* [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
@ 2022-10-25 14:12 Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-25 16:07 ` kernel test robot
2022-10-26 1:51 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Bouchinet @ 2022-10-25 14:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: philippe.trebuchet, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, paul, jmorris, serge,
casey, davem, lucien.xin, vgoyal, omosnace, mortonm,
nicolas.bouchinet, mic, cgzones, linux-security-module, kpsingh,
revest, jackmanb, bpf, roberto.sassu
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the
`evm_protected_xattr_common` function of the EVM LSM. The bug is
triggered if a `inode_init_security` hook returns 0 without initializing
the given `struct xattr` fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no
other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory
leaks.
The `call_int_hook_xattr` macro has been inlined into the
`security_inode_init_security` hook in order to check hooks return
values and skip ones who doesn't init `xattrs`.
Modify `evm_init_hmac` function to init the EVM hmac using every
entry of the given xattr array.
The `MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR` value is now based on the security modules
compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and
IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the `inode_init_security` hook
definition to `-EOPNOTSUPP`.
Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using
it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only
one that should be kfreed by the caller).
Cc: roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
---
Changes since v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1K3bf+dtNnVe7DG@archlinux/
* The `evm_init_hmacs` has been merged with `evm_init_hmac`
(as suggested by Mimi Zohar).
* The commit message has been updated to match the patch changes.
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 11 ++++++++--
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 7 ++++---
security/security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 806448173033..e5dd0c0f6345 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
unsigned int obj_type)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 84a0d7e02176..95aff9383de1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -229,8 +229,8 @@
* This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
* transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
* the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function
- * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
- * being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
+ * is expected to allocate the value via kmalloc, with the caller
+ * being responsible for calling kfree after using it.
* If the security module does not use security attributes or does
* not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
* then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 708de9656bbd..c82f271cfd19 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -385,7 +385,9 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
return rc;
}
-int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name);
+
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattrs,
char *hmac_val)
{
struct shash_desc *desc;
@@ -396,7 +398,12 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
return PTR_ERR(desc);
}
- crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
+ for (int i = 0; lsm_xattrs[i].value != NULL; i++) {
+ if (evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattrs[i].name))
+ crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ lsm_xattrs[i].value,
+ lsm_xattrs[i].value_len);
+ }
hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
kfree(desc);
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 2e6fb6e2ffd2..0420453a80e8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -284,6 +284,8 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
int found = 0;
struct xattr_list *xattr;
+ if (!req_xattr_name)
+ return found;
namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled)
@@ -305,7 +307,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
return found;
}
-static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
{
return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
}
@@ -841,8 +843,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
int rc;
- if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
- !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+ if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
return 0;
xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14d30fec8a00..79524f8734f1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -30,7 +30,11 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
-#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
+#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR \
+ ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
@@ -1091,9 +1095,11 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
{
+ int i = 0;
+ int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
- int ret;
+ struct security_hook_list *hook_ptr;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
@@ -1103,15 +1109,26 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
- &lsm_xattr->name,
- &lsm_xattr->value,
- &lsm_xattr->value_len);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hook_ptr, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
+ list) {
+ ret = hook_ptr->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+ &lsm_xattr->name,
+ &lsm_xattr->value,
+ &lsm_xattr->value_len);
+ if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ continue;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR))
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (ret != 0)
+ break;
+ lsm_xattr++;
+ i++;
+ }
if (ret)
goto out;
evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
- ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+ ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
--
2.38.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
2022-10-25 14:12 [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors Nicolas Bouchinet
@ 2022-10-25 16:07 ` kernel test robot
2022-10-26 1:51 ` kernel test robot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-10-25 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, linux-integrity
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, philippe.trebuchet, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, paul,
jmorris, serge, casey, davem, lucien.xin, vgoyal, omosnace,
mortonm, nicolas.bouchinet, mic, cgzones, linux-security-module,
kpsingh, revest, jackmanb, bpf, roberto.sassu
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2277 bytes --]
Hi Nicolas,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.1-rc2 next-20221025]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT%40archlinux
patch subject: [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
config: m68k-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: m68k-linux-gcc (GCC) 12.1.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
git checkout acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-12.1.0 make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=m68k SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:310:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'evm_protected_xattr' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
310 | int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +/evm_protected_xattr +310 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
309
> 310 int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
311 {
312 return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
313 }
314
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 66114 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
2022-10-25 14:12 [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-25 16:07 ` kernel test robot
@ 2022-10-26 1:51 ` kernel test robot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-10-26 1:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicolas Bouchinet, linux-integrity
Cc: llvm, oe-kbuild-all, philippe.trebuchet, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin,
paul, jmorris, serge, casey, davem, lucien.xin, vgoyal, omosnace,
mortonm, nicolas.bouchinet, mic, cgzones, linux-security-module,
kpsingh, revest, jackmanb, bpf, roberto.sassu
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2580 bytes --]
Hi Nicolas,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on zohar-integrity/next-integrity]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.1-rc2 next-20221025]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT%40archlinux
patch subject: [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
config: hexagon-randconfig-r002-20221023 (attached as .config)
compiler: clang version 16.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 791a7ae1ba3efd6bca96338e10ffde557ba83920)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Nicolas-Bouchinet/evm-Correct-inode_init_security-hooks-behaviors/20221025-221337
git checkout acbbdcb851ed7cd1894efad182f0325db04b9e5a
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=hexagon SHELL=/bin/bash security/integrity/evm/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:310:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'evm_protected_xattr' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
^
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:310:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
^
static
1 warning generated.
vim +/evm_protected_xattr +310 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
309
> 310 int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
311 {
312 return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
313 }
314
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 32258 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2022-10-25 14:12 [PATCH v3] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-25 16:07 ` kernel test robot
2022-10-26 1:51 ` kernel test robot
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