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* [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support
@ 2022-07-01 15:27 Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] arm64: unwind: add asynchronous unwind tables to kernel and modules Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2022-07-01 15:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel; +Cc: catalin.marinas, will, mark.rutland, maz, Ard Biesheuvel

Generic kernel images such as Android's GKI usually enable all available
security features, which are typically implemented in such a way that
they only take effect if the underlying hardware can support it, but
don't interfere with correct and efficient operation otherwise.

For shadow call stack support, which is always supported by the
hardware, it means it will be enabled even if pointer authentication is
also supported, and enabled for signing return addresses stored on the
stack. The additional security provided by shadow call stack is only
marginal in this case, whereas the performance overhead is not.

Given that return address signing is based on PACIASP/AUTIASP
instructions that implicitly operate on the return address register
(X30) and are not idempotent (i.e., each needs to be emitted exactly
once before the return address is stored on the ordinary stack and after
it has been retrieved from it), we can convert these instruction 1:1
into shadow call stack pushes and pops involving the register X30.
As this is something that can be done at runtime rather than build time,
we can do this conditionally based on whether or not return address
signing is supported on the underlying hardware.

In order to be able to unwind call stacks that involve return address
signing, whether or not the return address is currently signed is
tracked by DWARF CFI directives in the unwinding metadata. This means we
can use this information to locate all PACIASP/AUTIASP instructions in
the binary, instead of having to use brute force and go over all
instructions in the entire program.

This series implements this approach for Clang, which has recently been
fixed to emit all these CFI directives correctly. This series is based
on an older PoC sent out last year [0] that targeted GCC only (due to
this issue). This v3 targets Clang only, as GCC has its own issues with
CFI accuracy.

Changes since v3 [1]:
- rebase onto arm64/for-next/core
- fix init value of dynamic_scs_enabled static key
- don't discard .eh_frame sections (to work around a bug in an older
  Clang version if we are keeping them for dynamic SCS patching,
- print a diagnostic if dynamic SCS patching is enabled,
- apply build fix suggested by Sami and add his ack to patch #2

Changes since v2 [2]:
- don't enable unwind table generation for nVHE code - it cannot be
  patched anyway so it has no use for it;
- drop checks for ID reg overrides
- fix some remaining TODOs regarding augmentation data and the code
  alignment factor
- disable PAC for leaf functions when dynamic SCS is configured, so that
  we don't end up with SCS pushes and pops in all leaf functions too;
- add I-cache maintenance after code patching
- add Rb's from Nick and Kees.

Changes since RFC v1:
- implement boot time check for PAC/BTI support, and only enable dynamic
  SCS if neither are supported;
- implement module patching as well;
- switch to Clang, and drop workaround for GCC bug;

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20211013152243.2216899-1-ardb@kernel.org/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20220613134008.3760481-1-ardb@kernel.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20220505161011.1801596-1-ardb@kernel.org/

Ard Biesheuvel (3):
  arm64: unwind: add asynchronous unwind tables to kernel and modules
  scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks
  arm64: implement dynamic shadow call stack for Clang

 Makefile                              |   2 +
 arch/Kconfig                          |   7 +
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                    |  12 +
 arch/arm64/Makefile                   |  15 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h   |   8 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h          |  47 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile            |   2 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S              |   3 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c               |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/module.c            |   8 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/patch-scs.c         | 257 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile         |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c              |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c             |   4 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S       |  13 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile      |   1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile |   1 +
 include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h     |   9 +-
 include/linux/scs.h                   |  18 ++
 kernel/scs.c                          |  14 +-
 scripts/module.lds.S                  |   8 +-
 21 files changed, 425 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/patch-scs.c

-- 
2.35.1


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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 1/3] arm64: unwind: add asynchronous unwind tables to kernel and modules
  2022-07-01 15:27 [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2022-07-01 15:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2022-07-01 15:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel
  Cc: catalin.marinas, will, mark.rutland, maz, Ard Biesheuvel,
	Nick Desaulniers

Enable asynchronous unwind table generation for both the core kernel as
well as modules, and emit the resulting .eh_frame sections as init code
so we can use the unwind directives for code patching at boot or module
load time.

This will be used by dynamic shadow call stack support, which will rely
on code patching rather than compiler codegen to emit the shadow call
stack push and pop instructions.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                    |  3 +++
 arch/arm64/Makefile                   |  5 +++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h   |  8 ++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile         |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S       | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile      |  1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile |  1 +
 include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h     |  9 +++++++--
 scripts/module.lds.S                  |  8 +++++++-
 9 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 794cd34153b2..a9314b684f3c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -369,6 +369,9 @@ config KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET
 	default 0xeffffff800000000 if ARM64_VA_BITS_36 && KASAN_SW_TAGS
 	default 0xffffffffffffffff
 
+config UNWIND_TABLES
+	bool
+
 source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms"
 
 menu "Kernel Features"
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 6d9d4a58b898..4fbca56fa602 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -45,8 +45,13 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-mabi=lp64)
 
 # Avoid generating .eh_frame* sections.
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES),y)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables
+else
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
+KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
+endif
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK),y)
 prepare: stack_protector_prepare
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h
index 094701ec5500..dbba4b7559aa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h
@@ -17,4 +17,12 @@ SECTIONS {
 	 */
 	.text.hot : { *(.text.hot) }
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES
+	/*
+	 * Currently, we only use unwind info at module load time, so we can
+	 * put it into the .init allocation.
+	 */
+	.init.eh_frame : { *(.eh_frame) }
+#endif
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
index 839291430cb3..4c0ea3cd4ea4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS	:= $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \
 		   -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \
 		   -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h \
 		   -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -ffreestanding -D__NO_FORTIFY \
+		   -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables \
 		   $(call cc-option,-fno-addrsig)
 
 # remove SCS flags from all objects in this directory
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 45131e354e27..4c13dafc98b8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -121,6 +121,17 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64;
 #define TRAMP_TEXT
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES
+#define UNWIND_DATA_SECTIONS				\
+	.eh_frame : {					\
+		__eh_frame_start = .;			\
+		*(.eh_frame)				\
+		__eh_frame_end = .;			\
+	}
+#else
+#define UNWIND_DATA_SECTIONS
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The size of the PE/COFF section that covers the kernel image, which
  * runs from _stext to _edata, must be a round multiple of the PE/COFF
@@ -231,6 +242,8 @@ SECTIONS
 		__alt_instructions_end = .;
 	}
 
+	UNWIND_DATA_SECTIONS
+
 	. = ALIGN(SEGMENT_ALIGN);
 	__inittext_end = .;
 	__initdata_begin = .;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
index f9fe4dc21b1f..23de41479495 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ quiet_cmd_hypcopy = HYPCOPY $@
 # Remove ftrace, Shadow Call Stack, and CFI CFLAGS.
 # This is equivalent to the 'notrace', '__noscs', and '__nocfi' annotations.
 KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) $(CC_FLAGS_CFI), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-unwind-tables
 
 # KVM nVHE code is run at a different exception code with a different map, so
 # compiler instrumentation that inserts callbacks or checks into the code may
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d0537573501e..78c46638707a 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86)		+= -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ \
 # disable the stackleak plugin
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64)		:= $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
 				   -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+				   -fno-unwind-tables -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables \
 				   $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none)
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM)		:= $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
 				   -fno-builtin -fpic \
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
index 7515a465ec03..6d870275372b 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -1008,15 +1008,20 @@
  * keep any .init_array.* sections.
  * https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=46478
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES
+#define DISCARD_EH_FRAME
+#else
+#define DISCARD_EH_FRAME	*(.eh_frame)
+#endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KCSAN) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG)
 # ifdef CONFIG_CONSTRUCTORS
 #  define SANITIZER_DISCARDS						\
-	*(.eh_frame)
+	DISCARD_EH_FRAME
 # else
 #  define SANITIZER_DISCARDS						\
 	*(.init_array) *(.init_array.*)					\
-	*(.eh_frame)
+	DISCARD_EH_FRAME
 # endif
 #else
 # define SANITIZER_DISCARDS
diff --git a/scripts/module.lds.S b/scripts/module.lds.S
index 1d0e1e4dc3d2..7fd5d5e5fad4 100644
--- a/scripts/module.lds.S
+++ b/scripts/module.lds.S
@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@
  * Archs are free to supply their own linker scripts.  ld will
  * combine them automatically.
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES
+#define DISCARD_EH_FRAME
+#else
+#define DISCARD_EH_FRAME	*(.eh_frame)
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CFI_CLANG
 # include <asm/page.h>
 # define ALIGN_CFI 		ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE)
-# define SANITIZER_DISCARDS	*(.eh_frame)
+# define SANITIZER_DISCARDS	DISCARD_EH_FRAME
 #else
 # define ALIGN_CFI
 # define SANITIZER_DISCARDS
-- 
2.35.1


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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 2/3] scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks
  2022-07-01 15:27 [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] arm64: unwind: add asynchronous unwind tables to kernel and modules Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2022-07-01 15:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64: implement dynamic shadow call stack for Clang Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-07 19:35 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Sami Tolvanen
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2022-07-01 15:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel
  Cc: catalin.marinas, will, mark.rutland, maz, Ard Biesheuvel,
	Nick Desaulniers, Kees Cook, Sami Tolvanen

In order to allow arches to use code patching to conditionally emit the
shadow stack pushes and pops, rather than always taking the performance
hit even on CPUs that implement alternatives such as stack pointer
authentication on arm64, add a Kconfig symbol that can be set by the
arch to omit the SCS codegen itself, without otherwise affecting how
support code for SCS and compiler options (for register reservation, for
instance) are emitted.

Also, add a static key and some plumbing to omit the allocation of
shadow call stack for dynamic SCS configurations if SCS is disabled at
runtime.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
---
 Makefile            |  2 ++
 arch/Kconfig        |  7 +++++++
 include/linux/scs.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/scs.c        | 14 ++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 513c1fbf7888..98f5c4da93b7 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -887,8 +887,10 @@ LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --gc-sections
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+ifndef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS
 CC_FLAGS_SCS	:= -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(CC_FLAGS_SCS)
+endif
 export CC_FLAGS_SCS
 endif
 
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 52eaa16d9b79..3d9042893359 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -639,6 +639,13 @@ config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
 	  reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them
 	  and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks.
 
+config DYNAMIC_SCS
+	bool
+	help
+	  Set by the arch code if it relies on code patching to insert the
+	  shadow call stack push and pop instructions rather than on the
+	  compiler.
+
 config LTO
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h
index 18122d9e17ff..4ab5bdc898cf 100644
--- a/include/linux/scs.h
+++ b/include/linux/scs.h
@@ -53,6 +53,22 @@ static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	return sz >= SCS_SIZE - 1 || READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*magic) != SCS_END_MAGIC;
 }
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(dynamic_scs_enabled);
+
+static inline bool scs_is_dynamic(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS))
+		return false;
+	return static_branch_likely(&dynamic_scs_enabled);
+}
+
+static inline bool scs_is_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS))
+		return true;
+	return scs_is_dynamic();
+}
+
 #else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
 static inline void *scs_alloc(int node) { return NULL; }
@@ -62,6 +78,8 @@ static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
 static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; }
 static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
 static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
+static inline bool scs_is_enabled(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool scs_is_dynamic(void) { return false; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c
index b7e1b096d906..d7809affe740 100644
--- a/kernel/scs.c
+++ b/kernel/scs.c
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/vmstat.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_SCS
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(dynamic_scs_enabled);
+#endif
+
 static void __scs_account(void *s, int account)
 {
 	struct page *scs_page = vmalloc_to_page(s);
@@ -101,14 +105,20 @@ static int scs_cleanup(unsigned int cpu)
 
 void __init scs_init(void)
 {
+	if (!scs_is_enabled())
+		return;
 	cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "scs:scs_cache", NULL,
 			  scs_cleanup);
 }
 
 int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
 {
-	void *s = scs_alloc(node);
+	void *s;
 
+	if (!scs_is_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	s = scs_alloc(node);
 	if (!s)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -148,7 +158,7 @@ void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	void *s = task_scs(tsk);
 
-	if (!s)
+	if (!scs_is_enabled() || !s)
 		return;
 
 	WARN(task_scs_end_corrupted(tsk),
-- 
2.35.1


_______________________________________________
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64: implement dynamic shadow call stack for Clang
  2022-07-01 15:27 [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] arm64: unwind: add asynchronous unwind tables to kernel and modules Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2022-07-01 15:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2022-07-07 19:35 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Sami Tolvanen
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2022-07-01 15:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel; +Cc: catalin.marinas, will, mark.rutland, maz, Ard Biesheuvel

Implement dynamic shadow call stack support on Clang, by parsing the
unwind tables at init time to locate all occurrences of PACIASP/AUTIASP
instructions, and replacing them with the shadow call stack push and pop
instructions, respectively.

This is useful because the overhead of the shadow call stack is
difficult to justify on hardware that implements pointer authentication
(PAC), and given that the PAC instructions are executed as NOPs on
hardware that doesn't, we can just replace them without breaking
anything. As PACIASP/AUTIASP are guaranteed to be paired with respect to
manipulations of the return address, replacing them 1:1 with shadow call
stack pushes and pops is guaranteed to result in the desired behavior.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig            |   9 +
 arch/arm64/Makefile           |  10 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h  |  47 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile    |   2 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S      |   3 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c       |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/module.c    |   8 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/patch-scs.c | 257 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c      |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c     |   4 +
 10 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a9314b684f3c..a5156aca1b24 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -2082,6 +2082,15 @@ config ARCH_NR_GPIO
 
           If unsure, leave the default value.
 
+config UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS
+	bool "Enable shadow call stack dynamically using code patching"
+	# needs Clang with https://reviews.llvm.org/D111780 incorporated
+	depends on CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 150000
+	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL && CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET
+	depends on SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	select UNWIND_TABLES
+	select DYNAMIC_SCS
+
 endmenu # "Kernel Features"
 
 menu "Boot options"
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 4fbca56fa602..e439ebbd167d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -77,10 +77,16 @@ branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=
 # We enable additional protection for leaf functions as there is some
 # narrow potential for ROP protection benefits and no substantial
 # performance impact has been observed.
+PACRET-y := pac-ret+leaf
+
+# Using a shadow call stack in leaf functions is too costly, so avoid PAC there
+# as well when we may be patching PAC into SCS
+PACRET-$(CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS) := pac-ret
+
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL),y)
-branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf+bti
+branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI) := -mbranch-protection=$(PACRET-y)+bti
 else
-branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf
+branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=$(PACRET-y)
 endif
 # -march=armv8.3-a enables the non-nops instructions for PAC, to avoid the
 # compiler to generate them and consequently to break the single image contract
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
index 8297bccf0784..e5726d737e37 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
@@ -24,6 +24,53 @@
 	.endm
 #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
+
+#else
+
+#include <linux/scs.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS
+static inline bool should_patch_pac_into_scs(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We only enable the shadow call stack dynamically if we are running
+	 * on a system that does not implement PAC or BTI. PAC and SCS provide
+	 * roughly the same level of protection, and BTI relies on the PACIASP
+	 * instructions serving as landing pads, preventing us from patching
+	 * those instructions into something else.
+	 */
+	u64 reg = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
+
+	if (reg & ((0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |
+		   (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT)))
+		return false;
+
+	reg = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
+	if (reg & (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR2_APA3_SHIFT))
+		return false;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL)) {
+		reg = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1);
+		if (reg & (0xf << ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT))
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void dynamic_scs_init(void)
+{
+	if (should_patch_pac_into_scs()) {
+		pr_info("Enabling dynamic shadow call stack\n");
+		static_branch_enable(&dynamic_scs_enabled);
+	}
+}
+#else
+static inline void dynamic_scs_init(void) {}
+#endif
+
+int scs_patch(const u8 eh_frame[], int size);
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY __ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_SCS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
index 1add7b01efa7..420b53b24f07 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)		+= pointer_auth.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE)			+= mte.o
 obj-y					+= vdso-wrap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO)		+= vdso32-wrap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS)	+= patch-scs.o
+CFLAGS_patch-scs.o			+= -mbranch-protection=none
 
 # Force dependency (vdso*-wrap.S includes vdso.so through incbin)
 $(obj)/vdso-wrap.o: $(obj)/vdso/vdso.so
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index c300b43659dc..7187a979faba 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -443,6 +443,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__primary_switched)
 #endif
 	mov	x0, x22				// pass FDT address in x0
 	bl	init_feature_override		// Parse cpu feature overrides
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS
+	bl	scs_patch_vmlinux
+#endif
 	mov	x0, x20
 	bl	switch_to_vhe			// Prefer VHE if possible
 	ldp	x29, x30, [sp], #16
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c
index bda49430c9ea..c284ec35c27c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/irq.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static void init_irq_scs(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK))
+	if (!scs_is_enabled())
 		return;
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
index f2d4bb14bfab..111dc6414e6d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module.c
@@ -15,9 +15,11 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/insn.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
 void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
@@ -529,5 +531,11 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
 	if (s)
 		apply_alternatives_module((void *)s->sh_addr, s->sh_size);
 
+	if (scs_is_dynamic()) {
+		s = find_section(hdr, sechdrs, ".init.eh_frame");
+		if (s)
+			scs_patch((void *)s->sh_addr, s->sh_size);
+	}
+
 	return module_init_ftrace_plt(hdr, sechdrs, me);
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/patch-scs.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/patch-scs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1b3da02d5b74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/patch-scs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 - Google LLC
+ * Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@google.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
+
+//
+// This minimal DWARF CFI parser is partially based on the code in
+// arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c, and on the document below:
+// https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/LSB_4.0.0/LSB-Core-generic/LSB-Core-generic/ehframechpt.html
+//
+
+#define DW_CFA_nop                          0x00
+#define DW_CFA_set_loc                      0x01
+#define DW_CFA_advance_loc1                 0x02
+#define DW_CFA_advance_loc2                 0x03
+#define DW_CFA_advance_loc4                 0x04
+#define DW_CFA_offset_extended              0x05
+#define DW_CFA_restore_extended             0x06
+#define DW_CFA_undefined                    0x07
+#define DW_CFA_same_value                   0x08
+#define DW_CFA_register                     0x09
+#define DW_CFA_remember_state               0x0a
+#define DW_CFA_restore_state                0x0b
+#define DW_CFA_def_cfa                      0x0c
+#define DW_CFA_def_cfa_register             0x0d
+#define DW_CFA_def_cfa_offset               0x0e
+#define DW_CFA_def_cfa_expression           0x0f
+#define DW_CFA_expression                   0x10
+#define DW_CFA_offset_extended_sf           0x11
+#define DW_CFA_def_cfa_sf                   0x12
+#define DW_CFA_def_cfa_offset_sf            0x13
+#define DW_CFA_val_offset                   0x14
+#define DW_CFA_val_offset_sf                0x15
+#define DW_CFA_val_expression               0x16
+#define DW_CFA_lo_user                      0x1c
+#define DW_CFA_negate_ra_state              0x2d
+#define DW_CFA_GNU_args_size                0x2e
+#define DW_CFA_GNU_negative_offset_extended 0x2f
+#define DW_CFA_hi_user                      0x3f
+
+extern const u8 __eh_frame_start[], __eh_frame_end[];
+
+enum {
+	PACIASP		= 0xd503233f,
+	AUTIASP		= 0xd50323bf,
+	SCS_PUSH	= 0xf800865e,
+	SCS_POP		= 0xf85f8e5e,
+};
+
+static void __always_inline scs_patch_loc(u64 loc)
+{
+	u32 insn = le32_to_cpup((void *)loc);
+
+	switch (insn) {
+	case PACIASP:
+		*(u32 *)loc = cpu_to_le32(SCS_PUSH);
+		break;
+	case AUTIASP:
+		*(u32 *)loc = cpu_to_le32(SCS_POP);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * While the DW_CFA_negate_ra_state directive is guaranteed to
+		 * appear right after a PACIASP/AUTIASP instruction, it may
+		 * also appear after a DW_CFA_restore_state directive that
+		 * restores a state that is only partially accurate, and is
+		 * followed by DW_CFA_negate_ra_state directive to toggle the
+		 * PAC bit again. So we permit other instructions here, and ignore
+		 * them.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+	dcache_clean_pou(loc, loc + sizeof(u32));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Skip one uleb128/sleb128 encoded quantity from the opcode stream. All bytes
+ * except the last one have bit #7 set.
+ */
+static int __always_inline skip_xleb128(const u8 **opcode, int size)
+{
+	u8 c;
+
+	do {
+		c = *(*opcode)++;
+		size--;
+	} while (c & BIT(7));
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+struct eh_frame {
+	/*
+	 * The size of this frame if 0 < size < U32_MAX, 0 terminates the list.
+	 */
+	u32	size;
+
+	/*
+	 * The first frame is a Common Information Entry (CIE) frame, followed
+	 * by one or more Frame Description Entry (FDE) frames. In the former
+	 * case, this field is 0, otherwise it is the negated offset relative
+	 * to the associated CIE frame.
+	 */
+	u32	cie_id_or_pointer;
+
+	union {
+		struct { // CIE
+			u8	version;
+			u8	augmentation_string[];
+		};
+
+		struct { // FDE
+			s32	initial_loc;
+			s32	range;
+			u8	opcodes[];
+		};
+	};
+};
+
+static int noinstr scs_handle_fde_frame(const struct eh_frame *frame,
+					bool fde_has_augmentation_data,
+					int code_alignment_factor)
+{
+	int size = frame->size - offsetof(struct eh_frame, opcodes) + 4;
+	u64 loc = (u64)offset_to_ptr(&frame->initial_loc);
+	const u8 *opcode = frame->opcodes;
+
+	if (fde_has_augmentation_data) {
+		int l;
+
+		// assume single byte uleb128_t
+		if (WARN_ON(*opcode & BIT(7)))
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+
+		l = *opcode++;
+		opcode += l;
+		size -= l + 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Starting from 'loc', apply the CFA opcodes that advance the location
+	 * pointer, and identify the locations of the PAC instructions.
+	 */
+	while (size-- > 0) {
+		switch (*opcode++) {
+		case DW_CFA_nop:
+		case DW_CFA_remember_state:
+		case DW_CFA_restore_state:
+			break;
+
+		case DW_CFA_advance_loc1:
+			loc += *opcode++ * code_alignment_factor;
+			size--;
+			break;
+
+		case DW_CFA_advance_loc2:
+			loc += *opcode++ * code_alignment_factor;
+			loc += (*opcode++ << 8) * code_alignment_factor;
+			size -= 2;
+			break;
+
+		case DW_CFA_def_cfa:
+		case DW_CFA_offset_extended:
+			size = skip_xleb128(&opcode, size);
+			fallthrough;
+		case DW_CFA_def_cfa_offset:
+		case DW_CFA_def_cfa_offset_sf:
+		case DW_CFA_def_cfa_register:
+		case DW_CFA_same_value:
+		case DW_CFA_restore_extended:
+		case 0x80 ... 0xbf:
+			size = skip_xleb128(&opcode, size);
+			break;
+
+		case DW_CFA_negate_ra_state:
+			scs_patch_loc(loc - 4);
+			break;
+
+		case 0x40 ... 0x7f:
+			// advance loc
+			loc += (opcode[-1] & 0x3f) * code_alignment_factor;
+			break;
+
+		case 0xc0 ... 0xff:
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			pr_err("unhandled opcode: %02x in FDE frame %lx\n", opcode[-1], (uintptr_t)frame);
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int noinstr scs_patch(const u8 eh_frame[], int size)
+{
+	const u8 *p = eh_frame;
+
+	while (size > 4) {
+		const struct eh_frame *frame = (const void *)p;
+		bool fde_has_augmentation_data = true;
+		int code_alignment_factor = 1;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (frame->size == 0 ||
+		    frame->size == U32_MAX ||
+		    frame->size > size)
+			break;
+
+		if (frame->cie_id_or_pointer == 0) {
+			const u8 *p = frame->augmentation_string;
+
+			/* a 'z' in the augmentation string must come first */
+			fde_has_augmentation_data = *p == 'z';
+
+			/*
+			 * The code alignment factor is a uleb128 encoded field
+			 * but given that the only sensible values are 1 or 4,
+			 * there is no point in decoding the whole thing.
+			 */
+			p += strlen(p) + 1;
+			if (!WARN_ON(*p & BIT(7)))
+				code_alignment_factor = *p;
+		} else {
+			ret = scs_handle_fde_frame(frame,
+						   fde_has_augmentation_data,
+						   code_alignment_factor);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		}
+
+		p += sizeof(frame->size) + frame->size;
+		size -= sizeof(frame->size) + frame->size;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+asmlinkage void __init scs_patch_vmlinux(void)
+{
+	if (!should_patch_pac_into_scs())
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ON(scs_patch(__eh_frame_start, __eh_frame_end - __eh_frame_start));
+	icache_inval_all_pou();
+	isb();
+}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
index d20620a1c51a..30f3c7563694 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int init_sdei_scs(void)
 	int cpu;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK))
+	if (!scs_is_enabled())
 		return 0;
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
index d0e6c7a291da..37e0ba95afc3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 
 #include <asm/acpi.h>
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
 #include <asm/kasan.h>
 #include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/smp_plat.h>
@@ -297,6 +299,8 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 	jump_label_init();
 	parse_early_param();
 
+	dynamic_scs_init();
+
 	/*
 	 * Unmask asynchronous aborts and fiq after bringing up possible
 	 * earlycon. (Report possible System Errors once we can report this
-- 
2.35.1


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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support
  2022-07-01 15:27 [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64: implement dynamic shadow call stack for Clang Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2022-07-07 19:35 ` Sami Tolvanen
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Sami Tolvanen @ 2022-07-07 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel; +Cc: linux-arm-kernel, catalin.marinas, will, mark.rutland, maz

Hi Ard,

On Fri, Jul 01, 2022 at 05:27:21PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Generic kernel images such as Android's GKI usually enable all available
> security features, which are typically implemented in such a way that
> they only take effect if the underlying hardware can support it, but
> don't interfere with correct and efficient operation otherwise.
> 
> For shadow call stack support, which is always supported by the
> hardware, it means it will be enabled even if pointer authentication is
> also supported, and enabled for signing return addresses stored on the
> stack. The additional security provided by shadow call stack is only
> marginal in this case, whereas the performance overhead is not.
> 
> Given that return address signing is based on PACIASP/AUTIASP
> instructions that implicitly operate on the return address register
> (X30) and are not idempotent (i.e., each needs to be emitted exactly
> once before the return address is stored on the ordinary stack and after
> it has been retrieved from it), we can convert these instruction 1:1
> into shadow call stack pushes and pops involving the register X30.
> As this is something that can be done at runtime rather than build time,
> we can do this conditionally based on whether or not return address
> signing is supported on the underlying hardware.
> 
> In order to be able to unwind call stacks that involve return address
> signing, whether or not the return address is currently signed is
> tracked by DWARF CFI directives in the unwinding metadata. This means we
> can use this information to locate all PACIASP/AUTIASP instructions in
> the binary, instead of having to use brute force and go over all
> instructions in the entire program.
> 
> This series implements this approach for Clang, which has recently been
> fixed to emit all these CFI directives correctly. This series is based
> on an older PoC sent out last year [0] that targeted GCC only (due to
> this issue). This v3 targets Clang only, as GCC has its own issues with
> CFI accuracy.
> 
> Changes since v3 [1]:
> - rebase onto arm64/for-next/core

Btw, this no longer seems to apply cleanly to for-next/core. I've found
using git format-patch --base=auto helpful when sending patches against
trees that change more frequently.

> - fix init value of dynamic_scs_enabled static key
> - don't discard .eh_frame sections (to work around a bug in an older
>   Clang version if we are keeping them for dynamic SCS patching,
> - print a diagnostic if dynamic SCS patching is enabled,
> - apply build fix suggested by Sami and add his ack to patch #2

Nevertheless, the patches look good to me, and SCS was correctly enabled
on CPUs without PAC support in my testing. For the series:

Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>

Sami

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2022-07-07 19:37 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2022-07-01 15:27 [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Ard Biesheuvel
2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] arm64: unwind: add asynchronous unwind tables to kernel and modules Ard Biesheuvel
2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] scs: add support for dynamic shadow call stacks Ard Biesheuvel
2022-07-01 15:27 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64: implement dynamic shadow call stack for Clang Ard Biesheuvel
2022-07-07 19:35 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: dynamic shadow call stack support Sami Tolvanen

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