All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map
@ 2018-08-05 16:53 Miquel Raynal
  2018-08-05 16:53 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification Miquel Raynal
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Miquel Raynal @ 2018-08-05 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: u-boot

The second check on pcr_map in sandbox_tpm2_xfer() is wrong. It should
check for pcr_map not being empty. Instead, it is a pure copy/paste of
the first check which is redundant.

This has been found thanks to a Coverity Scan report:

    CID 183370:  Memory - illegal accesses  (UNINIT)
    Using uninitialized value "pcr_index".
        put_unaligned_be32(tpm->pcr_extensions[pcr_index], recv);

This is because pcr_index is initialized only if the user input is
correct, ie. at least one valid bit is set in pcr_map.

Fix the second check and also initialize pcr_index to 0 (which is
harmless in case of error) to make Coverity Scan happy.

Reported-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
---
 drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c b/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c
index 66f6c9ba82..b15ec732ad 100644
--- a/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c
+++ b/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 	u32 capability, property, property_count;
 
 	/* TPM2_PCR_Read/Extend variables */
-	int pcr_index;
+	int pcr_index = 0;
 	u64 pcr_map = 0;
 	u32 selections, pcr_nb;
 	u16 alg;
@@ -483,8 +483,8 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
-		if (pcr_map >> SANDBOX_TPM_PCR_NB) {
-			printf("Wrong PCR map.\n");
+		if (!pcr_map) {
+			printf("Empty PCR map.\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
 			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
-- 
2.14.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification
  2018-08-05 16:53 [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Miquel Raynal
@ 2018-08-05 16:53 ` Miquel Raynal
  2018-08-08  9:56   ` Simon Glass
  2018-08-13 23:57   ` [U-Boot] [U-Boot, " Tom Rini
  2018-08-08  9:56 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Simon Glass
  2018-08-13 23:57 ` [U-Boot] [U-Boot,1/2] " Tom Rini
  2 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Miquel Raynal @ 2018-08-05 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: u-boot

The recv variable in sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf() is a pointer on a pointer
of a char array. It means accessing *recv is the char array pointer
itself while **recv is the first character of that array. There is no
need for such indirection here, so simplify the code.

Simplifying things will make the last assignment right: "*recv = NULL"
is now correct. The issue has been found by the following Coverity
Scan report:

    CID 183371:  Incorrect expression  (UNUSED_VALUE)
    Assigning value "4UL" to "*recv" here, but that stored value is overwritten before it can be used.
    232             *recv += sizeof(rc);
    233
    234             /* Add trailing \0 */
    235             *recv = NULL;

While at simplifying things, use '\0' instead of NULL when adding an
empty char at the end of the buffer.

Reported-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
---
 drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c b/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c
index b15ec732ad..f282ea6adf 100644
--- a/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c
+++ b/drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c
@@ -215,24 +215,24 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_check_readyness(struct udevice *dev, int command)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(u8 **recv, size_t *recv_len, u16 tag, u32 rc)
+static int sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(u8 *recv, size_t *recv_len, u16 tag, u32 rc)
 {
 	*recv_len = sizeof(tag) + sizeof(u32) + sizeof(rc);
 
 	/* Write tag */
-	put_unaligned_be16(tag, *recv);
-	*recv += sizeof(tag);
+	put_unaligned_be16(tag, recv);
+	recv += sizeof(tag);
 
 	/* Write length */
-	put_unaligned_be32(*recv_len, *recv);
-	*recv += sizeof(u32);
+	put_unaligned_be32(*recv_len, recv);
+	recv += sizeof(u32);
 
 	/* Write return code */
-	put_unaligned_be32(rc, *recv);
-	*recv += sizeof(rc);
+	put_unaligned_be32(rc, recv);
+	recv += sizeof(rc);
 
 	/* Add trailing \0 */
-	*recv = NULL;
+	*recv = '\0';
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		printf("TPM2: Unmatching length, received: %ld, expected: %d\n",
 		       send_size, length);
 		rc = TPM2_RC_SIZE;
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -295,13 +295,13 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 	sent += sizeof(command);
 	rc = sandbox_tpm2_check_readyness(dev, command);
 	if (rc) {
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	rc = sandbox_tpm2_check_session(dev, command, tag, &sent, &hierarchy);
 	if (rc) {
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 
 		tpm->startup_done = true;
 
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		break;
 
 	case TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST:
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 
 		tpm->tests_done = true;
 
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		break;
 
 	case TPM2_CC_CLEAR:
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 				tpm->pcr[i][j] = 0;
 		}
 
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		break;
 
 	case TPM2_CC_HIERCHANGEAUTH:
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 			sent += new_pw_sz;
 		}
 
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		break;
 
 	case TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY:
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		if (!property_count ||
 		    property + property_count > TPM2_PROPERTY_NB) {
 			rc = TPM2_RC_HANDLE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		/* Write tag */
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		tpm->properties[TPM2_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY] = get_unaligned_be32(sent);
 		sent += sizeof(*tpm->properties);
 
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		break;
 
 	case TPM2_CC_PCR_READ:
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		if (selections != 1) {
 			printf("Sandbox cannot handle more than one PCR\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		alg = get_unaligned_be16(sent);
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		if (alg != TPM2_ALG_SHA256) {
 			printf("Sandbox TPM only handle SHA256 algorithm\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		pcr_array_sz = *sent;
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		if (!pcr_array_sz || pcr_array_sz > 8) {
 			printf("Sandbox TPM cannot handle so much PCRs\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < pcr_array_sz; i++)
@@ -480,13 +480,13 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 			printf("Sandbox TPM handles up to %d PCR(s)\n",
 			       SANDBOX_TPM_PCR_NB);
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		if (!pcr_map) {
 			printf("Empty PCR map.\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < SANDBOX_TPM_PCR_NB; i++)
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		if (pcr_nb != 1) {
 			printf("Sandbox cannot handle more than one PCR\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		/* Check the hash algorithm */
@@ -547,19 +547,19 @@ static int sandbox_tpm2_xfer(struct udevice *dev, const u8 *sendbuf,
 		if (alg != TPM2_ALG_SHA256) {
 			printf("Sandbox TPM only handle SHA256 algorithm\n");
 			rc = TPM2_RC_VALUE;
-			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+			return sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		}
 
 		/* Extend the PCR */
 		rc = sandbox_tpm2_extend(dev, pcr_index, sent);
 
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 		break;
 
 	default:
 		printf("TPM2 command %02x unknown in Sandbox\n", command);
 		rc = TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE;
-		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(&recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
+		sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf(recv, recv_len, tag, rc);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.14.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map
  2018-08-05 16:53 [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Miquel Raynal
  2018-08-05 16:53 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification Miquel Raynal
@ 2018-08-08  9:56 ` Simon Glass
  2018-08-13 23:57 ` [U-Boot] [U-Boot,1/2] " Tom Rini
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2018-08-08  9:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: u-boot

On 5 August 2018 at 10:53, Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> wrote:
> The second check on pcr_map in sandbox_tpm2_xfer() is wrong. It should
> check for pcr_map not being empty. Instead, it is a pure copy/paste of
> the first check which is redundant.
>
> This has been found thanks to a Coverity Scan report:
>
>     CID 183370:  Memory - illegal accesses  (UNINIT)
>     Using uninitialized value "pcr_index".
>         put_unaligned_be32(tpm->pcr_extensions[pcr_index], recv);
>
> This is because pcr_index is initialized only if the user input is
> correct, ie. at least one valid bit is set in pcr_map.
>
> Fix the second check and also initialize pcr_index to 0 (which is
> harmless in case of error) to make Coverity Scan happy.
>
> Reported-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
> ---
>  drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c | 6 +++---
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

It is always nice to see a test update with a bug fix (so we test that
the problem is fixed). I'm not sure if that is possible?

- Simon

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification
  2018-08-05 16:53 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification Miquel Raynal
@ 2018-08-08  9:56   ` Simon Glass
  2018-08-13 23:57   ` [U-Boot] [U-Boot, " Tom Rini
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2018-08-08  9:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: u-boot

On 5 August 2018 at 10:53, Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> wrote:
> The recv variable in sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf() is a pointer on a pointer
> of a char array. It means accessing *recv is the char array pointer
> itself while **recv is the first character of that array. There is no
> need for such indirection here, so simplify the code.
>
> Simplifying things will make the last assignment right: "*recv = NULL"
> is now correct. The issue has been found by the following Coverity
> Scan report:
>
>     CID 183371:  Incorrect expression  (UNUSED_VALUE)
>     Assigning value "4UL" to "*recv" here, but that stored value is overwritten before it can be used.
>     232             *recv += sizeof(rc);
>     233
>     234             /* Add trailing \0 */
>     235             *recv = NULL;
>
> While at simplifying things, use '\0' instead of NULL when adding an
> empty char at the end of the buffer.
>
> Reported-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
> ---
>  drivers/tpm/tpm2_tis_sandbox.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
>  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [U-Boot,1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map
  2018-08-05 16:53 [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Miquel Raynal
  2018-08-05 16:53 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification Miquel Raynal
  2018-08-08  9:56 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Simon Glass
@ 2018-08-13 23:57 ` Tom Rini
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tom Rini @ 2018-08-13 23:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: u-boot

On Sun, Aug 05, 2018 at 06:53:06PM +0200, Miquel Raynal wrote:

> The second check on pcr_map in sandbox_tpm2_xfer() is wrong. It should
> check for pcr_map not being empty. Instead, it is a pure copy/paste of
> the first check which is redundant.
> 
> This has been found thanks to a Coverity Scan report:
> 
>     CID 183370:  Memory - illegal accesses  (UNINIT)
>     Using uninitialized value "pcr_index".
>         put_unaligned_be32(tpm->pcr_extensions[pcr_index], recv);
> 
> This is because pcr_index is initialized only if the user input is
> correct, ie. at least one valid bit is set in pcr_map.
> 
> Fix the second check and also initialize pcr_index to 0 (which is
> harmless in case of error) to make Coverity Scan happy.
> 
> Reported-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

-- 
Tom
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 819 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/attachments/20180813/186a3b20/attachment.sig>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [U-Boot, 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification
  2018-08-05 16:53 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification Miquel Raynal
  2018-08-08  9:56   ` Simon Glass
@ 2018-08-13 23:57   ` Tom Rini
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tom Rini @ 2018-08-13 23:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: u-boot

On Sun, Aug 05, 2018 at 06:53:07PM +0200, Miquel Raynal wrote:

> The recv variable in sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf() is a pointer on a pointer
> of a char array. It means accessing *recv is the char array pointer
> itself while **recv is the first character of that array. There is no
> need for such indirection here, so simplify the code.
> 
> Simplifying things will make the last assignment right: "*recv = NULL"
> is now correct. The issue has been found by the following Coverity
> Scan report:
> 
>     CID 183371:  Incorrect expression  (UNUSED_VALUE)
>     Assigning value "4UL" to "*recv" here, but that stored value is overwritten before it can be used.
>     232             *recv += sizeof(rc);
>     233
>     234             /* Add trailing \0 */
>     235             *recv = NULL;
> 
> While at simplifying things, use '\0' instead of NULL when adding an
> empty char at the end of the buffer.
> 
> Reported-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

-- 
Tom
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 819 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/attachments/20180813/d180b540/attachment.sig>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-08-13 23:57 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-08-05 16:53 [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Miquel Raynal
2018-08-05 16:53 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong assignment with a simplification Miquel Raynal
2018-08-08  9:56   ` Simon Glass
2018-08-13 23:57   ` [U-Boot] [U-Boot, " Tom Rini
2018-08-08  9:56 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/2] tpm: sandbox: fix wrong check on pcr_map Simon Glass
2018-08-13 23:57 ` [U-Boot] [U-Boot,1/2] " Tom Rini

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.