* [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
@ 2013-02-25 16:49 Jan Beulich
2013-02-26 5:35 ` Ren, Yongjie
2013-02-26 6:04 ` Keir Fraser
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2013-02-25 16:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Jinsong Liu, Yongjie Ren
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4274 bytes --]
This fixes the wrong use of literal vector 0xF7 with an "int"
instruction (invalidated by 25113:14609be41f36) and the fact that doing
the injection via a software interrupt was never valid anyway (because
cmci_interrupt() acks the LAPIC, which does the wrong thing if the
interrupt didn't get delivered though it).
In order to do latter, the patch introduces send_IPI_self(), at once
removing two opend coded uses of "genapic" in the IRQ handling code.
Reported-by: Yongjie Ren <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
bool_t is_mc_panic;
unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
+uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, poll_bankmask);
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, no_cmci_banks);
@@ -1198,12 +1199,6 @@ static void x86_mc_mceinject(void *data)
__asm__ __volatile__("int $0x12");
}
-static void x86_cmci_inject(void *data)
-{
- printk("Simulating CMCI on cpu %d\n", smp_processor_id());
- __asm__ __volatile__("int $0xf7");
-}
-
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
#define ID2COOKIE(id) ((mctelem_cookie_t)(id))
@@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
break;
case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
- if ( !cmci_support )
+ if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
ret = x86_mcerr(
"No CMCI supported in platform\n", -EINVAL);
else
- on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_cmci_inject, NULL, 1);
+ {
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpumap) )
+ send_IPI_self(cmci_apic_vector);
+ send_IPI_mask(cpumap, cmci_apic_vector);
+ }
break;
default:
ret = x86_mcerr("Wrong mca type\n", -EINVAL);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum mcheck_type {
mcheck_intel
};
+extern uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
+
/* Init functions */
enum mcheck_type amd_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
enum mcheck_type intel_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool_t bsp);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
@@ -644,7 +644,6 @@ static void intel_init_cmci(struct cpuin
{
u32 l, apic;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
- static uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
if (!mce_available(c) || !cmci_support) {
if (opt_cpu_info)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ void irq_move_cleanup_interrupt(struct c
* to myself.
*/
if (irr & (1 << (vector % 32))) {
- genapic->send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
+ send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
TRACE_3D(TRC_HW_IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_DELAY,
irq, vector, smp_processor_id());
goto unlock;
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static void send_cleanup_vector(struct i
cpumask_and(&cleanup_mask, desc->arch.old_cpu_mask, &cpu_online_map);
desc->arch.move_cleanup_count = cpumask_weight(&cleanup_mask);
- genapic->send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
+ send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
desc->arch.move_in_progress = 0;
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask
genapic->send_IPI_mask(mask, vector);
}
+void send_IPI_self(int vector)
+{
+ genapic->send_IPI_self(vector);
+}
+
/*
* Some notes on x86 processor bugs affecting SMP operation:
*
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_core_
void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void);
-void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
+void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *, int vector);
+void send_IPI_self(int vector);
extern void (*mtrr_hook) (void);
[-- Attachment #2: x86-CMCI-inject.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 4297 bytes --]
x86: fix CMCI injection
This fixes the wrong use of literal vector 0xF7 with an "int"
instruction (invalidated by 25113:14609be41f36) and the fact that doing
the injection via a software interrupt was never valid anyway (because
cmci_interrupt() acks the LAPIC, which does the wrong thing if the
interrupt didn't get delivered though it).
In order to do latter, the patch introduces send_IPI_self(), at once
removing two opend coded uses of "genapic" in the IRQ handling code.
Reported-by: Yongjie Ren <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
bool_t is_mc_panic;
unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
+uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, poll_bankmask);
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, no_cmci_banks);
@@ -1198,12 +1199,6 @@ static void x86_mc_mceinject(void *data)
__asm__ __volatile__("int $0x12");
}
-static void x86_cmci_inject(void *data)
-{
- printk("Simulating CMCI on cpu %d\n", smp_processor_id());
- __asm__ __volatile__("int $0xf7");
-}
-
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
#define ID2COOKIE(id) ((mctelem_cookie_t)(id))
@@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
break;
case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
- if ( !cmci_support )
+ if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
ret = x86_mcerr(
"No CMCI supported in platform\n", -EINVAL);
else
- on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_cmci_inject, NULL, 1);
+ {
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpumap) )
+ send_IPI_self(cmci_apic_vector);
+ send_IPI_mask(cpumap, cmci_apic_vector);
+ }
break;
default:
ret = x86_mcerr("Wrong mca type\n", -EINVAL);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum mcheck_type {
mcheck_intel
};
+extern uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
+
/* Init functions */
enum mcheck_type amd_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
enum mcheck_type intel_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool_t bsp);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
@@ -644,7 +644,6 @@ static void intel_init_cmci(struct cpuin
{
u32 l, apic;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
- static uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
if (!mce_available(c) || !cmci_support) {
if (opt_cpu_info)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ void irq_move_cleanup_interrupt(struct c
* to myself.
*/
if (irr & (1 << (vector % 32))) {
- genapic->send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
+ send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
TRACE_3D(TRC_HW_IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_DELAY,
irq, vector, smp_processor_id());
goto unlock;
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static void send_cleanup_vector(struct i
cpumask_and(&cleanup_mask, desc->arch.old_cpu_mask, &cpu_online_map);
desc->arch.move_cleanup_count = cpumask_weight(&cleanup_mask);
- genapic->send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
+ send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
desc->arch.move_in_progress = 0;
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask
genapic->send_IPI_mask(mask, vector);
}
+void send_IPI_self(int vector)
+{
+ genapic->send_IPI_self(vector);
+}
+
/*
* Some notes on x86 processor bugs affecting SMP operation:
*
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_core_
void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void);
-void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
+void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *, int vector);
+void send_IPI_self(int vector);
extern void (*mtrr_hook) (void);
[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 126 bytes --]
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
2013-02-25 16:49 [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection Jan Beulich
@ 2013-02-26 5:35 ` Ren, Yongjie
2013-02-26 6:04 ` Keir Fraser
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ren, Yongjie @ 2013-02-26 5:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, xen-devel; +Cc: Liu, Jinsong
Tested-by: Yongjie Ren <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
Best Regards,
Yongjie (Jay)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@suse.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2013 12:49 AM
> To: xen-devel
> Cc: Liu, Jinsong; Ren, Yongjie
> Subject: [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
>
> This fixes the wrong use of literal vector 0xF7 with an "int"
> instruction (invalidated by 25113:14609be41f36) and the fact that doing
> the injection via a software interrupt was never valid anyway (because
> cmci_interrupt() acks the LAPIC, which does the wrong thing if the
> interrupt didn't get delivered though it).
>
> In order to do latter, the patch introduces send_IPI_self(), at once
> removing two opend coded uses of "genapic" in the IRQ handling code.
>
> Reported-by: Yongjie Ren <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
> bool_t is_mc_panic;
> unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
> unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
> +uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
>
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, poll_bankmask);
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, no_cmci_banks);
> @@ -1198,12 +1199,6 @@ static void x86_mc_mceinject(void *data)
> __asm__ __volatile__("int $0x12");
> }
>
> -static void x86_cmci_inject(void *data)
> -{
> - printk("Simulating CMCI on cpu %d\n", smp_processor_id());
> - __asm__ __volatile__("int $0xf7");
> -}
> -
> #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
>
> #define ID2COOKIE(id) ((mctelem_cookie_t)(id))
> @@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long
> do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
> on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
> break;
> case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
> - if ( !cmci_support )
> + if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
> ret = x86_mcerr(
> "No CMCI supported in platform\n", -EINVAL);
> else
> - on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_cmci_inject, NULL, 1);
> + {
> + if ( cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpumap) )
> + send_IPI_self(cmci_apic_vector);
> + send_IPI_mask(cpumap, cmci_apic_vector);
> + }
> break;
> default:
> ret = x86_mcerr("Wrong mca type\n", -EINVAL);
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum mcheck_type {
> mcheck_intel
> };
>
> +extern uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
> +
> /* Init functions */
> enum mcheck_type amd_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
> enum mcheck_type intel_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool_t bsp);
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
> @@ -644,7 +644,6 @@ static void intel_init_cmci(struct cpuin
> {
> u32 l, apic;
> int cpu = smp_processor_id();
> - static uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
>
> if (!mce_available(c) || !cmci_support) {
> if (opt_cpu_info)
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ void irq_move_cleanup_interrupt(struct c
> * to myself.
> */
> if (irr & (1 << (vector % 32))) {
> - genapic->send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
> + send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
> TRACE_3D(TRC_HW_IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_DELAY,
> irq, vector, smp_processor_id());
> goto unlock;
> @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static void send_cleanup_vector(struct i
>
> cpumask_and(&cleanup_mask, desc->arch.old_cpu_mask,
> &cpu_online_map);
> desc->arch.move_cleanup_count =
> cpumask_weight(&cleanup_mask);
> - genapic->send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask,
> IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
> + send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
>
> desc->arch.move_in_progress = 0;
> }
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
> @@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask
> genapic->send_IPI_mask(mask, vector);
> }
>
> +void send_IPI_self(int vector)
> +{
> + genapic->send_IPI_self(vector);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Some notes on x86 processor bugs affecting SMP operation:
> *
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
> @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_core_
>
> void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void);
>
> -void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
> +void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *, int vector);
> +void send_IPI_self(int vector);
>
> extern void (*mtrr_hook) (void);
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
2013-02-25 16:49 [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection Jan Beulich
2013-02-26 5:35 ` Ren, Yongjie
@ 2013-02-26 6:04 ` Keir Fraser
2013-03-25 13:41 ` Egger Christoph
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Keir Fraser @ 2013-02-26 6:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, xen-devel; +Cc: Jinsong Liu, Yongjie Ren
On 25/02/2013 16:49, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com> wrote:
> This fixes the wrong use of literal vector 0xF7 with an "int"
> instruction (invalidated by 25113:14609be41f36) and the fact that doing
> the injection via a software interrupt was never valid anyway (because
> cmci_interrupt() acks the LAPIC, which does the wrong thing if the
> interrupt didn't get delivered though it).
>
> In order to do latter, the patch introduces send_IPI_self(), at once
> removing two opend coded uses of "genapic" in the IRQ handling code.
>
> Reported-by: Yongjie Ren <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
> bool_t is_mc_panic;
> unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
> unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
> +uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
>
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, poll_bankmask);
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, no_cmci_banks);
> @@ -1198,12 +1199,6 @@ static void x86_mc_mceinject(void *data)
> __asm__ __volatile__("int $0x12");
> }
>
> -static void x86_cmci_inject(void *data)
> -{
> - printk("Simulating CMCI on cpu %d\n", smp_processor_id());
> - __asm__ __volatile__("int $0xf7");
> -}
> -
> #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
>
> #define ID2COOKIE(id) ((mctelem_cookie_t)(id))
> @@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
> on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
> break;
> case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
> - if ( !cmci_support )
> + if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
> ret = x86_mcerr(
> "No CMCI supported in platform\n", -EINVAL);
> else
> - on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_cmci_inject, NULL, 1);
> + {
> + if ( cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpumap) )
> + send_IPI_self(cmci_apic_vector);
> + send_IPI_mask(cpumap, cmci_apic_vector);
> + }
> break;
> default:
> ret = x86_mcerr("Wrong mca type\n", -EINVAL);
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum mcheck_type {
> mcheck_intel
> };
>
> +extern uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
> +
> /* Init functions */
> enum mcheck_type amd_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
> enum mcheck_type intel_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool_t bsp);
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
> @@ -644,7 +644,6 @@ static void intel_init_cmci(struct cpuin
> {
> u32 l, apic;
> int cpu = smp_processor_id();
> - static uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
>
> if (!mce_available(c) || !cmci_support) {
> if (opt_cpu_info)
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ void irq_move_cleanup_interrupt(struct c
> * to myself.
> */
> if (irr & (1 << (vector % 32))) {
> - genapic->send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
> + send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
> TRACE_3D(TRC_HW_IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_DELAY,
> irq, vector, smp_processor_id());
> goto unlock;
> @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static void send_cleanup_vector(struct i
>
> cpumask_and(&cleanup_mask, desc->arch.old_cpu_mask, &cpu_online_map);
> desc->arch.move_cleanup_count = cpumask_weight(&cleanup_mask);
> - genapic->send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
> + send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
>
> desc->arch.move_in_progress = 0;
> }
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
> @@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask
> genapic->send_IPI_mask(mask, vector);
> }
>
> +void send_IPI_self(int vector)
> +{
> + genapic->send_IPI_self(vector);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Some notes on x86 processor bugs affecting SMP operation:
> *
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
> @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_core_
>
> void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void);
>
> -void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
> +void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *, int vector);
> +void send_IPI_self(int vector);
>
> extern void (*mtrr_hook) (void);
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
2013-02-26 6:04 ` Keir Fraser
@ 2013-03-25 13:41 ` Egger Christoph
2013-03-25 14:30 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Egger Christoph @ 2013-03-25 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Keir Fraser; +Cc: Jinsong Liu, Yongjie Ren, Jan Beulich, xen-devel
On 26.02.13 07:04, Keir Fraser wrote:
> On 25/02/2013 16:49, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com> wrote:
>
>> This fixes the wrong use of literal vector 0xF7 with an "int"
>> instruction (invalidated by 25113:14609be41f36) and the fact that doing
>> the injection via a software interrupt was never valid anyway (because
>> cmci_interrupt() acks the LAPIC, which does the wrong thing if the
>> interrupt didn't get delivered though it).
>>
>> In order to do latter, the patch introduces send_IPI_self(), at once
>> removing two opend coded uses of "genapic" in the IRQ handling code.
>>
>> Reported-by: Yongjie Ren <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>
> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
One nit inline.
>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
>> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
>> bool_t is_mc_panic;
>> unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
>> unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
>> +uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
>>
>> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, poll_bankmask);
>> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mca_banks *, no_cmci_banks);
>> @@ -1198,12 +1199,6 @@ static void x86_mc_mceinject(void *data)
>> __asm__ __volatile__("int $0x12");
>> }
>>
>> -static void x86_cmci_inject(void *data)
>> -{
>> - printk("Simulating CMCI on cpu %d\n", smp_processor_id());
>> - __asm__ __volatile__("int $0xf7");
>> -}
>> -
>> #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
>>
>> #define ID2COOKIE(id) ((mctelem_cookie_t)(id))
>> @@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
>> on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
>> break;
>> case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
>> - if ( !cmci_support )
>> + if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
cmci_apic_vector is uninitialized here when the platform does not
support CMCI.
Christoph
>> ret = x86_mcerr(
>> "No CMCI supported in platform\n", -EINVAL);
>> else
>> - on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_cmci_inject, NULL, 1);
>> + {
>> + if ( cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpumap) )
>> + send_IPI_self(cmci_apic_vector);
>> + send_IPI_mask(cpumap, cmci_apic_vector);
>> + }
>> break;
>> default:
>> ret = x86_mcerr("Wrong mca type\n", -EINVAL);
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
>> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum mcheck_type {
>> mcheck_intel
>> };
>>
>> +extern uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
>> +
>> /* Init functions */
>> enum mcheck_type amd_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
>> enum mcheck_type intel_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool_t bsp);
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
>> @@ -644,7 +644,6 @@ static void intel_init_cmci(struct cpuin
>> {
>> u32 l, apic;
>> int cpu = smp_processor_id();
>> - static uint8_t cmci_apic_vector;
>>
>> if (!mce_available(c) || !cmci_support) {
>> if (opt_cpu_info)
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
>> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ void irq_move_cleanup_interrupt(struct c
>> * to myself.
>> */
>> if (irr & (1 << (vector % 32))) {
>> - genapic->send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
>> + send_IPI_self(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
>> TRACE_3D(TRC_HW_IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_DELAY,
>> irq, vector, smp_processor_id());
>> goto unlock;
>> @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static void send_cleanup_vector(struct i
>>
>> cpumask_and(&cleanup_mask, desc->arch.old_cpu_mask, &cpu_online_map);
>> desc->arch.move_cleanup_count = cpumask_weight(&cleanup_mask);
>> - genapic->send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
>> + send_IPI_mask(&cleanup_mask, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
>>
>> desc->arch.move_in_progress = 0;
>> }
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
>> @@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask
>> genapic->send_IPI_mask(mask, vector);
>> }
>>
>> +void send_IPI_self(int vector)
>> +{
>> + genapic->send_IPI_self(vector);
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Some notes on x86 processor bugs affecting SMP operation:
>> *
>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
>> @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_core_
>>
>> void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void);
>>
>> -void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
>> +void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *, int vector);
>> +void send_IPI_self(int vector);
>>
>> extern void (*mtrr_hook) (void);
>>
>>
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
2013-03-25 13:41 ` Egger Christoph
@ 2013-03-25 14:30 ` Jan Beulich
2013-03-25 15:03 ` Egger Christoph
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2013-03-25 14:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Egger Christoph; +Cc: Jinsong Liu, Yongjie Ren, Keir Fraser, xen-devel
>>> On 25.03.13 at 14:41, Egger Christoph <chegger@amazon.de> wrote:
> On 26.02.13 07:04, Keir Fraser wrote:
>> On 25/02/2013 16:49, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com> wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
>>> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
>>> bool_t is_mc_panic;
>>> unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
>>> unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
>>> +uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
> ...
>>> @@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
>>> on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
>>> break;
>>> case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
>>> - if ( !cmci_support )
>>> + if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
>
> cmci_apic_vector is uninitialized here when the platform does not
> support CMCI.
How that? It's zero in that case (just like any other global variable
without explicit initializer), which is exactly what the conditional
tests for.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection
2013-03-25 14:30 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2013-03-25 15:03 ` Egger Christoph
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Egger Christoph @ 2013-03-25 15:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich; +Cc: Jinsong Liu, Yongjie Ren, Keir Fraser, xen-devel
On 25.03.13 15:30, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 25.03.13 at 14:41, Egger Christoph <chegger@amazon.de> wrote:
>> On 26.02.13 07:04, Keir Fraser wrote:
>>> On 25/02/2013 16:49, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com> wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
>>>> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ bool_t __read_mostly mce_broadcast = 0;
>>>> bool_t is_mc_panic;
>>>> unsigned int __read_mostly nr_mce_banks;
>>>> unsigned int __read_mostly firstbank;
>>>> +uint8_t __read_mostly cmci_apic_vector;
>> ...
>>>> @@ -1479,11 +1474,15 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_m
>>>> on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
>>>> break;
>>>> case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
>>>> - if ( !cmci_support )
>>>> + if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
>>
>> cmci_apic_vector is uninitialized here when the platform does not
>> support CMCI.
>
> How that? It's zero in that case (just like any other global variable
> without explicit initializer), which is exactly what the conditional
> tests for.
umm... right. Sorry for the noise.
Christoph
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2013-03-25 15:03 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2013-02-25 16:49 [PATCH] x86: fix CMCI injection Jan Beulich
2013-02-26 5:35 ` Ren, Yongjie
2013-02-26 6:04 ` Keir Fraser
2013-03-25 13:41 ` Egger Christoph
2013-03-25 14:30 ` Jan Beulich
2013-03-25 15:03 ` Egger Christoph
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.