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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>,
	Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>,
	"Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>,
	Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>,
	Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>,
	Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org>,
	linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	cluster-devel@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v2] ext4: don't BUG if kernel subsystems dirty pages without asking ext4 first
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 12:51:28 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhlBUCi9O30szf6l@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Yhks88tO3Em/G370@mit.edu>

On Fri, Feb 25, 2022 at 02:24:35PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> [un]pin_user_pages_remote is dirtying pages without properly warning
> the file system in advance (or faulting in the file data if the page
> is not yet in the page cache).  This was noted by Jan Kara in 2018[1]
> and more recently has resulted in bug reports by Syzbot in various
> Android kernels[2].
> 
> This is technically a bug in the mm/gup.c codepath, but arguably ext4
> is fragile in that a buggy get_user_pages() implementation causes ext4
> to crash, where as other file systems are not crashing (although in
> some cases the user data will be lost since gup code is not properly
> informing the file system to potentially allocate blocks or reserve
> space when writing into a sparse portion of file).  I suspect in real
> life it is rare that people are using RDMA into file-backed memory,
> which is why no one has complained to ext4 developers except fuzzing
> programs.
> 
> So instead of crashing with a BUG, issue a warning (since there may be
> potential data loss) and just mark the page as clean to avoid
> unprivileged denial of service attacks until the problem can be
> properly fixed.  More discussion and background can be found in the
> thread starting at [2].
> 
> [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg142700.html

Can you use a lore link
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20180103100430.GE4911@quack2.suse.cz/T/#u)?

> +			/*
> +			 * Should never happen but for buggy code in
> +			 * other subsystemsa that call

subsystemsa => subsystems

> +			 * set_page_dirty() without properly warning
> +			 * the file system first.  See [1] for more
> +			 * information.
> +			 *
> +			 * [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg142700.html

Likewise, lore link here.

- Eric

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: cluster-devel.redhat.com
Subject: [Cluster-devel] [PATCH -v2] ext4: don't BUG if kernel subsystems dirty pages without asking ext4 first
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 12:51:28 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhlBUCi9O30szf6l@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Yhks88tO3Em/G370@mit.edu>

On Fri, Feb 25, 2022 at 02:24:35PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> [un]pin_user_pages_remote is dirtying pages without properly warning
> the file system in advance (or faulting in the file data if the page
> is not yet in the page cache).  This was noted by Jan Kara in 2018[1]
> and more recently has resulted in bug reports by Syzbot in various
> Android kernels[2].
> 
> This is technically a bug in the mm/gup.c codepath, but arguably ext4
> is fragile in that a buggy get_user_pages() implementation causes ext4
> to crash, where as other file systems are not crashing (although in
> some cases the user data will be lost since gup code is not properly
> informing the file system to potentially allocate blocks or reserve
> space when writing into a sparse portion of file).  I suspect in real
> life it is rare that people are using RDMA into file-backed memory,
> which is why no one has complained to ext4 developers except fuzzing
> programs.
> 
> So instead of crashing with a BUG, issue a warning (since there may be
> potential data loss) and just mark the page as clean to avoid
> unprivileged denial of service attacks until the problem can be
> properly fixed.  More discussion and background can be found in the
> thread starting at [2].
> 
> [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg142700.html

Can you use a lore link
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20180103100430.GE4911 at quack2.suse.cz/T/#u)?

> +			/*
> +			 * Should never happen but for buggy code in
> +			 * other subsystemsa that call

subsystemsa => subsystems

> +			 * set_page_dirty() without properly warning
> +			 * the file system first.  See [1] for more
> +			 * information.
> +			 *
> +			 * [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg142700.html

Likewise, lore link here.

- Eric



  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-25 20:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-16 16:31 [REPORT] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2620 - page_buffers() Lee Jones
2022-02-16 16:31 ` [Cluster-devel] " Lee Jones
2022-02-18  1:06 ` John Hubbard
2022-02-18  1:06   ` [Cluster-devel] " John Hubbard
2022-02-18  4:08   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-18  4:08     ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-18  6:33     ` John Hubbard
2022-02-18  6:33       ` [Cluster-devel] " John Hubbard
2022-02-23 23:31       ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-23 23:31         ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-24  0:44         ` John Hubbard
2022-02-24  0:44           ` [Cluster-devel] " John Hubbard
2022-02-24  4:04           ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-24  4:04             ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-18  7:51     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-02-18  7:51       ` [Cluster-devel] " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-02-23 23:35       ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-23 23:35         ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-24  1:48         ` Dave Chinner
2022-02-24  1:48           ` [Cluster-devel] " Dave Chinner
2022-02-24  3:50           ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-24  3:50             ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-24 10:29             ` Dave Chinner
2022-02-24 10:29               ` [Cluster-devel] " Dave Chinner
2022-02-18  2:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-18  2:54   ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-18  4:24   ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-02-18  4:24     ` [Cluster-devel] " Matthew Wilcox
2022-02-18  6:03     ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-18  6:03       ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 19:24 ` [PATCH -v2] ext4: don't BUG if kernel subsystems dirty pages without asking ext4 first Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 19:24   ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 20:51   ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2022-02-25 20:51     ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-25 21:08     ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 21:08       ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 21:23       ` [PATCH -v3] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 21:23         ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 21:33         ` John Hubbard
2022-02-25 21:33           ` [Cluster-devel] " John Hubbard
2022-02-25 23:21           ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-25 23:21             ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-26  0:18             ` Hillf Danton
2022-02-26  0:41             ` John Hubbard
2022-02-26  0:41               ` [Cluster-devel] " John Hubbard
2022-02-26  1:40               ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-26  1:40                 ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-26  2:00                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-26  2:00                   ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-02-26  2:55                 ` John Hubbard
2022-02-26  2:55                   ` [Cluster-devel] " John Hubbard
2022-03-03  4:26         ` [PATCH -v4] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-03-03  4:26           ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o
2022-03-03  8:21           ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-03  8:21             ` [Cluster-devel] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-03  9:21           ` Lee Jones
2022-03-03  9:21             ` [Cluster-devel] " Lee Jones
2022-03-03 14:38           ` [PATCH -v5] ext4: don't BUG if someone " Theodore Ts'o
2022-03-03 14:38             ` [Cluster-devel] " Theodore Ts'o

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