was too adversarial and needed correction
> ---
>  Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt |  7 +++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                  |  3 ++-
>  fs/overlayfs/dir.c                      | 12 ++++++++----
>  fs/overlayfs/inode.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
>  fs/overlayfs/namei.c                    |  9 ++++++---
>  fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h                |  1 +
>  fs/overlayfs/readdir.c                  |  6 ++++--
>  fs/overlayfs/super.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/util.c                     |  8 ++++++--
>  9 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> index 72615a2c0752..4328be5cdaa9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> @@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged.  Other content
>  such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
>  directory only.  These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
>  
> +credentials
> +-----------
> +
> +All access to the upper, lower and work directories is the creator's
> +credentials.

Can we call it "mounter's credentials" instead of "creator's credential"
everywhere in the patch. It just feels more intuitive and that's how
we have been referrring to it.

> If caller_credentials is set, then the access caller's
> +instance credentials will be used.
> +
>  whiteouts and opaque directories
>  --------------------------------
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> index ddaddb4ce4c3..abc21844f712 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> @@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
>  		dput(parent);
>  		dput(next);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);

How about defining ovl_revert_creds(old_cred) helper and do nothing if old_cred
is null. This will be similar to ovl_override_creds() helper which does
not switch creds based on a mount option.

>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> index f480b1a2cd2e..8b75e0899ee1 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> @@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
>  		if (!attr->hardlink) {
>  			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> -					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> +					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name,
> +					old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(),
>  					override_cred);

Calling this security hook should be unnecessary if actual file creation
is happening in the context of caller's creds. This hook was needed when
new file creation was happening with mounter's creds. 

We probably will have to define another helper to organize this code
better. For now, it probably is fine, and not a big deal.

>  			if (err) {
>  				put_cred(override_cred);
> @@ -577,7 +578,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
>  	}
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return err;
>  }
>  
> @@ -824,7 +826,8 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
>  		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
>  	else
>  		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (!err) {
>  		if (is_dir)
>  			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
> @@ -1150,7 +1153,8 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
>  out_unlock:
>  	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	ovl_nlink_end(new, locked);
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(old);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> index ed16a898caeb..222678b6e67e 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
>  		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
> +		if (old_cred)
> +			revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		if (!err)
>  			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
>  		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
> @@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
>  		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
>  
>  out:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  		mask |= MAY_READ;
>  	}
>  	err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return p;
>  }
>  
> @@ -302,7 +306,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
>  		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
> @@ -320,7 +325,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return res;
>  }
>  
> @@ -344,7 +350,8 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
>  		return res;
>  
> @@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
>  	acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return acl;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index c993dd8db739..c8b84d262ec2 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect;
>  	}
>  
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	dput(index);
>  	kfree(stack);
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> @@ -1043,7 +1044,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	kfree(upperredirect);
>  out:
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return ERR_PTR(err);
>  }
>  
> @@ -1097,7 +1099,8 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>  			dput(this);
>  		}
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return positive;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> index 41655a7d6894..7e17db561a04 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {
>  	const char *redirect_mode;
>  	bool index;
>  	bool nfs_export;
> +	bool caller_credentials;
>  	int xino;
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> index ef1fe42ff7bb..af3874d589ad 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> @@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd)
>  		}
>  		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index 704b37311467..184688ab35cb 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def,
>  		 "Auto enable xino feature");
>  
> +static bool __read_mostly ovl_caller_credentials;
> +module_param_named(caller_credentials, ovl_caller_credentials, bool, 0644);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_caller_credentials,
> +		 "Use caller credentials rather than creator credentials for accesses");
> +
>  static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe)
>  {
>  	unsigned int i;
> @@ -376,6 +381,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)
>  						"on" : "off");
>  	if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def())
>  		seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]);
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		seq_puts(m, ",caller_credentials");
> +	else
> +		seq_puts(m, ",creator_credentials");
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ enum {
>  	OPT_XINO_ON,
>  	OPT_XINO_OFF,
>  	OPT_XINO_AUTO,
> +	OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,
> +	OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,
>  	OPT_ERR,
>  };
>  
> @@ -429,6 +440,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = {
>  	{OPT_XINO_ON,			"xino=on"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_OFF,			"xino=off"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_AUTO,			"xino=auto"},
> +	{OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,	"creator_credentials"},
> +	{OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,	"caller_credentials"},

I like Amir's suggestion of using override_creds=on/off, with
override_creds=on being default.

Thanks
Vivek

>  	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  	if (!config->redirect_mode)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> +	config->caller_credentials = ovl_caller_credentials;
>  	while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) {
>  		int token;
>  		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> @@ -555,6 +569,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  			config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO;
>  			break;
>  
> +		case OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = false;
> +			break;
> +
> +		case OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = true;
> +			break;
> +
>  		default:
>  			pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p);
>  			return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> index 6f1078028c66..538802289511 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
>  
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		return NULL;
>  	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
>  }
>  
> @@ -630,7 +632,8 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked)
>  	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
>  	 */
>  	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out:
>  	if (err)
> @@ -650,7 +653,8 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked)
>  
>  			old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> -			revert_creds(old_cred);
> +			if (old_cred)
> +				revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		}
>  
>  		mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock);
> -- 
> 2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred
@ 2018-06-19 14:16   ` Vivek Goyal
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Vivek Goyal @ 2018-06-19 14:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mark Salyzyn
  Cc: linux-kernel, Miklos Szeredi, Jonathan Corbet, linux-unionfs, linux-doc

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:27:19PM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> All accesses to the lower filesystems reference the creator (mount)
> context.  This is a security issue as the user context does not
> overlay the creator context.
> 
> A module bool parameter and mount option caller_credentials is added
> to set the default, and to act as a presence check for this "feature".
> The module parameter is used to change the default behavior, But
> since I can not break user API, I have to preserve the original
> behavior as default.
> 
> On MAC security model expect to set the caller_credentials to Y as
> part of early initialization to preserve security model when the
> option of iether caller_credentials or creator_credentials is not
> explicitly specified in the mount.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> 
> v2:
> - forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error
> - wording in commit message was too adversarial and needed correction
> ---
>  Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt |  7 +++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                  |  3 ++-
>  fs/overlayfs/dir.c                      | 12 ++++++++----
>  fs/overlayfs/inode.c                    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
>  fs/overlayfs/namei.c                    |  9 ++++++---
>  fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h                |  1 +
>  fs/overlayfs/readdir.c                  |  6 ++++--
>  fs/overlayfs/super.c                    | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  fs/overlayfs/util.c                     |  8 ++++++--
>  9 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> index 72615a2c0752..4328be5cdaa9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> @@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged.  Other content
>  such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
>  directory only.  These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
>  
> +credentials
> +-----------
> +
> +All access to the upper, lower and work directories is the creator's
> +credentials.

Can we call it "mounter's credentials" instead of "creator's credential"
everywhere in the patch. It just feels more intuitive and that's how
we have been referrring to it.

> If caller_credentials is set, then the access caller's
> +instance credentials will be used.
> +
>  whiteouts and opaque directories
>  --------------------------------
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> index ddaddb4ce4c3..abc21844f712 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> @@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
>  		dput(parent);
>  		dput(next);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);

How about defining ovl_revert_creds(old_cred) helper and do nothing if old_cred
is null. This will be similar to ovl_override_creds() helper which does
not switch creds based on a mount option.

>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> index f480b1a2cd2e..8b75e0899ee1 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> @@ -561,7 +561,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
>  		if (!attr->hardlink) {
>  			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> -					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> +					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name,
> +					old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(),
>  					override_cred);

Calling this security hook should be unnecessary if actual file creation
is happening in the context of caller's creds. This hook was needed when
new file creation was happening with mounter's creds. 

We probably will have to define another helper to organize this code
better. For now, it probably is fine, and not a big deal.

>  			if (err) {
>  				put_cred(override_cred);
> @@ -577,7 +578,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
>  			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
>  	}
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return err;
>  }
>  
> @@ -824,7 +826,8 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
>  		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
>  	else
>  		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (!err) {
>  		if (is_dir)
>  			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
> @@ -1150,7 +1153,8 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old,
>  out_unlock:
>  	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
>  out_revert_creds:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	ovl_nlink_end(new, locked);
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(old);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> index ed16a898caeb..222678b6e67e 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
> @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>  		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
>  		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
> +		if (old_cred)
> +			revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		if (!err)
>  			ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);
>  		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
> @@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
>  		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
>  
>  out:
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>  		mask |= MAY_READ;
>  	}
>  	err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return p;
>  }
>  
> @@ -302,7 +306,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
>  		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out_drop_write:
>  	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
> @@ -320,7 +325,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return res;
>  }
>  
> @@ -344,7 +350,8 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
>  		return res;
>  
> @@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
>  	acl = get_acl(realinode, type);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return acl;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index c993dd8db739..c8b84d262ec2 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  		OVL_I(inode)->redirect = upperredirect;
>  	}
>  
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	dput(index);
>  	kfree(stack);
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> @@ -1043,7 +1044,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  	kfree(upperredirect);
>  out:
>  	kfree(d.redirect);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	return ERR_PTR(err);
>  }
>  
> @@ -1097,7 +1099,8 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>  			dput(this);
>  		}
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return positive;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> index 41655a7d6894..7e17db561a04 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {
>  	const char *redirect_mode;
>  	bool index;
>  	bool nfs_export;
> +	bool caller_credentials;
>  	int xino;
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> index ef1fe42ff7bb..af3874d589ad 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
> @@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd)
>  		}
>  		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
>  	}
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  	return err;
>  }
> @@ -906,7 +907,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
>  
>  	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index 704b37311467..184688ab35cb 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_xino_auto_def,
>  		 "Auto enable xino feature");
>  
> +static bool __read_mostly ovl_caller_credentials;
> +module_param_named(caller_credentials, ovl_caller_credentials, bool, 0644);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_caller_credentials,
> +		 "Use caller credentials rather than creator credentials for accesses");
> +
>  static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe)
>  {
>  	unsigned int i;
> @@ -376,6 +381,10 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)
>  						"on" : "off");
>  	if (ofs->config.xino != ovl_xino_def())
>  		seq_printf(m, ",xino=%s", ovl_xino_str[ofs->config.xino]);
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		seq_puts(m, ",caller_credentials");
> +	else
> +		seq_puts(m, ",creator_credentials");
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ enum {
>  	OPT_XINO_ON,
>  	OPT_XINO_OFF,
>  	OPT_XINO_AUTO,
> +	OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,
> +	OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,
>  	OPT_ERR,
>  };
>  
> @@ -429,6 +440,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = {
>  	{OPT_XINO_ON,			"xino=on"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_OFF,			"xino=off"},
>  	{OPT_XINO_AUTO,			"xino=auto"},
> +	{OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS,	"creator_credentials"},
> +	{OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS,	"caller_credentials"},

I like Amir's suggestion of using override_creds=on/off, with
override_creds=on being default.

Thanks
Vivek

>  	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  	if (!config->redirect_mode)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> +	config->caller_credentials = ovl_caller_credentials;
>  	while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) {
>  		int token;
>  		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> @@ -555,6 +569,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config)
>  			config->xino = OVL_XINO_AUTO;
>  			break;
>  
> +		case OPT_CREATOR_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = false;
> +			break;
> +
> +		case OPT_CALLER_CREDENTIALS:
> +			config->caller_credentials = true;
> +			break;
> +
>  		default:
>  			pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p);
>  			return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> index 6f1078028c66..538802289511 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
>  
> +	if (ofs->config.caller_credentials)
> +		return NULL;
>  	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
>  }
>  
> @@ -630,7 +632,8 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry, bool *locked)
>  	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
>  	 */
>  	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
> -	revert_creds(old_cred);
> +	if (old_cred)
> +		revert_creds(old_cred);
>  
>  out:
>  	if (err)
> @@ -650,7 +653,8 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry, bool locked)
>  
>  			old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>  			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> -			revert_creds(old_cred);
> +			if (old_cred)
> +				revert_creds(old_cred);
>  		}
>  
>  		mutex_unlock(&OVL_I(d_inode(dentry))->lock);
> -- 
> 2.18.0.rc1.244.gcf134e6275-goog
> 
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-06-19 14:16 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-06-18 19:27 [PATCH v2] overlayfs: caller_credentials option bypass creator_cred Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 19:27 ` Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 19:32 ` Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 19:32   ` Mark Salyzyn
2018-06-18 22:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-06-18 22:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-06-19  5:39   ` Amir Goldstein
2018-06-19  5:39     ` Amir Goldstein
2018-06-19 14:16 ` Vivek Goyal
2018-06-19 14:16   ` Vivek Goyal

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