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From: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Alexander Graf" <graf@amazon.com>,
	"Forrest Yuan Yu" <yuanyu@google.com>,
	"James Morris" <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"John Andersen" <john.s.andersen@intel.com>,
	"Liran Alon" <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Marian Rotariu" <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Nicușor Cîțu" <nicu.citu@icloud.com>,
	"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Thara Gopinath" <tgopinath@microsoft.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Zahra Tarkhani" <ztarkhani@microsoft.com>,
	"Ștefan Șicleru" <ssicleru@bitdefender.com>,
	dev@lists.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, x86@kernel.org,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, "Wei Liu" <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/9] virt: Implement Heki common code
Date: Mon, 8 May 2023 17:29:41 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZFkxhWhjyIzrPkt8@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230505152046.6575-4-mic@digikod.net>

On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:40PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> Hypervisor Enforced Kernel Integrity (Heki) is a feature that will use
> the hypervisor to enhance guest virtual machine security.
> 
> Configuration
> =============
> 
> Define the config variables for the feature. This feature depends on
> support from the architecture as well as the hypervisor.
> 
> Enabling HEKI
> =============
> 
> Define a kernel command line parameter "heki" to turn the feature on or
> off. By default, Heki is on.

For such a newfangled feature can we have it off by default? Especially
when there are unsolved issues around dynamically loaded code.

> 
[...]
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 3604074a878b..5cf5a7a97811 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ config X86
>  	select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B
>  	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT    if EFI
>  	select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_NO_PATCHABLE
> +	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HEKI		if X86_64

Why is there a restriction on X86_64?

>  
>  config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
>  	def_bool y
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
> index a6e8373a5170..42ef1e33b8a5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
[...]
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
> +
> +/*
> + * Gather all of the statically defined sections so heki_late_init() can
> + * protect these sections in the host page table.
> + *
> + * The sections are defined under "SECTIONS" in vmlinux.lds.S
> + * Keep this array in sync with SECTIONS.
> + */

This seems a bit fragile, because it requires constant attention from
people who care about this functionality. Can this table be
automatically generated?

Thanks,
Wei.

> +struct heki_va_range __initdata heki_va_ranges[] = {
> +	{
> +		.va_start = _stext,
> +		.va_end = _etext,
> +		.attributes = HEKI_ATTR_MEM_NOWRITE | HEKI_ATTR_MEM_EXEC,
> +	},
> +	{
> +		.va_start = __start_rodata,
> +		.va_end = __end_rodata,
> +		.attributes = HEKI_ATTR_MEM_NOWRITE,
> +	},
> +#ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
> +	{
> +		.va_start = __start_orc_unwind_ip,
> +		.va_end = __stop_orc_unwind_ip,
> +		.attributes = HEKI_ATTR_MEM_NOWRITE,
> +	},
> +	{
> +		.va_start = __start_orc_unwind,
> +		.va_end = __stop_orc_unwind,
> +		.attributes = HEKI_ATTR_MEM_NOWRITE,
> +	},
> +	{
> +		.va_start = orc_lookup,
> +		.va_end = orc_lookup_end,
> +		.attributes = HEKI_ATTR_MEM_NOWRITE,
> +	},
> +#endif /* CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC */
> +};
> +

  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-08 17:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-05 15:20 [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 1/9] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops.fault_gva() Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 2/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Add support for prewrite page tracking Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 16:28   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 16:49     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 17:31       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24 20:53         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 3/9] virt: Implement Heki common code Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 17:29   ` Wei Liu [this message]
2023-05-17 12:47     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-05-29 16:03       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 4/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to set EPT permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 16:44   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 17:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 17:17       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 5/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 21:11   ` Wei Liu
2023-05-29 16:48     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-30 23:16       ` Kees Cook
2023-05-30 23:16         ` Kees Cook
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 6/9] KVM: x86: Add Heki hypervisor support Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 21:18   ` Wei Liu
2023-05-26 16:49     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 7/9] KVM: VMX: Add MBEC support Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 8/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Enable guests to lock themselves thanks to MBEC Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 9/9] virt: Add Heki KUnit tests Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-24 21:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Trilok Soni
2023-05-25 13:25   ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-25 18:34     ` Trilok Soni
2023-05-30  9:54       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-24 22:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-25  0:37   ` Trilok Soni
2023-05-25 13:59   ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-25 15:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-25 16:07       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-25 19:16         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-26 15:35       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-26 15:22     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-30 16:23       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
     [not found]         ` <ZHes4a73Zg+6JuFB@google.com>
2023-06-02 15:07           ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-26  2:36 ` James Morris

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