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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wei.liu@kernel.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Alexander Graf" <graf@amazon.com>,
	"Forrest Yuan Yu" <yuanyu@google.com>,
	"James Morris" <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"John Andersen" <john.s.andersen@intel.com>,
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Marian Rotariu" <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Nicușor Cîțu" <nicu.citu@icloud.com>,
	"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Thara Gopinath" <tgopinath@microsoft.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Zahra Tarkhani" <ztarkhani@microsoft.com>,
	"Ștefan Șicleru" <ssicleru@bitdefender.com>,
	dev@lists.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, x86@kernel.org,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 5/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 16:16:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202305301614.BF8D80D3D5@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <901ff104-215c-8e81-fbae-5ecd8fa94449@digikod.net>

On Mon, May 29, 2023 at 06:48:03PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> 
> On 08/05/2023 23:11, Wei Liu wrote:
> > On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of
> > > X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE
> > > and X86_CR4_CET flags.
> > > 
> > > The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments.  The first
> > > is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to
> > > pin (i.e. mark as read-only).
> > > 
> > > These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once
> > > compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is
> > > not the case with this dedicated hypercall.
> > > 
> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> > > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> > > Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net
> > [...]
> > >   	hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
> > >   	if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu))
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > @@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
> > >   	return value;
> > >   }
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
> > > +
> > > +extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask;
> > > +
> > 
> > Can this be moved to a header file?
> 
> Yep, but I'm not sure which one. Any preference Kees?

Uh, er, I was never expecting that mask to be non-static. ;) To that
end, how about putting it in arch/x86/kvm/x86.h ?

-- 
Kees Cook

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Nicușor Cîțu" <nicu.citu@icloud.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"John Andersen" <john.s.andersen@intel.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Wei Liu" <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "James Morris" <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Marian Rotariu" <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	"Forrest Yuan Yu" <yuanyu@google.com>,
	dev@lists.cloudhypervisor.org,
	"Thara Gopinath" <tgopinath@microsoft.com>,
	"Ștefan Șicleru" <ssicleru@bitdefender.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Zahra Tarkhani" <ztarkhani@microsoft.com>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Graf" <graf@amazon.com>,
	"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 5/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 16:16:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202305301614.BF8D80D3D5@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <901ff104-215c-8e81-fbae-5ecd8fa94449@digikod.net>

On Mon, May 29, 2023 at 06:48:03PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> 
> On 08/05/2023 23:11, Wei Liu wrote:
> > On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of
> > > X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE
> > > and X86_CR4_CET flags.
> > > 
> > > The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments.  The first
> > > is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to
> > > pin (i.e. mark as read-only).
> > > 
> > > These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once
> > > compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is
> > > not the case with this dedicated hypercall.
> > > 
> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> > > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> > > Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net
> > [...]
> > >   	hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
> > >   	if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu))
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > @@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
> > >   	return value;
> > >   }
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
> > > +
> > > +extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask;
> > > +
> > 
> > Can this be moved to a header file?
> 
> Yep, but I'm not sure which one. Any preference Kees?

Uh, er, I was never expecting that mask to be non-static. ;) To that
end, how about putting it in arch/x86/kvm/x86.h ?

-- 
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
Virtualization mailing list
Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization

  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-30 23:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-05 15:20 [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 1/9] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops.fault_gva() Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 2/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Add support for prewrite page tracking Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 16:28   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 16:49     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 17:31       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24 20:53         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 3/9] virt: Implement Heki common code Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 17:29   ` Wei Liu
2023-05-17 12:47     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-05-29 16:03       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 4/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to set EPT permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 16:44   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 17:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 17:17       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 5/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 21:11   ` Wei Liu
2023-05-29 16:48     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-30 23:16       ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-05-30 23:16         ` Kees Cook
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 6/9] KVM: x86: Add Heki hypervisor support Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 21:18   ` Wei Liu
2023-05-26 16:49     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 7/9] KVM: VMX: Add MBEC support Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 8/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Enable guests to lock themselves thanks to MBEC Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 9/9] virt: Add Heki KUnit tests Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-24 21:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Trilok Soni
2023-05-25 13:25   ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-25 18:34     ` Trilok Soni
2023-05-30  9:54       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-24 22:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-25  0:37   ` Trilok Soni
2023-05-25 13:59   ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-25 15:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-25 16:07       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-25 19:16         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-26 15:35       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-26 15:22     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-30 16:23       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
     [not found]         ` <ZHes4a73Zg+6JuFB@google.com>
2023-06-02 15:07           ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-26  2:36 ` James Morris

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